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Religious Institutions, the No-Harm Doctrine,
and the Public Good
Marci A. Hamilton ∗
[When] principles break out into overt acts against peace and good
order [it is the] rightful purpose[] of civil government, for its officers to
interfere.
†

Thomas Jefferson

[F]or such actions as are prejudicial to the interests of others, the
individual is accountable, and may be subjected either to social or to
legal punishments, if society is of opinion that the one or the other is
requisite for its protection.
John Stuart Mill‡

Our cases do not at their farthest reach support the proposition that a
stance of conscientious opposition relieves an objector from any colliding
duty fixed by a democratic government.
Employment Division v. Smith §

∗ Paul R. Verkuil Chair in Public Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva
University. Thanks to my commentators, Ronald Garet and Mark Tushnet, and the
participants of the Church Autonomy Conference held at Brigham Young University,
especially Fred Gedicks and William Marshall. I also thank the Faculty Workshop at Hofstra
University School of Law and Angela Carmella, Erwin Chemerinsky, Philip Hamburger, Scott
Shapiro, and Lawrence Stratton for their helpful comments. I am deeply indebted to my
hardworking and outstanding research assistants Jodi Erickson, Vivek Jayaram, Andrew
Kopelman, Leo Mikityanskiy, and in particular, Rachel Steamer.
† An Act for Establishing Religious Freedom, 1785, in 12 STATUTES AT LARGE: BEING
A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA 84, 85 (photo. reprint 1969) (William Waller
Hening ed., Richmond 1823).
‡ ON LIBERTY 87 (David Spitz ed., 1975).
§ 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gillette v.
United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461 (1971)).
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I. INTRODUCTION
The only legitimate goal of a republican form of government is
the public good, and the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights,
sits firmly under this horizon.1 If the public good is the end of
government, all laws should contribute to the public good. The
question this Article addresses is how to incorporate religious liberty
into a system that is aimed at the public good. This Article situates
the religion clauses in this constitutional context and answers that
two principles define the parameters of religious liberty: (1) religious
belief must be absolutely protected, and (2) religious conduct that
harms others must be capable of being regulated. This second
concept, which I call the no-harm rule, has become entrenched in
Anglo-American culture after centuries of experience with religion as
sovereign, separate ecclesiastical courts and legal spheres, and legal
immunities. Each of those regimes has been rejected, because
religious entities have not been unwavering servants of the public
good.
This Article’s focus on regulating harm caused by religious
entities may well seem perverse in the United States, because
“[t]here is a long history in this country of religion being reduced to
2
Sunday school morality in service of the common good.” The
reality, however, is that religious entities, like all other human

1. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT §§ 131, 135 (C.B.
Macpherson ed., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1980) (1690); see also CHARLES LOUIS DE SECONDAT &
BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, 1 THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 43–47 (J.V. Pritchard ed., Thomas
Nugent trans., Rothman & Co. 1991) (1748). See generally M.N.S. SELLERS, REPUBLICAN
LEGAL THEORY: THE HISTORY, CONSTITUTION, AND PURPOSE OF LAW IN A FREE STATE
(2003); M.N.S. SELLERS, THE SACRED FIRE OF LIBERTY: REPUBLICANISM, LIBERALISM, AND
THE LAW (1998) [hereinafter SELLERS, SACRED FIRE]. This republican principle is not limited
to political theory; it also appears in Catholic Social Thought and in reformed theology. See
infra Part III.C. The construction of the public good is a complex amalgam of history,
religion, and culture. It is important to point out early in this Article, that it is not a purely
secular construct. See William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism,
58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308, 317 (1991) (“[T]he religious background of society will influence
the nature of the state interest.”). Indeed, no element of the United States’ constitutional
order is far removed from religious precepts and influences. See, e.g., Marci A. Hamilton, Direct
Democracy and the Protestant Ethic, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 411 (2004) [hereinafter
Hamilton, Direct Democracy]; Marci A. Hamilton, Why the People Do Not Rule (Aug. 2004)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
2. Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Religious Freedom and the Rule of Law: Exporting
Modernity in a Postmodern World, 22 MISS. C. L. REV. 173, 174 (2003).
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institutions, are capable of great harm to others, and the fact that
their conduct is religiously motivated does not alter the fact of the
harm. Like every other human institution, they are capable of being
tempted to abuse their power. Fortunately, the Framers were a
pragmatic and disillusioned group that instilled into the United
States’ republican form of government a healthy distrust of any
entity that holds power. The Constitution grants limited powers to
each branch of government and pits governing powers against each
4
other to limit their overreaching. The mechanism that restrains
private entities and fosters their social responsibility is the rule of
5
law. When it comes to the public good, the rule of law needs to
govern religious institutions, just as it does other private entities.
Since its inception, the United States’ constitutional system has
6
been one of ordered liberty, not license. Accordingly, the principles
of republicanism have informed the Supreme Court’s Religion
Clause7 jurisprudence, with the Court in the vast majority of cases
requiring obedience to legislative determinations of the public good,
unless there is evidence of animus or hostility towards religion.8
3. A more elaborate treatment of the harm that religious entities render can be found
in MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND RULE OF LAW (forthcoming
2005).
4. See Marci A. Hamilton, The Calvinist Paradox of Distrust and Hope at the
Constitutional Convention, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT (Michael W.
McConnell et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES]; see also Hamilton, Direct
Democracy, supra note 1, at 456–57.
5. See DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION 13 (1997) (“Under the
rule of law, citizens automatically have ‘rights,’ . . . [which are] the logical corollaries of
justiciable restraints on private and public action . . . .”); Michel Rosenfeld, The Rule of Law
and the Legitimacy of Constitutional Democracy, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1307, 1345–46 (2001).
6. Ordered liberty has been remarkable in engendering a robust and pluralistic
religious culture. See William P. Marshall, What Is the Matter with Equality? An Assessment of
the Equal Treatment of Religion and Nonreligion in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 75 IND.
L.J. 193, 216–17 (2000); see also DIANA L. ECK, A NEW RELIGIOUS AMERICA: HOW A
“CHRISTIAN COUNTRY” HAS NOW BECOME THE WORLD’S MOST RELIGIOUSLY DIVERSE
NATION (2001).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”).
8. See Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307, 1315 (2004) (holding that in the absence of
“hostility” or “animus” toward religion, a state’s denial of funding for vocational religious
instruction in order to avoid establishment is constitutional); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507, 514 (1997) (“[N]eutral, generally applicable laws may be applied to religious
practices even when not supported by a compelling governmental interest.”); Church of the
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“There is one condition attached to all exercises of freedom: that the
use of the freedom will not breach minimal responsibilities owed to
the larger society as those responsibilities are embodied in legitimate
laws.”9 This principle is as valid for religious entities as it is for
nonreligious entities.
The corollary—that religious persecution is unconstitutional—
can also be analyzed as part of the republican matrix. Religious
persecution shifts the focus from the public good to a single entity.
The legislature’s responsibility to engage in a broad-ranging
examination of the public good has been subverted by prejudice,
ignorance, or both.10 Thus, the rule against religious persecution
does not stand outside the republican form of government, but
rather contributes to it.
Yet, theoreticians of the First Amendment at times fail to advert
to this larger, republican calculus. Instead, the focus of free exercise
and even disestablishment theories is too often on the religious
entities themselves, as though their well-being is an adequate proxy
for the general public good.11 This focus on religious entities and
their corresponding interests alone is myopic and antidemocratic.
The needs of religious entities and the public good are not
necessarily equivalent.12 Constitutional analysis is therefore inevitably
faced with the question of how to square religious liberty with the
public good.

Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993) (“[A] law targeting
religious beliefs as such is never permissible . . . if the object of a law is to infringe upon or
restrict practices because of their religious motivation, the law is not neutral.” (internal
citations omitted)); Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878–79 (1990) (“We have
never held that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise
valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate. On the contrary, the record of
more than a century of our free exercise jurisprudence contradicts that proposition.”).
9. Angela C. Carmella, The Protection of Children and Young People: Catholic and
Constitutional Visions of Responsible Freedom, 44 B.C. L. REV. 1031, 1044 (2003).
10. The best example of this phenomenon can be found in the Court’s discussion of the
City of Hialeah’s efforts to rid itself of the Santerians. See Church of Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 534–
40.
11. See, e.g., Kathleen Brady, Religious Organizations and Free Exercise: The Surprising
Lessons of Smith, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1633; Carl H. Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment: The
Church-State Settlement in the Early American Republic, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1385.
12. See generally Marci A. Hamilton, Religion, the Rule of Law, and the Good of the
Whole: A View from the Clergy, 18 J.L. & POL. 387, 437 (2002).

1102

2HAM-FIN

1099]

12/1/2004 7:29 PM

Religious Institutions and the No-Harm Doctrine

Scholars and religious entities have suggested two paths to
achieve religious liberty. One is judicial, and the other is legislative.
Some have suggested that religious entities have a right to obtain
13
exemptions from generally applicable, neutral laws in the courts. In
the face of a long tradition of treating religious actors as responsible
social actors that must obey laws governing conduct, the Court
experimented with this approach between 1963 and 1990, during
which it subjected some general, neutral laws to strict scrutiny,
14
thereby rendering those laws presumptively unconstitutional. The
doctrine required the courts to determine whether the conduct
burdened by the law was central to the believer’s religious universe
and then to assess whether the government had a compelling interest
in the purpose of the law. The first inquiry would appear to be a
violation of the Establishment Clause, with courts put in the position
of assessing religious doctrine. The second put the judiciary in the
position of second-guessing legislative judgment, as opposed to
identifying invidious discrimination or religious persecution.
Normally, when strict scrutiny is applied in the constitutional arena,
it is because the law bears indicia of unconstitutional purposes—and
therefore the courts need to look closely at the law to determine
whether in fact the Constitution was violated. In these cases, the
court was addressing neutral, generally applicable laws that bore no
outward indication of any improper legislative purpose. The strict
scrutiny operated not to smoke out constitutionally suspect
purposes, but rather to place the religious entity in a position
generally superior to the law.
The approach was intolerable, however, because it threatened to
make religious entities laws unto themselves and to undermine the
rule of law, and therefore only a handful of neutral, generally
applicable laws were subject to strict scrutiny. In 1990, the Court
13. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free
Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1415 (1990) (“[C]onstitutionally compelled
exemptions were within the contemplation of the framers and ratifiers as a possible
interpretation of the free exercise clause.”).
14. Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 832–33 (1989)
(unemployment compensation); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136,
139–41 (1987) (same); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707,
716–17 (1981) (same); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (compulsory
education); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402–03 (1963) (unemployment compensation).
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definitively rejected the approach in favor of general application of
15
the laws governing conduct to religious entities. In response,
religious entities urged Congress to pass the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA), which made all laws in the United States
16
that substantially burdened religious entities presumptively illegal.
At least as applied to state law, RFRA was held invalid in 1997, and
the approach remains only in the small number of states that have
17
passed state-level RFRAs and as applied to federal law. The
religious entities’ preferred means of securing religious liberty
weighed the religious interest considerably more than the public
good and came into serious conflict with the no-harm principle.
The second path religious entities have followed is to lobby the
federal and state legislatures to obtain exemptions from generally
18
applicable, neutral laws. They have been quite successful. Under a
republican form of government, this second approach is more
15. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S 872, 878–79 (1990).
16. Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it
demonstrates that application of the burden to the person:
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1(b) (1993).
17. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997) (“The substantial costs RFRA
exacts, both in practical terms of imposing a heavy litigation burden on the States and in terms
of curtailing their traditional general regulatory power, far exceed any pattern or practice of
unconstitutional conduct under the Free Exercise Clause as interpreted in Smith.”); see also
Alan E. Brownstein, State RFRA Statutes and Freedom of Speech, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 605,
644 (1999) (describing state RFRAs). Brownstein also compiled a helpful list of state RFRAs:
Alabama Religious Freedom Amendment, S. 604, 1998 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 1998); New
Jersey Religious Freedom Act, A. 903, 208th Leg., 1998 Sess. (N.J. 1998); New
Jersey Religious Freedom Restoration Act, S. 321, 208th Leg., 1998 Sess. (N.J.
1998); Virginia Religious Freedom Protection Act, H.R. 668, 1998 Sess. (Va.
1998); Religious Freedom Protection Act, A. 1617, 1997–98 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1997)
(vetoed following enactment); Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1998, H.R.
3201, 1998 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1997); Religious Freedom Restoration Act, H.R. 2370,
90th Leg., 1997–98 Reg. Sess. (Ill. 1997); Religious Freedom Restoration Act, S.
1591, 90th Leg., 1997–98 Reg. Sess. (Ill. 1997); Michigan Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, H.R. 4376, 89th Leg., 1997 Reg. Sess. (Mich. 1997); Religious
Freedom, H.R. 1470, 155th Leg., 2d Sess. (N.H. 1997); Religious Freedom
Restoration, S. 5673, 220th Leg., 1997–98 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1997); Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-80.1–3 (R.I. 1997); South Carolina
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, H.R. 5045, 112th Leg., 1997 Reg. Sess. (S.C.
1997).
Id. n.4.
18. Many of these exemptions are detailed in HAMILTON, supra note 3.
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legitimate, because the legislature is the most competent branch to
consider and determine the public good. But while this approach is
more sound theoretically, it has been implemented in an imperfect
manner. The lobbying for religious exemptions has tended to occur
behind closed doors, and legislators have been inclined to consider
only the religious entity’s interest, rather than the larger public good.
The problem is that legislatures have abdicated the public interest in
favor of religious interests. In effect, the legislatures have acted as
rubber stamps for religious interests, rather than as an independent
body responsible for assessing and serving the public good. In a
properly functioning republican system, the legislature weighs the
claim for religious liberty against the harm that will ensue if an
exemption is granted.
The liberty that is consonant with the public good is ordered
liberty,19 which takes into account both liberty and the public good.
19. This is true in the history leading up to the Constitution, and in Supreme Court
case law across the spectrum of constitutional topics. See POLITICAL SERMONS OF THE
AMERICAN FOUNDING ERA 1730–1805 (Ellis Sandoz ed., 1991); Elisha Williams, The
Essential Rights and Liberties of Protestants, reprinted in POLITICAL SERMONS OF THE
AMERICAN FOUNDING ERA, 1730–1805, supra (urging obedience to laws involving “those
things which are the objects of the civil magistrate’s power, viz. the civil interests of the
people” but not on “matters of religion”); see also Boerne, 521 U.S. at 539–41 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (“Religious exercise shall be permitted so long as it does not violate general laws
governing conduct.”) (citing the Maryland Act Concerning Religion of 1649, negating a license
to act in a manner “unfaithful to the Lord Proprietary”; the Rhode Island Charter of 1663,
requiring people to “behave” in other than a “peaceable and quiet” manner; the earliest New
York, Maryland, and Georgia Constitutions, prohibiting interference with the “peace [and]
safety of the State”; the first New Hampshire Constitution, forbidding anyone from
“disturb[ing] the public peace”; and the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, prohibiting citizens
from “demean[ing]” oneself in other than a “peaceable and orderly manner”); BERNARD
BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 77 (1967) [hereinafter
BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS] (“Liberty, that is, was the capacity to exercise ‘natural rights’
within limits set, not by the mere will or desire of men in power but by non-arbitrary law—law
enacted by legislatures containing within them the proper balance of forces.”); GORDON S.
WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–87 (1969) [hereinafter WOOD,
THE CREATION]. The importance of “ordered liberty” in Supreme Court jurisprudence cannot
be overstated. See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180 (2003); Chavez v. Martinez, 538
U.S. 760, 774–75 (2003); Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 667 n.7 (2001); County of
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 (1998); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
720–25 (1997); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356–57 (1997); O’Dell v. Netherland,
521 U.S. 151, 157 (1997); Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 429 (1996); Goeke v.
Branch, 514 U.S. 115, 120 (1995); Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 345, 352, 360 (1993);
Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 478 (1993); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 134–36,
150–54 (1992); Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 22, 36 (1990); Butler v.
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Ordered religious liberty in the United States is grounded in
pragmatic experience,20 the history of abandoned religious privileges
in Britain,21 and the early Americans’ experience of religious tyranny
in Europe, all of which were viewed through the lens of the framing
generation’s Protestant worldview.22 There was a time when
churches did have autonomy from the law, and when the rights of
religious institutions and their clergy were above those of ordinary
citizens, but that was hundreds of years ago—before the common
law was entrenched and before the creation of the United States.
The current revelations of worldwide sexual abuse of children by
clergy, when combined with the concomitant secret knowledge of
their individual religious institutions reinforces what the Founders of
this country knew in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries:

McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 416, 427 (1990); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370, 392
(1989); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 307, 309, 311, 313–14 (1989); Yates v. Aiken, 484
U.S. 211, 215 (1988); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 744–47 (1987); Memphis
Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 (1986); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 702–
04, 729–31 (1986); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 680 & n.8 (1985); Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758, 769, 777, 787 (1985);
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357–58, 363 (1983); Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494, 499, 501–02, 504 n.10 (1977); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 665, 672–
75 (1977); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 n.3 (1977); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,
483 (1976); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 444 (1976); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693,
701–04, 710–14 (1976); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340–41, 384–85, 401–
02 (1974); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65–66, 79 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 152 (1973); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972); Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 453–54 (1971); Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 655 n.7,
666 (1971) (plurality opinion); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 150 n.14 (1968); Tehan
v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 414 n.12, 417 n.17 (1966); Ker v. California,
374 U.S. 23, 31 n.7 (1963); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342–43 (1963); Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 650 (1961); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 213–15 (1960);
Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 274–75 (1960) (per curiam); Napue v. Illinois, 360
U.S. 264, 269 (1959); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 127, 151 n.2 (1959); Leland v.
Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 801, 803–04 (1952); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169–70
(1952); Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 119–20 (1951); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77,
87–94 (1949); Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 649–53, 659, 663 (1948); Screws v. United
States, 325 U.S. 91, 95–97 (1945); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325–28 (1937)
(wherein Justice Cardozo coined the phrase).
20. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes put it best when he said that the “life of the law has
not been logic: it has been experience.” OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1
(1881). That is perhaps most true in the ongoing struggle to find the proper balance between
the two most authoritative structures of human existence, religion and the state.
21. See infra Part I.A.
22. See infra Part I.B.
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religious entities often will abuse what power they have.23 To set
aside the law for them without consideration of the public good is to
choose liberty at the expense of order and to make society
responsible for the harm religious institutions can cause. To be sure,
religious institutions are no different from any other individual or
institution on this score—all are human entities—but there has been
a tendency in recent decades to forget or suppress this principle
when it comes to religious entities.
The drive to avoid the law by contemporary religious entities is
not a new development, but it is an anachronistic one. There was a
time in Western culture when established religious entities were
sovereign and the clergy occupied a favored category under the law,
and it would have come as no surprise to anyone that the institution
was immune to the requirements of the law and that clergy were
relieved of its requirements while all other citizens were not.24 For
example, a citizen could be put to death for raping a child, for
example, while a clergy member could commit the same crime and
be sentenced to a year at a monastery.25 That, however, was centuries
ago. Since the twelfth century, when the concept of the common law
was first introduced by Henry II, the justifications for that special
treatment have become increasingly hollow.26 The logic of Henry
II’s attempts to place clergy under the same justice system as all
others was ineluctable: the victim of rape or murder by a clergy
member is just as injured as the victim of an ordinary citizen, though
it took centuries for Henry’s intended reforms to be fully effected.
The internal logic of the common law, which has been worked
out through Anglo-American history, has brought the United States
to the understanding that the public good requires the deterrence
and punishment of harmful actions, regardless of the identity of the
actor. As the Court announced in its first free exercise case, well over
a century ago, “Can a man excuse his practices to the contrary
because of his religious belief? To permit this would be to make the
professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land,

23.
24.
25.
26.

See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part II.A.2.
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and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.”27
This principle was reiterated by the Court when it stated in 1971 and
then again in 1990 that “[o]ur cases do not at their farthest reach
support the proposition that a stance of conscientious opposition
relieves an objector from any colliding duty fixed by a democratic
government.”28 The “vast majority” of free exercise cases have
recognized the principle that religious entities are subject to
generally applicable, neutral laws,29 because otherwise the public
good will be sacrificed.
This is not to say that every religious institution has conceded its
obligation to obey the secular law or that the logic of the common
law has met no resistance. When the Supreme Court reiterated in
Employment Division v. Smith the familiar doctrine that the rule of
law applies to religious entities, the response by religious entities—
spurred on by law professors—was to publicly proclaim their right to
act above generally applicable, neutral laws.30 Their outcry resulted in
RFRA.31 RFRA was a brash repudiation of the principle that laws
governing conduct apply to United States citizens, regardless of
identity, whether that identity is based on religion, or race, or
gender. It was Congress’s most expansive benefit for religion in
United States history, and in City of Boerne v. Flores,32 the Court held
RFRA unconstitutional as applied to the states because it was beyond
Congress’s power.33 In that decision, the Court also adhered to the

27. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–67 (1879). The Reynolds principle has
been reiterated in Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990), and Sch. Dist. of
Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 249 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
28. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461 (1971), quoted in Smith, 494 U.S. at
882.
29. Smith, 494 U.S. at 885; see also Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise Exemption and Religious
Institutions: The Case of Employment Discrimination, 67 B.U. L. REV. 391, 402 (1987)
(“[O]ur law frequently and presumptively rejects arguments designed to shield from public
and judicial view the internal behavior of significant institutions.”).
30. Hundreds of pages in the Congressional Record castigated the Supreme Court for
presuming to hold that generally applicable, neutral laws apply to religious entities. City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530–31 (1997); see also Petitioner’s Brief at 36–37, Boerne
(No. 95-2074).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3 (1994) (“[RLUIPA] applies to all Federal law, and the
implementation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and whether adopted before or
after November 16, 1993.”).
32. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
33. Id. at 536.
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rule that unless a legislature indicates otherwise, every person,
including every religious person, will be governed by generally
applicable, neutral laws.34
The most coherent reading of the Supreme Court’s Religion
Clause cases shows that there is no defensible rule that would permit
a religious defense to laws that govern conduct injuring third
parties.35 There is an absolute right to believe,36 but at the same time
there can be no constitutional right to harm others in the name of
religion.37 If a legitimate legislature has duly enacted a law that
34. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. The Supreme Court specifically addressed “neutral law[s] of
general applicability” in Smith, id. at 879, but the principle undergirding the decision was the
rule of law—the principle that laws apply neutrally to all and that, therefore, the arbitrary
decisions of individual government decisionmakers may not rule. In the interest of full
disclosure, I represented the City of Boerne before the Supreme Court.
35. While this is true of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence and is a view, in my
experience, that American citizens hold generally, it is not held by some participants of this
conference. See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, The Voluntary Principle and Church Autonomy, Then
and Now, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1593; Esbeck, supra note 11; Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle,
Sexual Misconduct and Ecclesiastical Immunity, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1789.
36. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 877 (“The free exercise of religion means, first and foremost,
the right to believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires.”); Thomas v. Review
Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981) (“[R]eligious beliefs need not
be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First
Amendment protection.”); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 372 (1970) (White, J.,
dissenting); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184 (1965) (“The validity of what [the
conscientious objector] believes cannot be questioned.”); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 443 (1961) (“No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs
or disbeliefs.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S.
1, 15–16 (1947)); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303–04 (1940) (“Thus the
Amendment embraces two concepts,—freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is
absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be.”); see also Wooley v. Maynard, 430
U.S. 705 (1977) (invalidating the compelled display of a license plate slogan that offended
individual religious beliefs); W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 634 (1943)
(invalidating a statute requiring school children to salute the U.S. flag during the Pledge of
Allegiance, and noting that “[t]o sustain the compulsory flag salute we are required to say that
a Bill of Rights which guards the individual’s right to speak his own mind, left it open to public
authorities to compel him to utter what is not in his mind”).
37. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 878–79 (“[A]n individual’s religious beliefs [do not] excuse
him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to
regulate.”); Minersville Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594 (1940)
(“Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle for religious toleration,
relieved the individual from obedience to a general law not aimed at the promotion or
restriction of religious beliefs.”); Reynolds v. United States, 494 U.S. 145, 167 (1878). Smith
opened the door for legislators to create exemptions for religious entities, but there is no
constitutional requirement of accommodation. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882 (“Oregon’s drug law
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makes certain conduct illegal because it harms particular individuals
or the public as a whole, that determination cannot be overturned in
the courts by claims that the motivation for the illegal conduct was
religious. Nor can it be overturned based on the contention that the
religious institution is naturally autonomous from the law.38 The noharm principle is at the core of the Court’s Religion Clause
jurisprudence.
“Church autonomy,” the focus of this Conference, simply does
not make sense in the context of the larger republican theory of the
Constitution. “Republican liberty signifies government in pursuit of
the common good, when no citizen is subject to the unfettered will
39
of another.” Yet church autonomy would permit religious entities
to avoid being legally accountable for the harm they have caused.
While this is not the article to provide an extended discussion of
republicanism in the United States, a brief history should help the
reader to understand the explanation of the religion clauses in this
Article. Prior to the Constitutional Convention, the American
experiment in government was a failure. Neither the Declaration of
Independence nor the Articles of Confederation generated
governing structures that had the capacity to serve the public good.
The Declaration established thirteen states that were separate from
Great Britain. Under the Articles, this federation of states was
incapable of being coordinated to serve the larger good. At the same
time, the state legislatures became vortices of corruption and
40
unresponsive to the public crises of the day. The Framers gathered
because a more suitable government was necessary, and the focus of
the debate was on how to stem the human impulse to abuse power
41
to the detriment of the people’s interest. The Constitution’s

represents an attempt to regulate religious beliefs . . . [however], ‘[o]ur cases do not at their
farthest reach support the proposition that a stance of conscientious opposition relieves an
objector from any colliding duty fixed by a democratic government.’” (quoting Gillette v.
United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461 (1971))).
38. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 882.
39. SELLERS, SACRED FIRE supra note 1, at 100.
40. See Hamilton, Direct Democracy, supra note 1, at 421–22.
41. See BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS, supra note 19, at 57–60; WOOD, THE
CREATION, supra note 19, at 135; see also Hamilton, Direct Democracy, supra note 1, at 421.
See generally Marci A. Hamilton, The Calvinist Paradox of Distrust and Hope at the
Constitutional Convention, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 4, at 294–306.
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representative structure was chosen and crafted for the purpose of
42
making representatives accountable to the public good.
“Autonomy,” which means that an institution holds “[t]he right
of self-government, of making its own laws and administering its
own affairs,”43 stands in stark contrast to the relationship between
citizens and the public good contemplated by republicanism. As
participants in this Conference have used the term at times, and at
base, autonomy means that the entity creates its own legal universe.
That is a notion that cannot be reconciled with the entrenched
principle of ordered liberty embodied in the United States’
republican system.44 There is no legitimate independent legal
universe and no entity that exists completely divorced from the
society. A purely libertarian state is an abstraction, because humans
live as a society, which entails the inevitability that one entity may
harm another.45 John Stuart Mill explained it as follows: “Though
society is not founded on a contract . . . the fact of living in society

42. See SELLERS, SACRED FIRE, supra note 1, at 39–40 (discussing historical influences
on the framing generation’s choice of a republican form of representative government and
concluding they chose it because “[t]his conception of liberty as subjection to equal laws made
by common consent, for the general welfare, maintained the old republican connection
between political rights and substantive freedom”); WOOD, THE CREATION, supra note 19, at
164 (“Only with the presence of the democracy in the Constitution [through an elected
legislature] could any government remain faithful to the public good.”); Hamilton, Why the
People Do Not Rule, supra note 1, at 43 (discussing Calvin’s influence on the Framers, and
Calvin’s notion that “[r]epresentatives were to be watched by the people and tethered to their
common good, yet they bore the independent duty to make decisions serving the people on
behalf of God”).
43. 1 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 807 (2d ed. 1989).
44. The Establishment Clause reinforces the fact that limitations are necessary for
religious institutions. “The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, coupled with the
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of ordered liberty, preclude both the Nation and the
States from making any law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof.” Wallace v. Jafree, 472 U.S. 38, 67–68 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(holding an Alabama statute requiring a moment of silence at the start of each school day
unconstitutional).
45. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 142 (Mark Goldie ed., 1993)
[hereinafter LOCKE, TWO TREATISES]. Locke explained:
[T]he end of law is not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve and enlarge freedom.
For in all the states of created beings, capable of laws, where there is no law there is
no freedom. For liberty is to be free from restraint and violence from others, which
cannot be where there is no law . . . .
Id.
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renders it indispensable that each should be bound to observe a
46
certain line of conduct toward the rest.” Once one comes to
understand the no-harm rule (and its distinguished pedigree),
autonomy, or immunity, of any institution—including religious
institutions—from the rule of law becomes intolerable.47
“Church autonomy” is not and should not be a doctrine
recognized in the United States. In fact, the Supreme Court has
never recognized a doctrine of “church autonomy,” notwithstanding
the title of this Conference or the use of the term in other articles.48
It is an unfortunate term that does not begin to describe the actual
or proper relationship between religious institutions and the law and
was ill-chosen when it was coined by a 1952 New York appellate
court, not for the purpose of immunizing religious institutions from
legal accountability, but ironically rather for the purpose of
explaining that courts may investigate ecclesiastical questions when
“necessary . . . to determine the civil or property rights of the
parties.”49 The Supreme Court has never used the phrase to describe
46. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 70 (David Spitz ed., 1975).
47. Religious institutions and individuals come into conflict with many general laws,
including child abuse laws, medical neglect laws, zoning laws, prison regulations,
antidiscrimination laws, fair housing laws, breach-of-the-peace laws, among others. The scope
of the potential harm to the public good arising from the breach of such laws is enormous. See,
e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of
Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990) (showing that the religious organization made no showing
that sales tax imposed a substantial burden on religious beliefs); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S.
599 (1961) (upholding a statute that proscribed retail sales on Sunday); Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879); Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 351 (Fla. 2002) (“[T]he First
Amendment does not provide a shield behind which a church may avoid liability for harm
caused to an adult and a child parishioner arising from the alleged sexual assault or battery by
one of its clergy . . . .”); Lundman v. McKown, 530 N.W.2d 807 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995)
(holding that a church’s appeal of compensatory damages awarded in the case of an elevenyear-old boy who died from medical neglect did not succeed on a First Amendment theory).
48. See generally, Brady, supra note 11; Esbeck, supra note 11; Lupu & Tuttle, supra
note 35. Professor Lupu has written a very insightful article arguing that church autonomy is
indefensible in the discrimination context. Lupu, supra note 29, at 401 (noting that in the
context of discrimination claims, religious “institutions engaged in constitutionally protected
activities are entitled to no special autonomy rights by virtue of their function”).
49. Cadman Mem’l Congregation Soc’y of Brooklyn v. Kenyon, 279 A.D. 1015 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1952). In Cadman, the court explained:
In controversies such as this, ecclesiastical or doctrinal questions may be inquired
into only insofar as it may be necessary to do so to determine the civil or property
rights of the parties. . . . The court’s jurisdiction is clearly established and a definite
question is laid before us for determination. . . . I am not, however, in entire accord
with the determination of the trial court. The Congregational Christian Church
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its jurisprudence,50 and it appears in the Supreme Court’s cases only
twice, solely as footnote references to law review articles.51 The
phrase was delivered to the academic mainstream in 1981 by
Douglas Laycock, who popularized the use of the phrase in his
article, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of
Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy.52 While
some have tried to transform the phrase into a notion of church
freedom from the law, such an interpretation has not gained traction
in the courts, which is as it should be.
The courts have not approached the issue of religious
institutional liability or responsibility from the standpoint of rightful
autonomy, but rather have divided cases involving religious
institutions into three categories that have been crafted in light of
the larger principles of republicanism, order, and liberty.
The courts’ religious institution jurisprudence can be summed up
under three fundamental principles: First, religious individuals and
institutions are absolutely protected in the creation and observance
of their beliefs, including self-governance that is driven by
ecclesiology.53 Following this principle, the Court has declined
jurisdiction over “solely” ecclesiastical disputes, that is,

(using the name collectively) is admitted to be one in which each individual church
is completely autonomous. There is no hierarchy or single ecclesiastical authority
beyond it to which it owes obedience. While through the years the various churches
have associated themselves in matters of common interest within the framework of
an underlying faith, what authority is vested in such associations, conferences and
councils arises from the congregations. They are not designed or intended as a
repository of any part of the church’s autonomy.
Id. at 1015, 1017.
50. Indeed, it has been used by the Court only to quote the title of legal articles. Corp.
of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 341–42 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(quoting Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of
Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1389
(1981)); Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 620 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) (referring to Paul G.
Kauper, Church Autonomy and the First Amendment: The Presbyterian Church Case, 1969 SUP.
CT. REV. 347).
51. See supra note 50.
52. Laycock, supra note 50. By labeling the notion as a “right,” Professor Laycock gave
the notion a status that it has not earned in either the Supreme Court’s free exercise cases or
American history. See Lupu, supra note 29, at 400–01 (critiquing Laycock’s positing of a
theory of church autonomy).
53. See infra Part IV.A.
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intraorganizational disputes over belief.54 These are the cases often
cited as proof of church “autonomy,” but they do not stand for
independence from the law, but rather the legal principle that
government may not determine belief—a principle that appears
throughout First Amendment cases, whether they are religious
institution cases, free exercise cases, or free speech cases.55
Second, there are cases in which the courts have declined to
mediate church employment disputes, on the ground that the adult
employee voluntarily shouldered the church’s belief system. These
are the judicially crafted “ministerial exception” cases. Under this
reasoning, the relationship between a voluntary, adult religious
employee and a religious employer has been shielded in some,
though not all, instances from judicial intervention.56
This Article focuses primarily on the third category of cases—
those involving (1) conduct rather than belief and (2) harm to third
parties. The cases in this third group involve the conduct of religious
institutions or individuals that harm innocent and unconsenting
third parties, and they present instances in which the religious
institution’s arguments for freedom from the law are at their lowest
ebb. They are properly governed by “‘neutral principles of law’”57
and have been explained by then-Justice Rehnquist as follows:
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990); Wooley v.
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
633–34 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303–04 (1940); Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1879).
56. Compare Bryce v. Episcopal Church in Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648, 658 (10th
Cir. 2002) (refusing jurisdiction over an employment dispute between a church and one of the
plaintiffs who was clergy and therefore subject to the governance of the church, and a second
plaintiff who “affirmatively interjected herself into the church’s internal ecclesiastical
dialogue”), with Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 964 (9th Cir. 2004)
(holding that a minister’s sexual harassment claim was limited to certain inquiries, but that
“[a]s Bollard makes clear, accommodating Title VII’s mandate and the First Amendment’s
strictures does not mean peremptorily dismissing all sexual harassment claims brought by
ministers against churches”), Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 948
(9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the ministerial exemption is not applicable to a sexual
harassment suit brought by a member of clergy where the order did not argue its actions were
motivated by religious belief), and McKelvey v. Pierce, 800 A.2d 840, 857–58 (N.J. 2002)
(holding that the ministerial exception does not apply to lay employees).
57. See Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 357 (Fla. 2002) (citing Presbyterian Church v.
Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969)), for the
principle that “[t]here are neutral principles of law . . . which can be applied without
‘establishing’ churches to which the property is awarded.”
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There are constitutional limitations on the extent to which a civil
court may inquire into and determine matters of ecclesiastical
cognizance and polity in adjudicating intrachurch disputes. But this
Court never has suggested that those constraints similarly apply
outside the context of such intraorganizational disputes. Thus,
Serbian Orthodox Diocese and the other cases cited by applicant are
not in point. Those cases are premised on a perceived danger that
in resolving intrachurch disputes the State will become entangled in
essentially religious controversies or intervene on behalf of groups
espousing particular doctrinal beliefs. Such considerations are not
applicable to purely secular disputes between third parties and a
particular defendant, albeit a religiously affiliated organization.58

The Supreme Court’s religious institution cases operate from the
principle of no-harm, which is part and parcel of the core principle of
ordered liberty embedded in republicanism—the maximal amount of
liberty is calibrated to achieve the minimal amount of harm.59 They
reflect the Constitution’s larger orientation towards republican
democracy, which rests on the no-harm rule, not a principle of
autonomy.
This Article makes the case that the Supreme Court has taken the
proper approach in its Religion Clause cases by (1) favoring
legislative determinations of the public good, which entails the
exclusive power to craft exemptions from generally applicable,
neutral laws, over judicially crafted exemptions; and (2) recognizing
the obligation to obey neutral principles of law in the religious
institution cases under the Establishment Clause.
Both sets of cases rest on the same principles. Both recognize an
absolute right to believe anything, and both demand the
accountability of religious institutions to the public good when they
act. The Court has allowed for expansive religious liberty in the
context of an ordered society.

58. Gen. Council on Fin. and Admin. of the United Methodist Church v. Superior
Court of California, 439 U.S. 1369, 1372–73 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1978) (citations
omitted) (emphasis added) (denying application for stay); see also Malicki, 814 So. 2d at 356–
57 (distinguishing internal church disputes from third-party harm cases).
59. See Carmella, supra note 9, at 1044 (“There is one condition attached to all
exercises of freedom: that the use of the freedom will not breach minimal responsibilities owed
to the larger society as those responsibilities are embodied in legitimate laws.”).
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This Article shows that the no-harm principle is a long-held
moral and legal principle that history, philosophy, and theology
support. It is the primary justification in Anglo-American culture for
60
criminal law, tort law, and a significant amount of regulatory law. It
is so well respected and entrenched that attempts to avoid it by
contemporary religious entities cannot and should not succeed.
Ultimately, the no-harm principle dictates that religious entities be
treated and regulated as any other entity in society—that is, under
the no-harm doctrine. There can be no church autonomy in a society
that values citizens equally.
This Article is divided into six Parts. Part II makes the case
through history, philosophy, and theology that church autonomy is
deeply at odds with ordered liberty and long-entrenched
constitutional principles. The Framers of the Constitution and the
First Amendment worked from within a republican frame of
reference so that religious entities were not seen as beyond the
boundaries of the law but rather as integral to society and therefore
subject to the principle of no harm. This Part is subdivided into
three sections. First, it describes the history of three abandoned
religious privileges: the benefit of clergy, sanctuary, and charitable
immunity. Second, it describes the Protestant and republican
mindset at the time of the framing, a mindset that cannot be squared
with church “autonomy.” Third, it introduces the no-harm rule
articulated by John Locke, which informed the Framers and was later
refined and made a pillar of modern democracies in the philosophy
of John Stuart Mill.
Part III explores possible philosophical and theological theories
in the religious institution context and demonstrates their
inconsistency with church autonomy and their consonance with the
no-harm rule.
Part IV describes the Supreme Court’s Religion Clause
jurisprudence as it relates to religious institutions. This Part
demonstrates that the same principles undergird the Free Exercise

60. See generally KEETON ON TORTS 6 (1984) (“So far as there is one central idea, it
would seem that it is that liability must be based upon conduct which is socially unreasonable.
The common thread woven into all torts is the idea of unreasonable interference with the
interests of others.”); Richard Epstein, The Harm Principle—and How It Grew, 45 U.
TORONTO L.J. 369 (1995) (referring to the “deep philosophical pedigree” of the no-harm
rule, which is “universal and durable”).
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Clause and the Establishment Clause in the Court’s cases—belief is
absolutely protected, but conduct may be regulated by the
61
legislature in the interest of the public good. The courts may not
exercise jurisdiction when the issue is solely a matter of belief or
ecclesiology, but they may and indeed must when the issue involves
the application of neutral principles of law to a religious institution.
Part IV further defines the no-harm principle. Part V employs the
clergy abuse era in the United States Catholic Church as a case study
to illustrate the necessity of a no-harm rule to deter abuses of power
that undermine the public good. Part VI offers a short conclusion.
II. THE HISTORICAL, PHILOSOPHICAL, AND THEOLOGICAL
BACKGROUND OF THE NO-HARM RULE
Modern-day claims to church autonomy and the myriad
privileges invoked in cases involving tortious or criminal behavior by
religious individuals and institutions are remnants of the nowdiscredited practices in Anglo-American history. There have been
regimes during which religious entities were protected from the law.
Their raison d’etre, however, has been overtaken by the growth of
the common law, the rule of law, and the no-harm principle, which
can be traced from John Locke through the Framers, John Stuart
Mill, and his philosophical successors.
The logic underlying the common law is that all similarly situated
62
individuals should be governed by the same laws. In sum, the
fundamental fairness that is at the foundation of the common law,63
61. A third category in addition to belief and conduct is religious speech. Religious
speech cases have been decided under the Free Speech Clause, as opposed to the religion
clauses, and therefore will not be addressed in the analysis of this Article. Suffice it to say that
conduct is not speech and cannot receive the identical treatment. Belief does no harm to
others, speech may do some, but conduct has the greatest capacity for harm. Accordingly, the
force of law is strongest against conduct, as between belief, speech, and conduct. Because
conduct is distinct from speech in terms of the public good, I do not agree with the theories
that have tried to translate the Free Exercise Clause into the Free Speech Clause. See, e.g.,
Robert W. Tuttle, How Firm a Foundation: Protecting Religious Land Use After Boerne, 68
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 861, 867 (2000); cf. Frederick Mark Gedicks, Towards a Defensible Free
Exercise Doctrine, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 925, 928 (2000) (advocating a free exercise
doctrine that takes concepts from but is distinct from the Free Speech Clause).
62. A.R. HOGUE, ORIGINS OF THE COMMON LAW 5, 186–90 (1966).
63. See, e.g., Rosenfeld, supra note 5, at 1344–45 (noting that the common law “is
grounded in a common well of values, a widely shared sense of justice and fairness, and
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the rule of law, and the no-harm rule combined to impose an
inexorable logic that has led to a rejection of the notion that
religious institutions deserve special immunity from laws that
prohibit harm.64
From the third to the sixteenth centuries in Britain, church
autonomy was in fact the order of the day. The Roman Catholic
Church was cosovereign with the state, which means it was itself
immune from prosecution. The Church was permitted to harbor
fugitives from the law under the practice of “sanctuary,”65 and it
then instituted the benefit of clergy, ecclesiastical courts that
provided separate (and far more lenient) justice for clergy.66 After
these privileges were rejected in favor of civil law, and after the
Catholic Church lost its sovereign power in Britain, the Crown
imposed legal liability on clergy and religious institutions. The spirit
of the earlier privileges reappeared with the crafting of a judicial
doctrine that shielded charitable, including religious, institutions
from civil lawsuits demanding monetary damages for harm done by
the institution or its employees. Britain has rejected this charitable
immunity doctrine, and the United States has diluted it.67
Each of these tacks provided significant autonomy for religious
institutions. These also permitted such institutions to avoid
accountability to the public good. Eventually, each was overtaken by
the interrelated dynamic of the common law, the rule of law, and the
no-harm principle. These bedrock principles were fostered in the
United States by the views of John Locke, James Madison, Thomas
68
Jefferson, and John Stuart Mill, as well as others.

dedication to elaborating a pragmatically oriented, empirically based working legal order that
insures stability through steadfast adherence to core principles”); id. at 1348 (“At least under
certain propitious circumstances, therefore, the rule of law can promote both predictability and
fairness; this seems equally possible in an Anglo-American common law setting as in a
continental civil law system . . . .”); see also Charles H. Koch, Jr., Envisioning a Global Legal
Culture, 25 MICH J. INT’L L. 1, 54 (2003) (“[T]he common law judge is charged with
applying the ‘law’ in order to render individual fairness, but is also committed to treating like
cases alike.”).
64. See infra Part III.
65. See infra Part II.A.1.
66. See infra Part II.A.2.
67. See infra Part II.A.3.
68. See infra Part II.C.
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There are no longer the social practices, institutions, or widely
accepted principles that at one point in time supported the notion
that a criminal or tortious religious entity should be treated
differently from one that is secular. The dispositive question is
whether the entity’s conduct has led to illegal harm. Where it has,
the courts should hold the perpetrator liable—unless the legislature
has provided an exemption upon a determination that permitting the
religious entity to avoid the law will not harm the public good.
A. Historical Privileges That Permitted Clergy and Religious
Institutions To Stand Above the Law
One might ask why history is relevant to the calibration of
individual liberty and the public good. Contemporary legal debate
often divides between those advocating an originalist approach and
those opposing it. That fault `line is not relevant here. Rather, the
history of special privileges for religion is being recited for the
purpose of explaining the evolution of the relationship between
religious entities and the law. There has been an ongoing dialectic
between religious entities, the law, and the public good for centuries,
and it has shifted from strong privileges for religious entities toward
the persisting application of the rule of law. This play of power has
yielded a construct that incorporates lessons learned. As Justice
Holmes said, “the life of the law has not been logic: it has been
69
experience.” It is not uncommon for United States constitutional
theory to reach only as far back as the Constitutional Convention,
but the forces that have brought the United States to the no-harm
principle began long before the Framers were born.
There were three historical privileges directly benefiting religious
individuals and entities in Britain: sanctuary, benefit of clergy, and
charitable immunity. Britain has since discarded all three privileges.
Analyzing this history provides crucial background for understanding
that church autonomy is incongruous with the centuries-long
development of the relationship between religious institutions and
the law.
The United States Supreme Court has repudiated the spirit of
these three historic principles, but they still haunt religious
69. HOLMES, supra note 20, at 1.
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institution theories70 and the legal tactics of religious institutions
themselves.71 It is important to learn and understand this history,
because it was the background for the Framers and for the early
formation of the law governing religious institutions and individuals
in the United States. It is also important because it uncovers
extended experience with church autonomy and shows how it
became incongruous with the growth of the common law,
republicanism, and the rule of law in Britain and then in the United
States.
1. The sanctuary privilege
As early as the third century AD, secular authority recognized an
ecclesiastical right to provide sanctuary, or protection, for any person
threatened by “private vengeance for alleged wrongdoing.”72
Sanctuary permitted the Church to harbor fugitives—clergy and laity
alike—from the law. The Church, in effect, was a separate universe
above the law. The privilege was intended to forestall blood feuds
and the vigilantism of the times.73 Although secular government
tried to retain rights of control over some categories of wrongdoers,
the ecclesiastical authorities held full sway to determine whether and
what kind of sanctuary would be made available.74 The Church

70. See Brady, supra note 11; Perry Dane, “Omalous” Autonomy, 2004 BYU L. REV.
1715; Esbeck, supra note 11; Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 35; see also Locke v. Davey, 124 S.
Ct. 1307, 1309 (2004); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534–35 (1997); Employment
Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990); Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization,
493 U.S. 378, 389 (1990); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961); Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1879).
71. Religious institutions being sued or prosecuted for childhood sexual abuse have
repeatedly asserted so-called privileges over the law, claiming that they need not provide
internal documents, despite their relevance. The Catholic Church has asserted numerous
privileges that purportedly prevent the state from seeing employee files in grand jury
proceedings. See, e.g., William Lobdell & Jean Guccione, A Novel Tack by Cardinal, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 14, 2004, at A1.
72. Wayne A. Logan, Criminal Law Sanctuaries, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 321,
323–24 (2003). The practice of sanctuary may date back much farther. The Bible explicitly
mentions sanctuary three times, and temples in ancient Greece afforded sanctuary to criminals.
Id. Roman temples, on the other hand, offered only a temporary refuge before turning
criminals over to civil authorities. Id. at 324.
73. NORMAN MACLAREN TRENHOLME, THE RIGHT OF SANCTUARY IN ENGLAND: A
STUDY IN INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 47 (1903).
74. Id.
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further refused to deliver anyone within its sanctuary unless promises
were made that the wrongdoer would not be harmed.75
Seven centuries after the practice first appeared, the Crown
created the chartered sanctuary, a form of asylum that had its force
by virtue of a charter from the king.76 Chartered sanctuaries provided
greater protection than Church sanctuary, including broader
geographic and temporal scope, and a greater range of protected
offenses.77 The fugitives hidden in chartered sanctuaries, which could
be quite large geographically, were governed by the Church and
lived in a fugitive community, apart from the rest of the world.78
Secular authorities recognized this practice well into Tudor times.
The sanctuary privilege shielded both laity and clergy, but clergy
were often given special dispensation.79 The church fortified the
power of sanctuary by teaching the “fear of Divine vengeance.”
Thus, “when the Church said that those who sought her protection
must be treated with leniency and mercy, and their lives and persons
spared, no state or individual was strong enough or bold enough to
refuse to comply.”80
As the Crown sought to enlarge its jurisdiction and attitudes
about the proper role of the Church changed, so too did secular
deference to the practice of sanctuary. Beginning in 1467, the
Crown began to reduce the types and locations of offenses covered
by sanctuary, and by 1540, chartered sanctuary was abolished.81
Sanctuary was completely repealed in 1623 by act of Parliament
during the reign of James I. However, the practice persisted
unofficially with regards to service of process until the end of the

75. Id. at 325.
76. Id. at 47.
77. Id; see also Logan, supra note 72, at 326.
78. TRENHOLME, supra note 73, at 47.
79. Id. at 43 (noting that, during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the law forced
clergymen to surrender to ecclesiastical courts for “spiritual offenses” and to secular authorities
for common-law crimes). Once in secular courts, however, they would be permitted to invoke
the benefit of clergy, which sent them to the ecclesiastical courts, where they escaped the most
severe punishments. Id.
80. Id.
81. Logan, supra note 72, at 328.
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seventeenth century.82 By that era, the Crown found the separate
justice system insupportable because it made criminal punishment
inconsistent.83
The end of sanctuary did not signal the end of special treatment
for the clergy, but rather only one stage in the progression from
church autonomy through the common law to the rule of law.
“Despite its formal demise, the spirit of sanctuary lived on in the
practice known as ‘benefit of clergy,’ which did not offer outright
immunity, but served, when available, to mitigate the severity of
secular law.”84
2. The benefit of clergy privilege and the sovereignty of established
religion
The triumph of the common law over Church sovereignty
coincided with the rise of Puritanism, the interregnum, and the
Restoration, each of which contributed in some way to reduce the
ruling power of the Roman Catholic Church.85 By the end of the
seventeenth century, the ecclesiastical courts retained jurisdiction
only over discipline of clergy, certain types of sexual offenses
committed by laypersons, and minor matters concerning worship
services.86 The history of a second religious privilege mirrors that of
sanctuary—they both eventually disappeared—and provides useful
insight into the emergence of the common law, the waning of
ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and the end of church autonomy.
The second privilege was the “benefit of clergy.” This privilege
permitted clergy to avoid capital punishment and even conviction for
crimes by (1) mandating lesser penalties for clergy in the secular,
royal courts and (2) permitting clergy cases to be heard in the more
lenient ecclesiastical courts.87 The benefit of clergy principle, at least
from the time of Henry II (1154–1189) until the era of Elizabeth I
(1558–1603), placed clergy members above the royal law, creating
82. JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 491–
92 (1883).
83. Logan, supra note 72, at 329.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See GEORGE W. DALZELL, BENEFIT OF CLERGY IN AMERICA & RELATED MATTERS
10–12 (1955).
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two distinct classes of criminals—clergy and ordinary citizens. The
clergy were quite literally a privileged class with a separate justice
system and special punishment privileges; all other citizens were
subject to the general laws in the secular royal courts. The benefit of
clergy eventually lost its religious character and evolved into a rule of
lenity for all first-time felony offenders.88
To understand the benefit of clergy principle, one must go back
to twelfth-century Britain. In that era, King Henry II (1154–1189)
succeeded the lax reign of King Stephen (1135–1154), who had
permitted the barons and the Roman Catholic Church to exercise
overweening power.89 Henry II, who is known as the father of the
common law, took on both the barons and the Church but
ultimately failed to make the Church and its clergy accountable to
the public good.90
From 1076, when William the Conqueror established the dual
court system, to 1576, during the reign of Elizabeth I, the royal
courts and the ecclesiastical courts shared jurisdiction over criminal
law.91 The question of jurisdiction brought conflict and dissension
for centuries. Although Henry II saw the need to standardize
criminal justice and sought to bring clergy under the jurisdiction of
the civil courts, the scandal with Archbishop Thomas Becket derailed

88. Id. at 10; Phillip M. Spector, The Sentencing Rule of Lenity, 33 U. TOL. L. REV.
511, 515 (2002).
89. RICHARD BARBER, HENRY PLANTAGENET 30 (1967); C. WARREN HOLLISTER, THE
MAKING OF ENGLAND: 55 B.C. TO 1399, at 149–50 (7th ed. 1996).
90. BARBER, supra note 89, at 106–10; HOLLISTER, supra note 89, at 162–64.
91. DALZELL, supra note 87, at 13; 4 EDWARD A. FREEMAN, THE HISTORY OF THE
NORMAN CONQUEST OF ENGLAND: ITS CAUSES AND RESULTS 392 (1871); HOLLISTER, supra
note 89, at 115. William the Conqueror divided the ecclesiastical courts from the secular
courts, decreeing that “no bishop or archdeacon shall any longer hold pleas involving episcopal
laws in the hundred [court],” and that instead bishops were to maintain separate courts of
their own in which to try civil matters such as marriage, wills, debts, and criminal offenses
committed by or upon all members of the Church. RICHARD WINSTON, THOMAS BECKET 17
(1967) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting H.I. STUBBS, HISTORICAL
INTRODUCTIONS TO THE ROLLS SERIES (Arthur Hassell ed., 1902)). In the twelfth and
thirteenth centuries, canon law claimed jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases arising out of
sin and breach of faith, as well as over clerics and church property; secular law had jurisdiction
over criminal and civil cases arising out of seisin of freehold land and breach of the king’s
peace. HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN
LEGAL TRADITION 516 (1983).
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his plans and led to a system of special treatment of clergy criminals
that lasted several centuries.
Under Stephen, the clergy became accustomed to
unaccountability to the civil, or royal, courts.92 Henry II viewed their
privilege of being above the law as dangerous, and in 1164, he called
a meeting with the bishops of England to require them to agree to
observe the customary powers of the king in the area of criminal
law.93 Specifically, he demanded that criminal clerics be defrocked by
the Church and handed over to the civil courts.
Henry II was too astute a ruler not to perceive the immense evils
arising from [the special treatment for the church], and the
limitation which it imposed upon the royal power by emancipating
so large a class of his subjects from obedience to the laws of the
realm. When in 1164 he endeavored, in the Constitutions of
Clarendon, to set bounds to the privileges of the church, he
therefore especially attacked the benefit of clergy, and declared that
ecclesiastics were amenable to the royal jurisdiction.94

At first, the Archbishop of Canterbury, Thomas Becket, agreed.
Becket’s approval signaled a victory for Henry, because the
Archbishop of Canterbury was the most powerful prelate in Britain
and was second only to the Pope.95 As Archbishop, Becket had the
power to excommunicate and was the cleric who would perform
coronations in the event of a new king.96 To Henry’s dismay, Becket
reversed his position under pressure from other bishops.97 As a result

92. Peter D. Jason, The Courts Christian in Medieval England, 37 CATH. LAW. 339,
342 n.27 (1997) (“Overall, Stephen failed to preserve the barrier against papal authority over
the English Church. Therefore, when Henry II succeeded Stephen, he was faced with the
challenge of overcoming the increased authority of the Church.” (citing Z.N. BROOKE, THE
ENGLISH CHURCH AND THE PAPACY 188–89 (1968))).
93. Unless otherwise noted, the account of the feud between Henry II and Thomas
Becket in the following paragraphs can be found in BARBER, supra note 89, at 110–21;
HOLLISTER, supra note 89, at 160–64; WINSTON, supra note 91, at 166–91, 318–21.
94. HENRY C. LEA, STUDIES IN CHURCH HISTORY 187 (1869).
95. HOLLISTER, supra note 89, at 161.
96. WINSTON, supra note 91, at 319–20.
97. BARBER, supra note 89, at 110–11; HOLLISTER, supra note 89, at 133; WINSTON,
supra note 91, at 167–68. As Archbishop of Canterbury, Becket (who had previously served as
Henry’s royal chancellor) was the head of the English Church, responsible for the crowning of
kings and direct relations with Rome. HOLLISTER, supra note 89, at 161–63.

1124

2HAM-FIN

1099]

12/1/2004 7:29 PM

Religious Institutions and the No-Harm Doctrine

of the disagreement between the King and the Archbishop, Henry
halted Becket’s income and exiled him to France in 1164.98
In June of 1170, anxious to secure his succession, Henry sought
to have his eldest surviving son crowned. Because Becket was in
exile, and therefore unavailable, Henry had Canterbury’s ancient
rival, the archbishop of York, preside over young Henry’s
coronation. Becket was enraged at the affront and, with papal
backing, threatened to lay England under the ban of interdict.99 He
and Henry reached a truce, which allowed Becket to return to
England in the autumn of 1170. The Sheriff of Kent accused Becket
of returning to unseat young Henry. Becket replied, “I have not the
slightest intention of undoing the king’s coronation. . . . But I have
punished those who defied God and the prerogative of the church of
Canterbury by usurping the right to consecrate him.”100 Despite the
truce, just before returning to England, Becket further raised
Henry’s ire by excommunicating all the bishops who had
participated in young Henry’s coronation. It was after this incident
that Henry commented out of frustration to his assembled court,
“Will no one rid me of this turbulent prelate?”101
In response to this furious statement, four of Henry’s barons
murdered Becket in Canterbury Cathedral on December 29,
1170.102 Although he publicly disavowed involvement with the
murder, Henry was subsequently overcome with remorse and agreed
to permit the ecclesiastical courts to exercise jurisdiction over clerics

98. Henry ordered Becket to stand trial in the royal court for various offenses allegedly
committed when he was Henry’s chancellor. Claiming clerical immunity from royal
jurisdiction, Becket fled the country to appeal his case to the pope, which violated the
prohibition of unlicensed appeals to Rome. BARBER, supra note 89, at 116–21; HOLLISTER,
supra note 89, at 134; WINSTON, supra note 91, at 175–91.
99. BERMAN, supra note 91, at 262 (“Interdict was a partial or total suspension of
public services and sacraments; it could extend to one or more persons or to a whole locality or
kingdom.”).
100. 3 MATERIALS FOR THE HISTORY OF THOMAS BECKET, ARCHBISHOP OF
CANTERBURY 119 (James Craigie Robertson ed., 1875), quoted in WINSTON, supra note 91,
at 319–20.
101. BARBER, supra note 89, at 143–44; HOLLISTER, supra note 89, at 134; WINSTON,
supra note 91, at 302–05.
102. HOLLISTER, supra note 89, at 134.
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accused of crimes.103 From the aftermath of this feud, the practice
known as benefit of clergy emerged in the common law.104
The benefit of clergy, or privilegium clericale, was often the
difference between life and death.105 In the king’s courts, capital
punishment was mandated for all felonies.106 By contrast, capital
punishment lay beyond the power of the ecclesiastical courts.107
Hence, clergy and laypeople might commit the same illegal actions,
but the layperson’s sentence would be death while the cleric’s
sentence would be defrocking, incarceration in a monastery, or
forfeiture of belongings other than land.108
There were also procedural advantages for clergy members.
Ecclesiastical trials of criminal matters were conducted by
compurgation—the accused would take a formal oath that he was
innocent of the crime and bring into court an “arbitrary” number of
compurgators who would swear to their belief in his oath.109
Acquittal was typical, because evidence was only adduced for the
defense and perjury by the defendant and compurgators was
routine.110 Additionally, the clergy were exonerated from all prior
criminal acts upon conviction of a particular crime.111 Thus, the rape
of a girl and the murder of her father—both perpetrated by a single
cleric—could be reduced to a single crime and a single punishment
of suspension from ministry for two years.112 The same crimes by any
other citizen would have been tried as individual crimes and death
would have been the likely sentence for either or both.
103. BARBER, supra note 89, at 161–65; HOLLISTER, supra note 89, at 134; WINSTON,
supra note 91, at 375.
104. See 2 THE REPORTS OF JOHN SPELMAN 327 (J.H. Baker ed., 1978) (stating that the
benefit of clergy appeared in 1170).
105. DALZELL, supra note 87, at 11.
106. Spector, supra note 88, at 515.
107. DALZELL, supra note 87, at 11 (stating that a “church tribunal could not enter a
‘judgment of blood,’ i.e., a capital sentence or an attainder”).
108. See id.
109. R.H. HELMHOLZ, THE SPIRIT OF THE CLASSICAL CANON LAW 158–59 (1996).
110. DALZELL, supra note 87, at 11; R.H. Helmholz, Crime, Compurgation and the
Church Courts, in CANON LAW AND THE LAW OF ENGLAND 137 (1987) (“Too many accused
persons successfully underwent purgation for the method to inspire confidence as a fact-finding
device. . . . Almost every person who came before the ecclesiastical courts accused of theft,
murder, or other secular offense, and who went on to purgation, did so successfully.”).
111. DALZELL, supra note 87, at 11.
112. See Spector, supra note 88, at 515.
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Many laypeople, as well as Henry II, viewed this privilege for
clergy as grossly unfair.113 This negative response to preferential
treatment eventually moved the privilege beyond the clergy, so that
others could receive the benefit of this doctrine. First, it was
extended to those who were literate (when it was first instituted,
only the clergy were), and then to laypeople in general.114 From this
history, one can draw many interesting conclusions, but “the
remarkable point is that the clergy should have been able to maintain
for centuries a special privilege in crime. This is a corollary to the
magnitude and power of the church. . . .”115
The power of religious institutions during the British monarchy
was also felt through the operation of what might be considered the
“high courts” of the royal and ecclesiastical courts: the Star Chamber
and its ecclesiastical counterpart, the High Commission, the
beginnings of which appeared during the reign of Henry VIII and
came to full flower under Elizabeth I. These were the “prerogative
courts.”116 “The court of High Commission stood to the church and
to the ordinary ecclesiastical courts somewhat in the same relation as
the Council and Star Chamber stood to the state and the ordinary
courts of the state, central and local.”117 Upon declaring himself the
head of the Church in England, Henry VIII used both courts to
enforce spiritual uniformity on the people, a tradition followed by his
successors (whether Catholic or Protestant) until these courts were
abolished in 1641.118

113. DALZELL, supra note 87, at 12 (“From the time of the first Plantagenet the
toleration of a class of privileged criminals was persistently assailed as iniquitous.”); see also
LEA, supra note 94, at 186–91.
114. Spector, supra note 88, at 515 n.22 (noting that in 1350, the privilege was
statutorily extended to “all manner of clerks, as well secular as religious”). This statute was
intended to extend the privilege to “inferior Orders” of the clergy rather than to laypersons.
Id. Judges nonetheless interpreted “secular clerks” to include all literate males. Id. at 515
(citing 2 SIR WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 338 (2d ed.
1724)).
115. DALZELL, supra note 87, at 13.
116. Frank Riebli, Note, The Spectre of Star Chamber: The Role of an Ancient English
Tribunal in the Supreme Court’s Self-Incrimination Jurisprudence, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
807, 826 (2002).
117. 1 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 608 (A.L. Goodhart &
H.G. Hanbury eds., 7th ed. 1956).
118. Id. at 605–11.
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By 1576, under Elizabeth I, the benefit of clergy privilege had
been extended beyond clergy to those who were literate (the original
logic being that only the clergy were literate). Therefore, the benefit
of clergy was not only a means for the clergy to move their trials to
the friendlier ecclesiastical courts, but it also became a tool for
laypeople to reduce the likely sentence for a crime, even though they
were being tried in secular courts.119 It was assumed that a felony was
“clergyable,” i.e., capable of preventing capital punishment, unless
Parliament explicitly stated otherwise.120 Eventually, during the latter
half of the sixteenth century and the beginning of the seventeenth,
the benefit was inapplicable to murder, rape, abduction, thefts of the
person exceeding a shilling, burglary, highway robbery, stealing
horses, and stealing from churches.121
Also in 1576, Parliament abolished the ecclesiastical courts’
jurisdiction over crimes committed by clergy.122 At the same time,
the “benefit of clergy” became a gambit to be invoked at sentencing
for lay and clergy alike—that is, it was not a guarantee of a particular
court, with special procedural rules, for clergy.123 Parliament
removed the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts because it
perceived that the Church had taken over a large portion of its
criminal jurisdiction.124 The Crown was appalled at the level of
perjury and corruption in the ecclesiastical courts:
This scandalous prostitution of oaths, and the forms of justice, in
the almost constant acquittal of felonious clerks by purgation, was
the occasion, that, upon very heinous and notorious circumstances
of guilt, the temporal courts would not trust the ordinary with the
trial of the offender . . . . As, therefore, these mock trials took their
rise from factious and popish tenets, tending to exempt one part of
the nation from the general municipal law; it became high time,

119. DALZELL, supra note 87, at 24.
120. John H. Langbein, Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Criminal Trial: A View from the
Ryder Sources, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 40 (1983).
121. Id. at 38–39.
122. DALZELL, supra note 87, at 24 (discussing 18 Eliz., ch. 7, §§ 2–3 (1576)).
123. Langbein, supra note 120, at 38 n.147 (citing 18 Eliz., ch. 7, §§ 2–3 (1576),
discussed in 5 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 368 (Sir
George Tucker ed., 1803)); STEPHEN, supra note 82, at 462.
124. Spector, supra note 88, at 516.
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when the reformation was thoroughly established, to abolish so
vain and impious a ceremony.125

As a result, Blackstone writes, the 1576 statute abolished the
practice of purgation (and with it, the ecclesiastical courts’
jurisdiction over clergy members who committed crimes) by
directing that an offender who pled benefit of clergy “shall not to be
delivered to the [ecclesiastic courts], as formerly,” but instead was to
be burned on the hand to show that he had used the privilege for a
first-time felony (a practice that became ceremonial in some cases)
and, at the judge’s discretion, sentenced to up to a year in prison.126
The privilege was not available in later trials of the same individual.127
The 1576 statute served two purposes: (1) Parliament did away with
the corrupt practice of trial by compurgation, and (2) it effectively
enlarged the crown’s criminal jurisdiction at the expense of the
ecclesiastical courts. The loss of ecclesiastical jurisdiction over crimes
committed by clergy was significant, but it was not nearly as divisive
in its era as Henry II’s proposals in his era had been. One can detect
in the British society a gradually developing assumption that the
same crime deserved the same punishment, regardless of the actor.
The Church and the Crown continually came into conflict
throughout the medieval period over questions of jurisdiction.128 In
the thirteenth century, the gap between them widened when
common lawyers replaced ecclesiastics on the benches of the
common-law courts.129 Although the rival courts were separate
systems of law, differing in many of their rules and deriving their
force from different sovereigns,130 they were based on the same
philosophical foundation—“the will of God expressed through

125. BLACKSTONE, supra note 123, at 368–69.
126. Id. at 369.
127. Id. at 372.
128. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 117, at 584 (“As the state grew into conscious life it was
inevitable that occasions for disputes between the temporal and spiritual powers should
arise.”).
129. Id. (noting that, “from that time onwards, the professional jealousy of the common
lawyers led them to restrict the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts whenever it was possible
to restrict it”).
130. Id. at 587.
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authority,” whether ecclesiastical or royal.131 All this changed with
the Reformation—the attack on the authority of the Church was in
effect an attack on the whole medieval system of law.132 Religion was
no longer universally considered the basis of civil government, and
the premises of the common law gained ascendancy over
ecclesiastical law.133
It became clear that a “shift[] in the balance of power” to secular
authority at the expense of the ecclesiastical “had to be carried out in
the context of legal competition and compromise.”134 The
ecclesiastical courts continued to exercise jurisdiction over some
matters that had been in their purview since the medieval period,
such as tithing, probate, marriage, defamation, and cases involving
“mortal sins” such as fornication and adultery.135 Ecclesiastical
jurisdiction over most matters, however, had already begun to
decline at the outset of the Reformation, reflecting a “basic shift in
attitude towards the proper role of the Church in men’s lives.”136

131. THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 42
(1929).
132. Id. (noting that, by the time of Edward VI (1547–1553), the Reformation was used
as a political weapon against Rome, and that after the brief reign of Catholic Mary (1554–
1558), Elizabeth made the Reformation “the permanent basis of English political and religious
life”).
133. Id.
134. BERMAN, supra note 91, at 268.
135. Id. at 266–67.
136. HELMHOLZ, supra note 109, at 320–21; see also id. at 316–17 (noting that
ecclesiastical jurisdiction over testamentary debt and probate began a slow decline in the midsixteenth century); SELECT CASES ON DEFAMATION TO 1600, at xxxvii–xli (R.H. Helmholz
ed., Selden Society No. 101, 1985) (noting that royal courts began to prohibit the church
courts from hearing defamation cases involving secular crimes and began to hear such cases on
their own in the sixteenth century); Edward P. Steegmann, Note, Of History and Due Process,
63 IND. L.J. 369, 385 (1988) (explaining that sodomy was made a secular offense by statute in
1533 (citing STEPHEN, supra note 82, ch. 25)); Jeremy D. Weinstein, Note, Adultery, Law,
and the State: A History, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 195, 225 (1986) (noting that Puritans of the
Commonwealth made adultery a capital offense in 1650, although this was nullified in 1660
with the Restoration (citing BLACKSTONE, supra note 123, at 64–65)). On the other hand, the
Church retained jurisdiction over other matters well beyond the Reformation. See, e.g., R.H.
HELMHOLZ, MARRIAGE LITIGATION IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 3 (1974) (explaining that
jurisdiction over marriage and marital disputes was not withdrawn from the Church until
1857); HELMHOLZ, supra note 109, at 210 (noting that jurisdiction over bastardy litigation
was not withdrawn until the nineteenth century).
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The increasing entrenchment of the common law,137 the Roman
Catholic Church’s loss of moral authority during the Reformation,138
and the subsequent growth of Protestantism with its emphasis on
accountability139 undermined whatever argument the Church once
had for sovereignty or to have its clergy immune from the criminal
law. By 1641, one year after the Puritans gained control of
Parliament, the jurisdiction of the prerogative courts—Star Chamber
and the High Commission—was repealed, because “so large a
prerogative,” manifested in the courts’ inquisitorial form and their
arbitrary procedures, was “no longer compatible with liberty.”140
Additionally, in a dramatic move forward for the common law, the
ecclesiastical courts were deprived of all criminal jurisdiction; the
entirety of which was placed in common law courts.141
The rejection of the prerogative courts, whose abuses were
attributed to the monarchs (who governed both the state and
established church), was an early step toward the overthrow of the
monarchy in 1649.142

137. See PLUCKNETT, supra note 131, at 43–44, 46. See generally HELMHOLZ, supra
note 109, at 2 (discussing approaches to the relationship between the two systems during the
rise of the common law).
138. See WILL DURANT, THE REFORMATION: A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN CIVILIZATION
FROM WYCLIF TO CALVIN 1300–1564, at 584 (1957) [hereinafter DURANT, THE
REFORMATION] (referring to “[t]he collapse of the spiritual and moral authority of the
priesthood”); HOLDSWORTH, supra note 117, at 588 (“The wealth and corruption of the
church, and more particularly the abuses of the ecclesiastical courts, were exciting extreme
unpopularity.”); FRANK LAMBERT, THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE PLACE OF RELIGION
IN AMERICA 34–35 (Thomas LeBien ed., 2003) (“Whether or not the Church of England . . .
was in as deplorable condition as its critics made out is beside the point; the fact is, widespread
opinion that it was corrupt constituted the greater reality that shaped events.”).
139. Of the Reformers, John Calvin in particular addressed the faults of the sixteenthcentury Catholic Church as a problem in the structure of the church, with his primary concern
being the lack of accountability of the clergy to the members or the higher good. It was his
view that the Church had deviated from the ancient church’s structures of accountability. See,
e.g., 2 JOHN CALVIN, INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION, bk. IV, ch. IV, §§ 1–2, at
1068–70 (describing the ancient practice of electing bishops and noting their accountability to
“the assembly of his brethren”); id. at bk. IV, ch. VII, § 21, at 1141 (criticizing the
contemporary pope for ruling in a “tyrannical fashion” and considering “his own whim as
law,” and opining that such “is utterly abhorrent not only to a sense of piety but also of
humanity”).
140. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 117, at 597.
141. BERMAN, supra note 91, at 113; HOLDSWORTH, supra note 117, at 61.
142. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 123, at 370; PLUCKNETT, supra note 131, at 53–54.
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In England, the benefit of clergy eventually became a tool for all
143
first-time offenders to avoid the death penalty. In the eighteenth
century, the benefit of clergy was gradually replaced by the
“transportation” of convicts from England to the American and
Australian colonies, and was ultimately abolished in the nineteenth
century.144 In the American colonies, the benefit of clergy never
functioned as a special privilege for clergy. The states never
recognized ecclesiastical courts for clergy that substituted for secular
courts in criminal matters. Rather, clergy members were subject to
the law of the secular courts as were all citizens.145 The “benefit of
clergy,” therefore, never conferred any special benefit on clergy qua
clergy in the colonies or the states. Instead, from the outset, it was
merely a tool for juries and judges to avoid applying the death
penalty to first-time felonies.146
This history is crucial for understanding the treatment of
religious institutions under the First Amendment. Were there
competing ecclesiastical courts for bringing clergy criminals to justice
in the United States, there would be a stronger argument for the
civil courts to abstain from jurisdiction over claims relating to the
crimes of clergy (and their religious institutions). Although the
justice meted out to clergy in England was lopsided in favor of
religion, at least the possibility of trying a member of the clergy in
the ecclesiastical courts existed for crimes committed until 1576. The
only forum available for vindication of the state and federal laws in
the United States, by comparison, has always been the civil courts.147

143. BLACKSTONE, supra note 123, at 370.
144. DALZELL, supra note 87, at 49.
145. EDMUND S. MORGAN, ROGER WILLIAMS: THE CHURCH AND THE STATE 67
(1967). Because there were no high officials of the Anglican Church in the New World, there
were no ecclesiastical courts. Matters still subject to ecclesiastical jurisdiction in England—
marriage, divorce, and probate—became purely civil matters in the colonies. Id.
146. Langbein, supra note 120, at 38.
147. See MORGAN, supra note 145, at 67. The exceptions to this rule were the attempts
to establish ecclesiastical courts in colonial South Carolina. Colonists established an
ecclesiastical court of twenty laymen to remove ministers “for cause.” The English disapproved
of this aberration because it violated the Episcopal governing structure of the Church of
England. They then requested that a bishop of the Church of England be installed in the
colonies, which never happened. See SANFORD H. COBB, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN
AMERICA: A HISTORY 416–18 (Burt Franklin ed., 1970) (1902); Michael W. McConnell,
Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I: Establishment of Religion, 44 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 2105, 2142 (2003).
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Thus, a claim of clergy benefit—or clergy autonomy—lacks support
in the United States’ legal history.
United States history suggests that not only is there no basis for
clergy autonomy, but religious institutions are subject to the law in
civil courts as well. In England, clergy benefited from special
tribunals, while religious institutions were not held to account under
the rubric of secular law, because the Church was a separate
sovereign whose jurisdiction overlapped with that of the Crown.148
The decision in the United States, expressed in the Establishment
Clause, to forbid religious institutions from holding sovereign power
was a radical departure from British history, where to this day there is
a state-established church. The elimination of religious sovereign
power by definition made religious institutions private and therefore
on more equal footing with other private entities.
The primary assumption at the Constitutional Convention—and
it is the most important principle that has contributed to the
Constitution’s success—was that every individual and every
institution holding power was likely to abuse that power and
therefore must be checked.149 This principle led the Framers to
structure the government so that each level and each branch would
check the others.150 With respect to religion, the First Amendment’s

148. See BERMAN, supra note 91, at 269 (“Underlying the competition of ecclesiastical
and royal courts from the twelfth to the sixteenth centuries was the limitation on the
jurisdiction on each: neither pope nor king could command the total allegiance of any
subject.”); HELMHOLZ, supra note 109, at 124–26 (characterizing the Becket controversy as a
battle over jurisdiction, and noting that trouble arose in “areas of law and life where both
Church and State made a claim”); see also BERMAN, supra note 91, at 553 (arguing that a
defining feature of Western society is the emergence of “the church in the form of a state” in
the late eleventh century).
149. See generally Marci A. Hamilton, The Calvinist Paradox of Distrust and Hope at the
Constitutional Convention, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 4.
150. For example, the dual sovereignty of federalism was intended to divide power
between the federal government and the states, with each checking the other. See THE
FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison) (“The federal and State governments are in fact but
different agents and trustees of the people, constituted with different powers, and designed for
different purposes.”); id. (noting that federal and state governments each possess a different
“disposition and faculty” with which to “resist and frustrate the measures of the other”).
Similarly, the three federal branches were assigned discrete powers and the power to check the
other branches. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison) (“[T]he preservation of liberty
requires . . . that the three great departments of power should be separate and distinct.”); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (“[T]he defect must be supplied, by so contriving the
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Establishment Clause made it clear that religious institutions would
not be cosovereigns by prohibiting them from holding governing
power.151 The question then was how religious institutions were to
be checked; it would have been inconceivable to think that no check
was necessary, either from the Framers’ world view or the dominant
Protestant world view. While religious institutions would not be
directly checked by the structures of the Constitution, the
Establishment Clause relegated them to the private sphere, where
they would be checked like other private entities—by the rule of law.
Thus, the end, perhaps even the ineluctable, result of the
privatization of religion in the United States is the Supreme Court’s
current doctrine that religious institutions are properly subject to
“neutral principles of law.”152
The end of benefit of clergy shifted power away from
ecclesiastical courts to civil courts and led to a corresponding decline
153
in the sovereign authority of the established church in Britain. The
structural mechanisms that had protected religious individuals and
institutions from criminal liability in Britain no longer protected
them, as the common law gained ascendancy. That is the milieu
from which the colonies and then the states drew their own churchstate arrangements. The seventeenth-century settlers in what would
become the United States were part of a generation ruled by Queen
Elizabeth, during whose reign the ecclesiastical courts were
definitively removed from criminal jurisdiction. Neither the clergy’s
privileges nor the ecclesiastical courts made it across the Atlantic. At
the time the United States was established, both the privileges and
the ecclesiastical courts had given way in Britain to a system that
interior structure of the government as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual
relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places.”).
151. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”). See generally LEONARD W. LEVY, THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1983) [hereinafter LEVY,
THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE].
152. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602–03 (1979); see also Employment Div. v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 450 (1971); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–67
(1879).
153. In 1576, the ecclesiastical courts were relieved of their jurisdiction over clergy who
committed crimes. DALZELL, supra note 87, at 24 (discussing 18 Eliz., ch. 7, §§ 2–3 (1576)).
In 1641, the Puritan-dominated Long Parliament abolished all criminal jurisdiction of the
ecclesiastical courts. See HOLDSWORTH, supra note 117, at 611.
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permitted the government to bring clergy under civil court
authority154 and religious institutions to account for wrong doing.155
Thus, the current attempts by religious organizations to avoid
criminal liability by invoking alleged privileges have their roots in
history, but they have long lost their moral or legal underpinnings.156
3. Charitable immunity
After religious institutions lost their immunity to civil lawsuits,
the British courts, followed by the American courts, experimented
with protecting the coffers of charitable institutions subject to
liability. Charitable immunity was a rule that protected the financial
holdings of charitable organizations from actions in tort. Unlike
sanctuary and the benefit of clergy, it was not a privilege limited to
churches or clergy. Rather, it was intended to shield volunteer or
charitable associations in general.157 The doctrine of charitable
immunity protected charitable organizations from being sued in tort,

154. See, e.g., Forbes v. Eden, 5 Macph. (H. L.) 36, L.R., 1 H.L. Sc. 568 (1867);
Craigdallie v. Aikman, 1 Dow 1, 3 Eng. Rep. 601 (1813).
155. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
156. In many jurisdictions, the Catholic Church has attempted to resist grand jury
subpoenas for documents on the grounds of a First Amendment “privilege.” See William
Lobdell & Larry B. Stammer, Mahony Criticized by National Review Panel, L.A. TIMES, Feb.
28, 2004, at A1; see also James F. McCarty, Bishop Pilla Walks Tightrope in Priest Sex Abuse
Scandal, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, May 5, 2002, at A1 (describing church lawyers’ tactics
to avoid grand jury subpoenas); Peter Shinkle & Hannah Bergman, Diocesan Cooperation
Varies Across Country, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jun. 21, 2003, at 12 (noting that Los
Angeles and Metuchen, N.J., bishops are refusing to cooperate, while a St. Louis bishop and
new Boston bishop are cooperating). In another jurisdiction though, the church fully
cooperated without raising such defenses. “Specific to the Facts” in N.H. Crisis in the
Church/Statement, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 11, 2002, at A32 (reporting the settlement of the
New Hampshire Diocese sexual abuse claims and the bishop’s statement that, “[t]he Diocese
of Manchester has reached a legally binding mutual agreement with the Office of the Attorney
General of New Hampshire which involves acknowledgment by the diocese that the state has
evidence likely to sustain a criminal conviction against the diocese for a failure in its duty to
care for young people”).
157. See Bradley Canon & Dean Jaros, The Impact of Changes in Judicial Doctrine: The
Abrogation of Charitable Immunity, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 969, 971–72 (1979). Charitable
organizations are those that serve the public, not just their members. See Charles Robert
Tremper, Compensation for Harm from Charitable Activity, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 401, 408–
09 (1991).
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which meant that victims could not bring successful tort claims
against the organization or its employees.158
Charitable immunity gave way to the dynamic force of the rule of
law, which demands similar accountability for people wrongfully
acting in the same way and rendering the same harm. The concept of
“ordered liberty” and the principle of no-harm opened the door to
those who had been harmed to sue religious institutions in tort.159
The charitable immunity rule lasted for a very short period in Britain
and has fallen out of favor in the United States, though it has been
revived to a limited extent in the growth of limits on liability for
charitable institutions.160 This section examines the transformation.
In England, the doctrine of charitable immunity did not involve
religious institutions specifically, but rather only shielded those
organizations that provided aid to the poor.161 In contrast, in the
United States, the definition of charitable organization eventually

158. See Canon & Jaros, supra note 157, at 971; Tremper, supra note 157, at 401–02.
159. See, e.g., Forbes v. Eden, L.R. 1 Sc. 568 (1867) (“Per Lord Colonsay: A Court of
Law will not interfere with the rules of a voluntary association, unless to protect some civil right
or interest which is said to be infringed by their operation.” (emphasis added)); Craigdallie v.
Aikman, 1 Dow 1, 3 Eng. Rep. 601 (H. L. 1813) (Scot.).
160. Prior to congressional action, any protection was provided by state law. Most states
abandoned the doctrine of charitable immunity by the mid 1980s, only to see it revived in a
limited fashion in some states after a perceived crisis in liability insurance for nonprofit
organizations. Tremper, supra note 157, at 402 (noting that almost all states have abolished or
constricted the doctrine of charitable immunity). “The common law doctrine of charitable
immunity exists—to some degree—in nine states: Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Maine,
Maryland, New Jersey, Virginia, Utah and Wyoming.” NONPROFIT RISK MANAGEMENT
CENTER, STATE LIABILITY LAWS FOR CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS AND VOLUNTEERS 8
(2001). The Volunteer Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 14501–05, which was passed in 1997,
provides minimum levels of protection for churches and preempts any state law unless the state
law provides greater protection. Id. at 5. The states that limit liability by capping damages are
Colorado, Massachusetts, and South Carolina. Id. at 9. All other states have abolished
charitable immunity by case law but have resurrected some immunity or caps by state volunteer
protection acts. See id. at 14–118 (listing all states, applicability of charitable immunity, case
law supporting the extension of abolishment of the doctrine, and the scope of all volunteer
protection statutes); see also George v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass’n, 337 Ark. 206, 211 (1999)
(giving narrow construction to protect “[t]he essence of the doctrine . . . that agencies, trusts,
etc., created and maintained exclusively for charity may not have their assets diminished by
execution in favor of one injured by acts of persons charged with duties under the agency or
trust”).
161. See infra notes 173–74 and accompanying text (discussing Feoffees of Heriot’s
Hosp. v. Ross, 8 Eng. Rep. 1508 (1846)); see also Georgetown Coll. v. Hughes, 130 F.2d
810, 815–17 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (discussing the history of the charitable immunity doctrine and
its application to charitable corporations).
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reached beyond the traditional nonprofit groups that served the poor
to include hospitals, schools, and churches.162 At its height, the
immunity provided complete protection against any damage awards
and therefore made charitable organizations’ coffers autonomous of
any countervailing social responsibility.163 In the minority of U.S.
jurisdictions, immunity extended only to certain persons (e.g., actual
recipients of charity) or certain sources of the organizations’ income
(trust funds and donations).164
Charitable immunity appears to have been based on a variety of
justifications. The doctrine, originally developed in England in 1846,
was based on a trust theory “that the funds of the charity are not to
be diverted from the purposes intended by their donors and applied
to the payment of liabilities in tort.”165 Another theory offered was
that since charities do not gain or benefit from the services they
offer, they could not be held liable under the doctrine of respondeat
superior for works done on their behalf.166 A third justification was
that the recipients of charity assume the risk of negligence when they
accept the benefit, thereby waiving their right to sue.167 It also has
been put forward that the actions of charitable organizations are
analogous to municipalities, and, therefore, charities deserve the
protection that governmental immunity offers.168 Finally, public
policy—fueled by a fear that people and institutions working to
improve society would no longer contribute if they were liable for
actions associated with that work—justified it.169
The public policy argument was especially forceful in late
nineteenth-century America. When public charities first emerged in
the United States, they were foundering institutions run only on an
experimental basis.170 Any substantial judgment against them would
162. Canon & Jaros, supra note 157, at 971.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895E (1979); see also McDonald v.
Massachusetts, 120 Mass. 432, 434–35 (1876).
166. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895E (1979).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See Benjamin S. Birnbaum, Comment, Cashman v. Merident Hospital, 169 Atl. 915
(Conn.), 14 B.U. L. REV. 477, 478 (1934).
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have led to their demise, or, at the very least, it would have
discouraged contributions.171 In an effort to foster their growth and
thus benefit the public, most state courts adopted the policy of
shielding charities from tort liability.172
The now largely disfavored doctrine entered the common law in
1846 as dictum in the House of Lords’ decision in Feoffees of Heriot’s
Hospital v. Ross: “To give damages out of a trust fund would not be
to apply it to those objects whom the author of the fund had in view,
but would be to divert it to a completely different purpose.”173 The
case was an action for damages for wrongful exclusion from the
benefits of the charity, not for personal injury inflicted in its
operation.174 Thirty years later, Massachusetts was the first state to
adopt the doctrine of charitable immunity in McDonald v.
Massachusetts General Hospital,175 with many other state courts
following suit.176 By 1900, seven state supreme courts had followed
Massachusetts’ lead, with another thirty-three joining the movement
by 1938.177 Ironically, by the time the doctrine was entrenched in the
American courts, it was no longer good law in England.178 By 1871,
after only twenty-five years experience with the doctrine, the English
courts rejected it on the ground that it made no sense to hold
179
charities blameless for the harm they caused. As a 1909 case
characterized the doctrine, “[i]t is now well settled that a public
body is liable for the negligence of its servants in the same way as

171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Feoffees of Heriot’s Hosp. v. Ross, 8 Eng. Rep. 1508 (1846).
174. Id.
175. 120 Mass. 432 (1876), overruled in part by Colby v. Carney Hosp., 254 N.E.2d
407, 408 (Mass. 1969), stating:
In the past on many occasions we have declined to renounce the defence of
charitable immunity set forth in McDonald v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp. . . . . Now it
appears that only three or four States still adhere to the doctrine . . . . Accordingly,
we take this occasion to give adequate warning that the next time we are squarely
confronted by a legal question respecting the charitable immunity doctrine it is our
intention to abolish it.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
176. Canon & Jaros, supra note 157, at 971.
177. Id.
178. Id.; see also Foreman v. Mayor of Canterbury, L.R. 6 Q.B. 214 (1871); Mersey
Docks Trustees v. Gibbs, L.R. 1 H.L. 93 (1866).
179. See Foreman, L.R. 6 Q.B. 214.
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private individuals would be liable under similar circumstances
. . . .”180
By the early twentieth century, American scholars considered
charitable immunity to be a faulty doctrine based on a weak
foundation.181 In Georgetown College v. Hughes, one of the first
American cases rejecting charitable immunity, the court
characterized concept as an “anomaly,” stating that “[t]he doctrine
of immunity of charitable corporations found its way into the law . . .
through misconception or misapplication of previously established
principles.”182 As one defender of limited liability for charitable
organizations states, the “traditional rationales for denying all tort
recovery against charitable organizations cannot withstand close
scrutiny.”183 The reasoning is obvious: when the law is intended to
redress harm, and charitable institutions are intended to assist those
in need, permitting them to avoid liability for the harm they cause is
perverse. As with sanctuary, and especially the benefit of clergy, the
driving logic of the common law and the rule of law could not be
squared with special dispensation for charitable organizations when
they engendered harm.
Some vestiges of the doctrine remain, however.184 While it has
been thought appropriate to hold such organizations accountable for

180. Hillyer v. St. Bartholomew’s Hosp., 2 K.B. 820, 825 (1909).
181. Tremper, supra note 157, at 422 n.107 (describing rejected theories behind
charitable immunity).
182. 130 F.2d 810, 815 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
183. Tremper, supra note 157, at 422. The doctrine of charitable immunity established
by common law still exists, to varying degrees, in nine states: Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia,
Maine, Maryland, New Jersey, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming. NONPROFIT RISK
MANAGEMENT CENTER, supra note 160, at 8. In the face of the clergy sexual abuse cases,
there is a movement to repeal the doctrine of charitable immunity. For example, a New Jersey
senate committee has approved S540, an amendment to the state’s charitable immunity statute
that would bar immunity for charitable organizations in damage suits alleging negligent hiring
or supervision of an employee that resulted in sexual abuse of a minor. See Valerie L. Brown et
al., 2004 Capitol Report, N.J. LAW, Apr. 5, 2004, at 708.
184. George v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass’n, 337 Ark. 206, 211 (1999) (giving narrow
construction to protect “[t]he essence of the doctrine that agencies, trusts, etc., created and
maintained exclusively for charity may not have their assets diminished by execution in favor of
one injured by acts of persons charged with duties under the agency or trust”); see also Ryan v.
Holy Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church, 175 N.J. 333, 340–42 (2003) (discussing the
language and history of New Jersey’s charitable immunity act and the fact that it is broadly
construed). New Jersey is currently considering a bill modifying its charitable immunity law. A
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the actions of their employees, the institutions’ liability for
volunteers has been contested.185 A minority of states, in addition,
have imposed monetary caps on damage awards against charitable
organizations.186
Like the benefit of clergy and sanctuary, charitable immunity
largely gave way to the rule of law and its fundamental
presupposition that all citizens are equal under the law. As in Britain,
the United States nullified charitable immunity by the larger legal
system within which religious and charitable organizations, their
clergy, and their employees are accountable to those they harm.

bill to that effect has passed in the state senate and is pending in the state’s general assembly.
See S540, 2004 Leg., 211th Sess. (N.J. 2004), available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us (last
visited Nov. 5, 2004). In a step backward in the progression against charitable immunity, and
in response to Moses v. Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d 310, 331 (Colo. 1993), cert. denied, 511
U.S. 1137 (1994) (holding that a church has a fiduciary duty to victims of its clergy), the
Colorado legislature considered in 1999 whether to give churches financial immunity in cases
involving misconduct by their clergy. H.B. 1290, 62d Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo.
1999). The bill was narrowly defeated.
185. In 1997, Congress enacted the Volunteer Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 14501–05
(2000), which immunizes volunteers from tort liability in certain, limited circumstances. The
majority of state statutes follow this approach, with the VPA preempting those state laws that
protect volunteers more narrowly. 42 U.S.C. § 14502. Representative Porter (R., Ill.) stated
on the floor of the House of Representatives that:
[T]here are 124 separate charitable organizations that support this legislation very
strongly. They range from the American Association of University Women to the
American Heart Association, to the American Red Cross, to the American
Symphony Orchestra League, to B’nai Brith International, the Girl Scout Council
USA, the National Association of Retired Federal Employees, the National Easter
Seal Society, the Salvation Army, Save the Children, United Way, the YMCA. Any
national organization that one can think of probably is a strong supporter of this
legislation.
143 CONG. REC. H3098 (daily ed. May 21, 1997) (statement of Rep. Porter). Britain has not
followed the United States’ lead on volunteer immunity. See Tash Shifrin, Volunteer Bill ‘Could
Be Deterrent,’ GUARDIAN, Mar. 5, 2004, available at http://society.guardian.co.uk/
print/0,3858,4873706-106647,00.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2004) (reporting that the chief
executive of Volunteering England said, “We have serious concerns that a bill intended to
support and encourage volunteering could have exactly the opposite effect”).
186. Those states are Colorado, Massachusetts, and South Carolina. NONPROFIT RISK
MANAGEMENT CENTER, supra note 160, at 9; see also Martin v. Kelley, No. 02-684, 2004
Mass. Super. Ct. LEXIS 277, at *8–9 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 12, 2004) (explaining the tort
damages cap of $20,000 imposed on charitable organizations by the Massachusetts legislature
in 1971).
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B. The Protestant Mindset and the History of Abuses of Power by
Religious Institutions Preceding and Informing the First Amendment
Were all religious institutions invariably beneficial to the public,
this Article would not need to be written. The rule would be plain:
religious institutions need not be deterred from tortious or criminal
behavior, and therefore they are immune from suit. While many
religious institutions supply important benefits to society, the notion
that they are invariably beneficial and therefore need not be subject
to society’s general constraints on behavior cannot be supported
either by history or experience.
No one was more aware of the capacity of religious institutions
to harm the public good than the framing generation, many
members of which had escaped England and the entrenched
religious authorities that had persecuted particular faiths with the aid
and acquiescence of the monarchy.187 Only decades before the first
emigrants started across the Atlantic, the Reformation initiated the
pitched struggle for sovereign power between the Catholic Church
and the Protestant churches.188 Thus, “[w]hen English settlers first
sailed for America in 1584, they carried with them a faith worked
189
This turbulence
out over fifty years of religious turbulence.”
continued well into the next century; religious persecution finally
abated when the Puritans rose to power and disbanded the Star
Chamber and the High Commission in 1641.190

187. See HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION II: THE IMPACT OF THE
PROTESTANT REFORMATIONS ON THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 209–10, 215–16 (2003)
[hereinafter BERMAN, PROTESTANT REFORMATIONS]. Between 1630 and 1640, an estimated
twenty thousand religious dissenters fled to the Massachusetts Bay Colony, and a similar
number emigrated to the Netherlands. Id. at 216.
188. The Reformation began on October 31, 1517, with Martin Luther’s protest at
Wittenberg. It ended at the close of the Thirty Years War in 1648. THE COLUMBIA
ENCYCLOPEDIA (6th ed. 2001), available at http://www.bartleby.com/65/re/
Reformat.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2004).
189. LAMBERT, supra note 138, at 38–39. Early attempts at colonization were
unsuccessful—settlements founded in Virginia between 1585 and 1587, and again in 1602,
were either abandoned or destroyed. See EDWARD P. CHEYNEY, A SHORT HISTORY OF
ENGLAND 354–55 (1919). Jamestown, Virginia, founded in 1607, was the first permanent
English settlement in America. Id. at 403.
190. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 117, at 611.
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During the Tudor and Stuart years, 1485–1714,191 which
encompasses the years immediately preceding and during the
colonization of America, the Crown engaged in a systematic
suppression of religious dissent and persecution of those whose
beliefs differed from the established church. For example, in 1526,
Henry VIII divided his King’s Council into two branches: a privy
council to consider domestic and foreign policy issues, which came
to be known as the Star Chamber, and the court of High
Commission, which was to address ecclesiastical issues. When Henry
VIII officially became the head of the Church eight years later in
1534,192 he was able to use both commissions, or prerogative courts,
to exercise control over religious belief and practice. The unification
of church and state made “any deviation from the new religious
order a threat to royal supremacy.”193 Thus, heresy and treason
became indistinguishable as the Star Chamber, in cases involving
“sedition” or “subversion,” and the High Commission, in cases
involving “heresy,” worked in tandem to rid Britain of religious
dissenters. “Those who continued to support the authority of the
pope, Henry VIII sent to the executioner’s chopping block; those
who preached new doctrines he sent to the fires at Smithfield.”194
Henry VIII’s successors carried on his practices. His son, Edward VI,
was only ten when he ascended to the throne on Henry’s death in
1547, but the Dukes of Somerset and Northumberland ruled in his
name, both promoting Protestantism as the established and sole
religion of the realm.195 The Catholic Queen Mary (1553–1558)

191. See CHEYNEY, supra note 189, at 383–84.
192. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 117, at 591–92.
The Act of Supremacy [26 Henry VIII. C.I.] recognized the king as “the only
Supreme Head in earth of the Church of England,” having full power to correct all
“errors, heresies, abuses, offences, contempts, and enormities,” which by any
manner of spiritual authority ought to be reformed; and the form of oath taken
under the provisions of this Act denied to the Pope any other authority than that of
Bishop of Rome.
Id. The ecclesiastical authorities lost all power save that granted by the king, and ecclesiastical
judges no longer needed to be clerics—a move that displaced Rome’s canon law. Id. at 592.
193. Riebli, supra note 116, at 826 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 96 (1986)).
194. Id.
195. See DURANT, THE REFORMATION, supra note 138, at 579 (noting that Somerset
“favored a Protestant policy”); id. at 581, 584 (noting that in 1550, under Warwick who was
made Duke of Northumberland in 1551, “[t]he protectorate was now definitely Protestant”);
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ruled in a country predominated by Protestants,196 whom she
believed invited divine retribution on her reign for their heresy.197
She atoned for this sin by burning hundreds of Protestants at the
stake, including Bishops Cranmer, Ridley, and Latimer, during her
198
short reign.
Protestant Elizabeth I (1558–1603) gained control of a country
divided by religion. To reunite the country, she ruthlessly suppressed
Catholicism (she was excommunicated by the pope in 1570)199
through her enforcement of the Acts of Supremacy and Uniformity,
which she employed to institute the High Commission, and through
her use of the Tower of London to execute heretics.200 After
centuries of sovereign control in Britain, the Catholic Church found
itself in the 1570s instructing Catholics to avoid Anglican worship
services and to attend their own “despite the penalties for doing
so.”201 James I (1603–1625) and Charles I (1625–1649) avidly
suppressed religious opposition. Only five years before the end of
James I’s reign, in 1620, the Mayflower pilgrims sailed for
America.202 Throughout his reign, Charles I aggressively suppressed
the Puritans.203 Abuses by the Star Chamber and the High
Commission were legion, and thousands of British citizens left for
America (and the Netherlands), bringing with them certain
knowledge of the consequences of a government dominated by a
single religion.204 After Charles I refused to convene Parliament from
1629 until 1640, in part because of his fear of the Puritans’ growing
id. (“Religious persecution, so long of heretics by Catholics, was now in England, as in
Switzerland and Lutheran Germany, of heretics and Catholics by Protestants.”).
196. Although “numerically a minority,” the Protestants were “financially powerful,” and
nearly every influential family held property taken from the Catholic Church. Id. at 590. But
see id. at 588 (noting that London, however, was a “half-Protestant city”).
197. See id. at 595 (“To her simple faith these heresies seemed mortal crimes, far worse
than treason.”).
198. Id. at 597–98 (“[Cranmer’s] death marked the zenith of the persecution. Some 300
persons died in its course, 273 of them in the last four years of her reign.”).
199. ROBERT E. RODES, JR., LAW AND MODERNIZATION IN THE CHURCH OF
ENGLAND: CHARLES II TO THE WELFARE STATE 81 (1991).
200. See HOLDSWORTH, supra note 117.
201. RODES, supra note 199, at 81.
202. 7 THE CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY 13 (W. Ward et al. eds., 1934).
203. Riebli, supra note 116, at 826.
204. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
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power, the Puritans seized power and soon thereafter abolished the
prerogative courts and their abusive practices.205
In 1662, during the Restoration, Anglicans and Presbyterians
attempted to form a national church, but their effort failed and
Presbyterian ministers were expelled.206 Parliament passed a new Act
of Uniformity, and Presbyterian ministers who refused to conform
were expelled from their congregations.207 Dissenting Protestant
worship became legal in 1689, but the dissenters were not allowed
to hold property to construct churches unless they were subject to
the oversight of the Court of Chancery.208 Not until 1791 were the
Catholics given parity with other Protestant dissenters.209 The
inability of the established Anglican Church to answer to the public
good when dealing with issues involving taxation, tithing, local
government, marriage, education, and charity led to the state’s
210
assumption of jurisdiction over those issues. Thus, the public good
was the measuring stick that finally transformed Britain from a
country with only one recognized religion into one of religious
liberty. “English pluralism was the result of a gradual wearing away
of a unitary system through concessions made because it seemed
right to make them.”211
The United States, of course, did not begin as a fully pluralistic
and tolerant society either. The early colonies and then some of the
states, with the notable exception of Pennsylvania, had established
churches with corresponding privileges for members and disabilities
for dissenters, though there was no Tower of London or Star
Chamber and High Commission to force the established church’s
beliefs on others. The establishments, such as they were, gave way
212
not long after the Constitution and the Bill of Rights were ratified.
205. BERMAN, PROTESTANT REFORMATIONS, supra note 187, at 104.
206. See RODES, supra note 199, at 87.
207. Id. The original Act of Uniformity, passed by Elizabeth’s Parliament in 1571,
required that all Church of England prayers, services, and rites conform to the Book of
Common Prayer. See LAMBERT, supra note 138, at 40.
208. RODES, supra note 199, at 88–89.
209. Id. at 93.
210. See id. at 147. By excluding religious dissenters from these matters and therefore
depriving them of a full place in the national life, the Anglican Church was unable to maintain
a harmonious combination of religious connection and public concern. Id.
211. Id. at 147.
212. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE, supra note 151, at 25–26, 110–19.
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The Establishment Clause is testimony to the founding
generation’s rational fear of overweening religious power and of the
mischief that religious institutions can foster, particularly when they
hpld sovereign power. It cannot be, as Carl Esbeck argues, a rule
solely intended to protect religious entities.213 Neither the history
leading up to the founding of America nor the Protestant cast of
governance theories at the time of the framing supports his
conclusion. Indeed, they argue against it.
The dominant mindset of the early Americans was Protestant,214
and among Protestants, Calvinism predominated.215 At its most
fundamental level, all Protestantism incorporates the view that
religious individuals and institutions have the capacity to stray from a
holy path onto an evil one.216 For Protestants, individuals are locked
213. Esbeck, supra note 11, at 1576–77.
214. See Hamilton, Direct Democracy, supra note 1, at 394 n.22; see also BERNARD
BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 246–50 (1967)
(discussing the predominant religions in the colonies before the Revolutionary War); ALICE M.
BALDWIN, THE NEW ENGLAND CLERGY AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 22–31 (2d ed.
1965) (detailing the social impact of the works of New England clergy before 1763); FRANCIS
J. BREMER, SHAPING NEW ENGLAND: PURITAN CLERGYMEN IN SEVENTEENTH CENTURY
ENGLAND AND NEW ENGLAND 82–88 (1994) (noting the influence of the clergy on education
and government in seventeenth-century New England); GORDON S. WOOD, THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION: A HISTORY 129–35 (2002) (detailing the impact of Protestant ministers at the
forefront of the Revolutionary movement); James T. McHugh, A Liberal Theocracy: Philosophy,
Theology, and Utah Constitutional Law, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1515, 1520 n.16 (1997) (citing
BALDWIN, supra, at 22–31).
215. See Donald S. Lutz, Religious Dimensions in the Development of American
Constitutionalism, 39 EMORY L.J. 21 (1990). Professor Lutz argued:
Much of what we now consider mainstream Protestantism in America shared a
dissenting, Calvinist base. Except for the southern tidewater region—which was
initially dominated by the Church of England—and a large Catholic minority in
Maryland, New England, most of the central colonies (including the Dutch,
Swedish, and German settlers), and the piedmont region of the South were
dominated by essentially Calvinistic sects. This fact is essential when trying to
explain the surprising similarity to be found in state constitutions and colonial
documents written throughout America. The Calvinist assumptions and
commitments were strongest in New England and weakest in the South, but they
had their effect in all parts of the country.
Id. at 23–24.
216. The Reformation was instituted by Martin Luther and John Calvin because they
believed that the Roman Catholic Church had turned away from all that is holy and become
infested with evil. See, e.g., 2 CALVIN, supra note 138, at 1141, 1144, 1147 (referring to
“corruption of the present-day papacy”; “kingdom of Antichrist”; and “moral abandonment of
the popes”). They were Church insiders who initially acted in order to reform the Church
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into original sin. According to John Calvin, who along with Martin
Luther sparked the Reformation and Protestantism, there was never
a moment in history when humans could be trusted blindly to be or
do good:
[L]et us hold this as an undoubted truth which no siege engines
can shake: the mind of man has been so completely estranged from
God’s righteousness that it conceives, desires, and undertakes, only
that which is impious, perverted, foul, impure, and infamous. The
heart is so steeped in the poison of sin, that it can breathe out
nothing but a loathsome stench. But if some men occasionally
make a show of good, their minds nevertheless ever remain
enveloped in hypocrisy and deceitful craft, and their hearts bound
by inner perversity.217

Thus, Calvin counseled in favor of a diligent surveillance of one’s
own actions and the actions of others; he also endorsed the value of
the law (both biblical and secular) to guide human behavior away
from its propensity to do wrong.218 Granted, no man could ever live
up to all of the law’s demands, but it was necessary as a checking
measure nonetheless. Calvin’s view of human nature was powerfully
transmitted to a significant number of Framers—for example, James
Madison and Reverend John Witherspoon, who was president of the
College of New Jersey, the leading Presbyterian college at the time
and now Princeton University.219
itself, but the Church proved incapable of sufficiently rapid change to avoid having many of its
members leave the Church to follow Luther, Calvin, or other reformation leaders into new
churches. The instinct to schism, in response to the perceptions of corruption, has never left
the Protestant movement, resulting in the thousands of modern-day sects that continue to
divide. See generally STEVE BRUCE, A HOUSE DIVIDED: PROTESTANTISM, SCHISM, AND
SECULARIZATION (1990).
217. 1 CALVIN, supra note 139, at 340.
218. Calvin wrote that the “principal use” of the law was to help believers know the will
of God and to incite them to obedience:
[The law] is the best instrument for enabling them daily to learn with greater truth
and certainty what the will of the Lord is. . . . Then, because we need not doctrine
merely, but exhortation also, the servant of God will derive this further advantage
from the Law: by frequently meditating upon it, he will be excited to obedience,
and confirmed in it, and so drawn away form the slippery paths of sin.
Id. at 360–61; see also id. (“Even the believers have need of the law.”). The depravity of
humans, however, never made obedience to the law alone sufficient to ensure redemption. Id.
at 351–52.
219. See Hamilton, Why the People Do Not Rule, supra note 1; see also Hamilton, Direct
Democracy, supra note 1, at 428–29.
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Protestantism equally discounted the likelihood that a religious
institution could be trusted on its own to serve the public good.
“[Protestantism] is essentially an attempt to check the tendency to
corruption and degradation which attacks every institutional
religion.”220 The early Protestants, after all, were the Catholic
dissenters who eventually rejected the sixteenth-century Roman
Catholic Church for its malignant ways.221 The belief that the
Catholic Church had led the Christian Church down evil paths was a
fervently held belief at the time of the framing as well, with John
Adams identifying the “worst tyranny ever invented” as “the Romish
superstition.”222
The attitude of the vast majority of the framing generation on
this subject was little different from Calvin’s description of the
sixteenth-century Roman Church’s hubris and unaccountability:
Because of the primacy of the Roman Church, they say, no one has
the right to review the judgments of this See. Likewise: as judge it
will be judged neither by emperor, nor by kings, nor by all the
clergy, nor by the people. This is the very height of imperiousness
for one man to set himself up as judge of all, and suffer himself to
obey the judgment of none. But what if he exercise tyranny over
God’s people? If he scatter and lay waste Christ’s Kingdom? If he
throw the whole church into confusion? If he turn the pastoral

220. WILLIAM RALPH INGE, PROTESTANTISM 3–5 (1927); see also 1 EMILE G. LEONARD,
A HISTORY OF PROTESTANTISM: THE REFORMATION 316 (H.H. Rowley ed., Joyce M.H.
Reid trans., 1965) (noting that Farel agreed with Luther in condemning institutionalism,
saying: “sects, organizations and institutions are born of the flesh”). Wylie explained this
theory of Protestantism:
[Protestants] replaced the authority of the Infallability with the authority of the
Word of God. The long and dismal obscuration of centuries they dispelled, that the
twin stars of liberty and knowledge might shine forth . . . and human society . . .
might, after its halt of a thousand years, resume its march towards its high goal.
1 J.A. WYLIE, THE HISTORY OF PROTESTANTISM 2 (1870).
221. See DURANT, THE REFORMATION, supra note 138, at 329–33. On the eve of the
Reformation in Germany, the Catholic Church was rife with abuses. There had been a
breakdown of monastic discipline and clerical celibacy; greedy ecclesiastical authorities
increased clerical rents, incomes, and taxes. The higher ecclesiastical orders brazenly displayed
their wealth, to the chagrin of the people, “mercenary abuse of sacred things” was common,
and hush money was often sent to Rome.
222. See CHARLES P. HANSON, NECESSARY VIRTUE: THE PRAGMATIC ORIGINS OF
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN NEW ENGLAND 11 (1998). See generally PHILIP HAMBURGER, THE
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (2003).
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office into robbery? Nay, though he be utterly wicked, he denies he
is bound to give an accounting.223

The solution for the wayward path of the Catholic Church, at least
according to Calvin, was proper government, a need the early
colonial Presbyterians (and Calvinists), identified both in the society
and the Church:
Man’s depraved apostate Condition renders Government needful.
Needful both in the State and the Church. In the former without
Government Anarchy wou’d soon take place with all its wild and
dire Effects and Men wou’d be like the Fishes of the Sea where the
greater devour the less. Nor is Govern[ment] in the Church less
needful than in the State and this for the same Reason.224

While drafting the Constitution, Madison—and the Framers in
general—had the despotic practices of the Catholic Inquisitors
stamped on their political consciousness, a fact proven by Madison’s
direct reference to the Inquisition in his Memorial and
Remonstrance,225 in which he argued against state payment of certain
Christian educators as follows:
Because the proposed establishment is a departure from the
generous policy, which, offering an Asylum to the persecuted and
oppressed of every Nation and Religion, promised a lustre to our
country, and an accession to the number of its citizens. What a
melancholy mark is the Bill of sudden degeneracy? Instead of
holding forth an Asylum to the persecuted, it is itself a signal of
persecution. It degrades from the equal rank of Citizens all those
whose opinions in Religion do not bend to those of the Legislative
authority. Distant as it may be in its present form from the
Inquisition, it differs from it only in degree. The one is the first
step, the other the last in the career of intolerance. The
magnanimous sufferer under this cruel scourge in foreign Regions,
must view the Bill as a Beacon on our Coast, warning him to seek

223. 2 CALVIN, supra note 139, at bk. IV, ch. VII, § 19.
224. Leonard J. Kramer, Presbyterians Approach the American Revolution, 31 J.
PRESBYTERIAN HIST. SOC. 72 (1953) (quoting minutes of the Synod of New England, 1776–
82).
225. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance, in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON
301–02 (William T. Hutchinson et al. eds., 1962) [hereinafter Madison, Memorial].
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some other haven, where liberty and philanthrophy in their due
extent, may offer a more certain respose from his Troubles.226

There can be no question that the excesses of the Inquisition (1184–
1834), the later Spanish Inquisition (1474–1834), the public
executions of those whose faith differed from the Crown in England
(1531–1689), and the excesses generated by the unity of power
between the monarchies and organized religion were part of the
calculus that the framing generation used to calibrate the need for
government, the reach of any religious institution’s power, and the
need to make religious institutions accountable to the public good.
Nor can there be question that they believed in placing legal
limitations on the religious institutions, because they believed at a
visceral level that religious institutions were not worthy of blind
trust.
Indeed, Madison’s mentor, the Reverend John Witherspoon,
explained the history of the United States in the context of the
Inquisition:
[A]t the time of the Reformation when religion began to revive,
nothing contributed more to facilitate its reception and increase its
progress than the violence of its persecutors. Their cruelty and the
patience of the sufferers naturally disposed men to examine and
weigh the cause to which they adhered with so much constancy
and resolution. At the same time also, when they were persecuted
in one city, they fled to another and carried the discoveries of
Popish fraud to every part of the world. It was by some of those
who were persecuted in Germany that the light of the Reformation
was brought so early into Britain.
[T]he violent persecution which many eminent Christians met with
in England from their brethren, who called themselves Protestants,
drove them in great numbers to a distant part of the New World
where the light of the gospel and true religion were unknown.227

This historical background informed the framing generation of
the qualities of religious organizations under the reign of Pope
226. Id. at 302.
227. THE SELECTED WRITINGS OF JOHN WITHERSPOON 135–36 (Thomas Miller ed.,
1990). Witherspoon, whose stamp on the Constitution is visible, was also mentor to a number
of other Framers. See generally Hamilton, Why the People Do Not Rule, supra note 1.
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Gregory IX (1227–1241). At that time, and in response to the
spread of “heretic” beliefs, Roman Catholic bishops conducted
medieval “inquisitions” designed to rid France, Germany, and Italy
of non-Catholics.228 Investigation of heresy was the duty of the
bishops.229 The Inquisition, by then known as the Holy Office, is
perhaps best known for convicting Galileo at trial in 1633 for his
“dangerous” scientific beliefs.230 Most Inquisition trials resulted in a
guilty verdict, and those convicted faced a myriad of horrific
punishments, including fines, imprisonment, and death.231
The Spanish Inquisition was independent of the medieval
Inquisition but was also part of that history the framing generation
would have known and used to judge contemporary ideas. The
purpose of the Spanish Inquisition was to discover and punish
converted Jews (and later Muslims) who were insincere.232 It was
established in 1478 by King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella with the
reluctant approval of Pope Sixtus IV.233 The institution was entirely
controlled by the Spanish kings; the Pope’s only check on the
Inquisition was in appointing the nominees.234 In 1483, the Crown
created a new royal council of the Supreme and General Inquisition
to expand its operation throughout Spain. The notorious Tomas de
Torquemada was named Inquisitor General—the head of the
council—and was responsible for creating branches of the Inquisition
in various cities by establishing local tribunals.235 The Spanish
Inquisition was not finally abolished until 1834, nearly sixty years
after the Declaration of Independence was signed.236

228. WILL DURANT, THE AGE OF FAITH: A HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL CIVILIZATION—
CHRISTIAN, ISLAMIC, AND JUDAIC—FROM CONSTANTINE TO DANTE: A.D. 325–1300, at 779
(1950) [hereinafter DURANT, THE AGE OF FAITH].
229. Id.
230. WADE ROWLAND, GALILEO’S MISTAKE: A NEW LOOK AT THE EPIC
CONFRONTATION BETWEEN GALILEO AND THE CHURCH 249–50, 255–56 (2003).
231. See DURANT, THE AGE OF FAITH, supra note 228, at 782.
232. Id. at 208–09.
233. 2 THE CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY 650 (W. Ward et al. eds., 1934).
234. See DURANT, THE AGE OF FAITH, supra note 228, at 209.
235. See JOHN EDWARD LONGHURST, THE AGE OF TORQUEMADA 77 (1964).
236. See 4 HENRY CHARLES LEA, A HISTORY OF THE INQUISITION OF SPAIN 467–68
(1907) (noting that the Spanish Inquisition ended in 1834); 7 THE CAMBRIDGE MODERN
HISTORY, supra note 233, at 208–09 (noting that the Declaration of Independence was signed
in 1776).
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The first permanently established English settlement in the
United States, in Jamestown, Virginia, was established in 1607, a
mere four years after the end of Queen Elizabeth’s reign. Only fifty
years before, the Tower of London was employed by Catholic
Queen Mary (1553–1558) to imprison and execute Protestants, after
she revived the heresy laws at the end of 1554.237 The first Protestant
martyr was publicly burned in 1555.238 Between 250 and 300 were
burned alive, while hundreds more were imprisoned.239 Queen
Mary’s successor, Protestant Queen Elizabeth I (1558–1603)
attempted to ward off Catholic Europe and those who refused to
attend Church of England services by incarcerating bishops,
archbishops, and others for years.240 “There were as many executions
of Catholics under Elizabeth as there were Protestants under Mary,
though over a reign nine times as long.”241 James I (1603–1625)
continued to use the Tower as a prison, as the Tudors had done.242
In 1643, Parliamentarians seized control of the Tower during the
Civil War in 1643. Throughout the Restoration, the Tower’s
function as a state prison declined and it became a military
headquarters and munitions storehouse. The last execution was in
1747,243 long after the first wave of emigrants left for the New World
in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.244 The Bloody
Tower, as it is often called, is a London monument to the British
history of religious dominance and intolerance. It was
unquestionably stamped on the mindset of any British subject at the
237. 7 THE CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY, supra note 233, at 532–33.
238. Id. at 533.
239. DURANT, THE AGE OF FAITH, supra note 228, at 596–99; see also CHEYNEY, supra
note 189, at 325. The official Web site of the British monarchy places the figure at around 300
executed in three years. History of the Monarchy, at http://www.royal.gov.uk/output/
Page45.asp (last visited Nov. 5, 2004).
240. 7 THE CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY, supra note 233, at 586.
241. See JOHN COFFEY, PERSECUTION AND TOLERATION IN PROTESTANT ENGLAND:
1558–1689, at 169–70 (2000).
242. See RUSSELL CHAMBERLIN, THE TOWER OF LONDON 68–71 (1989).
243. Id. at 78.
244. See supra note 187 and accompanying text; see also CHAMBERLIN, supra note 242, at
78; CHEYNEY, supra note 189, at 403. Jamestown, founded in 1607 in Virginia, was the first
permanent English settlement in America. Earlier attempts at colonization were unsuccessful—
settlements founded in Newfoundland in 1583, in Virginia between 1585 and 1587, and again
in Virginia in 1602 were either abandoned or destroyed. Id. at 354–55.
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time, and scores of those subjects emigrated to the New World. The
founding generation and the Framers thought about organized
religion in this British context and did not have to leap to reach the
conclusions that granting governing power to religion was
dangerous and that religious individuals and entities needed to be
curbed.
C. John Locke, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison,
and John Stuart Mill on the No-Harm Rule
There is nearly universal agreement that the no-harm rule
undergirds and justifies criminal law, tort law, and regulatory laws (at
least those that prohibit harm to others).245 The no-harm rule was a
notion articulated by John Locke in the seventeenth century, widely
shared by the framing generation in the eighteenth century, and
entrenched in modern philosophy and law by the influential John
Stuart Mill in the nineteenth century.246 It was further elaborated in
the twentieth century by H.L.A. Hart and Joel Feinberg.247
John Locke believed in a robust right of conscience, or belief.248
He then argued that “God is the true proprietor” and therefore
human beings could not “belong to one another.”249 From this
245. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 60, at 370–71.
246. See M.N.S. SELLERS, AMERICAN REPUBLICANISM: ROMAN IDEOLOGY IN THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 133–41 (1994); SELLERS, SACRED FIRE, supra note 1, at
101–02.
247. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, PRINCIPLES FOR A FREE SOCIETY: RECONCILING
INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY WITH THE COMMON GOOD 50–54 (1998); JOEL FEINBERG, THE
MORAL LIMITS OF CRIMINAL LAW (1984); H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY 4–5
(1962); see also JOEL FEINBERG, 1 THE MORAL LIMITS OF CRIMINAL LAW 214 (1988); Joel
Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in DOING AND DESERVING (1970).
248. Locke described his thoughts on liberty in this letter:
[L]iberty of conscience is every man’s natural right, equally belonging to dissenters
as to themselves; and . . . nobody ought to be compelled in matters of religion
either by law or force. The establishment of this one thing would take away all
ground of complaints and tumults upon account of conscience . . . .
JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (William Popple trans., 1689), available
at http://www.constitution.org/jl/tolerati.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2004).
249. LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 45 (“If human beings belong to God, they
cannot belong to one another, or even to themselves. Since God is the true proprietor, no one
else has the right to damage or destroy his property.”). Russell L. Caplan offers helpful
commentary on Locke’s ideas:
Under [Locke’s] theory, individuals are born into a “state of nature,” that is,
without organized government, and agree out of “strong Obligations of Necessity,
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precept Locke derived a general “no-harm” principle. Individuals
were not to “take away, or impair the life, or what tends to the
preservation of the life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of
another.”250 For Locke, then, individuals joining together in society
had a general liberty of conscience, or belief, but the state
legitimately restrained those actions that harmed others.
Locke’s no-harm principle was taken as commonplace during the
framing era. Thomas Jefferson famously explained, “the legitimate
powers of government extend to such acts only as are injurious to
others. But it does me no injury for my neighbour to say there are
twenty gods, or no God. It neither picks my pocket nor breaks my
leg.”251 Freedom of belief and “free argument and debate” were
essential human rights, but, when those “principles break out into
overt acts against peace and good order,” it is the “rightful
purpose[] of civil government, for its officers to interfere.”252 He
articulated the same principle when he wrote to James Madison in
1788 to outline the rights he thought necessary to include in a bill of
rights. On the one hand, he backed a bill of rights, but he was also
conscious that rights had the capacity to “do evil.” Thus, he
explained what the “freedom of religion” in the bill of rights would
(and would not) accomplish: “The declaration that religious faith

Convenience, and Inclination” to live in political communities. In so contracting,
individuals must give up some of their natural rights so that the rest of those rights
may be more effectively secured. The sole legitimate purpose of government,
therefore, is the good of the contracting parties—the public. Accordingly,
government has a right only to act for the benefit of the governed, to protect its
citizens from rebellion within and invasion without.
Russell L. Caplan, The History and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 69 VA. L. REV.
223, 230 (1983).
250. LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 45, at 164; see also Caplan, supra note 249, at
230.
251. Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, in THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS
123 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984).
252. Thomas Jefferson, An Act for Establishing Religious Freedom, 1785, in 12 STATUTES
AT LARGE: BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA 84, 85 (photo. reprint
1969) (William Waller Hening ed., Richmond 1823). On the absolute right to believe, see also
Letter from Thomas Jefferson, to Benjamin Rush (Apr. 21, 1803), in 10 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 381 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1905) (referring to “the common right of
independent opinion, by answering questions of faith, which the laws have left between god
and himself”).
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shall be unpunished, does not give impunity to criminal acts dictated
by religious error.”253
Many in the framing era were distrustful of religious
organizations and clerics.254 Deists at the time, like Jefferson,
believed in Christ but were unwilling to align themselves with any
particular organized religion, because in their eyes most organized
religions were a corruption of Christianity.255 Thus, he declared: “To
the corruptions of Christianity I am indeed opposed; but not to the
genuine precepts of Jesus himself.”256 Among Christians other than
Deists, anticlericalism also was an entrenched viewpoint.257
James Madison—drafter of the First Amendment—equally
recognized the right to complete freedom of belief: “Religious
bondage shackles and debilitates the mind and unfits it for every
noble enterprise every expanded prospect.”258 He admired the
tolerance of religious beliefs in Pennsylvania, which exhibited a
“liberal catholic and equitable way of thinking as to the rights of
Conscience,”259 but discussions of “conscience” were discussions
about belief, and not conduct.260 His mentor, the Reverend John
Witherspoon, articulated the principle of no-harm in his Lectures on
Moral Philosophy as follows: “[A]nother object of civil laws is,
limiting citizens in the exercise of their rights, so that they may not
be injurious to one another, but that the public good may be
261
promoted.”
253. Letter from Thomas Jefferson, to James Madison (Jul. 31, 1788), in THE PAPERS
440 (Julian P. Boyd et al. eds., 1950).
254. See supra notes 187–244 and accompanying text (discussing Protestant mindset).
255. KERRY S. WALTERS, THE AMERICAN DEISTS: VOICES OF REASON AND DISSENT IN
THE EARLY REPUBLIC 106–40 (1992). Jefferson, of course, was not solitary in his beliefs.
Deists dominated the colleges during the latter eighteenth century. Id.
256. Letter from Thomas Jefferson, supra note 253, at 380.
257. See generally HAMBURGER, supra note 222.
258. ADRIENNE KOCH, MADISON’S “ADVICE TO MY COUNTRY” 15 (1966) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting James Madison).
259. Letter from James Madison, to William Bradford (Apr. 1, 1774), in 1 THE PAPERS
OF JAMES MADISON 112 (William T. Hutchinson et al. ed., 1962).
260. See Laura Underkuffler-Freund, The Separation of the Religious and the Secular: A
Foundational Challenge to First Amendment Theory, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 837, 893 (1995)
(“For virtually all groups [at the founding], conscience was seen as a distinctly rational process;
it involved the exercise of human reason, judgment, and understanding. Because of its
involvement with human rational processes, conscience involved elements of free will, choice,
and (ultimately) human responsibility.”).
261. John Witherspoon, Lectures on Moral Philosophy, Eloquence and Divinity, in 7 THE
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
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In the Memorial and Remonstrance, Madison expressed
apprehension about the impact of religious institutions on society:
What influence in fact have ecclesiastical establishments had on
Civil Society? In some instances they have been seen to erect a
spiritual tyranny on the ruins of the Civil authority; in many
instances they have been seen upholding the thrones of political
tyranny: in no instance have they been seen the guardians of the
liberties of the people. Rulers who wished to subvert the public
liberty, may have found an established Clergy convenient
auxiliaries.262

These concerns dogged him through his distinguished career in
public service. At the end of his presidency, he worried publicly that
“[t]he danger of silent accumulations & encroachments by
Ecclesiastical Bodies have not sufficiently engaged attention in the
U.S.”263
James Madison was particularly harsh regarding the potential
abuses of power by both religious institutions and especially the
clergy. When backed by state authority, he declared, the clergy “tend
to great ignorance and corruption, all of which facilitate the
execution of mischievous projects.”264 He castigated the state of
liberty at the time: “Poverty and luxury prevail among all sorts:
pride, ignorance, and knavery among the priesthood, and vice and
wickedness among the laity. . . . That diabolical, Hell-conceived
principle of persecution rages among some, and to their eternal
infamy, the clergy can furnish their quota of imps for such
business.”265
Jefferson and Madison envisioned the potential for great harm to
the public good when a religious organization abuses power.266
WORKS OF JOHN WITHERSPOON 148 (1815).
262. Madison, Memorial, supra note 225, at 301–02.
263. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE, supra note 151, at 121 (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting MADISON’S DETACHED MEMORANDA 554 (Elizabeth Fleet ed.,
1946)).
264. Letter from James Madison, supra note 259, at 105.
265. Id. at 106.
266. See, e.g., Madison, Memorial, supra note 225, at 298–304. Madison wrote:
Because experience witnesseth that ecclesiastical establishments, instead of
maintaining the purity and efficacy of Religion, have had a contrary operation.
During almost fifteen centuries has the legal establishment of Christianity been on
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Thus, neither they nor their fellow citizens ever contemplated
absolute liberty for religious organizations. Indeed, absolute liberty
(religious or otherwise) was anarchy and called licentiousness. The
early Americans’ notions were reasonable in light of their knowledge
of the excesses of religious dominance in Europe, including the
Inquisition, the Spanish Inquisition, the clash of power between the
Catholic and Protestant churches immediately preceding the
founding of the New World colonies, and the years of bloody
executions at the Tower of London.
As I have documented in a previous article, the dominant view at
the time of the framing was to apply the rule of law to the actions of
religious individuals and institutions.267 In other words, the no-harm
principle was widely accepted, even among religious believers. The
arguments some have made for a mandatory constitutional right to
avoid the application of the law to religious conduct, or for the
application of strict scrutiny to neutral, generally applicable laws that
substantially burden religious entities268 simply cannot be
supported.269 Church autonomy—in the sense of an independent

trial. What have been its fruits? More or less in all places, pride and indolence in the
Clergy, ignorance and servility in the laity, in both, superstition, bigotry and
persecution.
Id. Similarly, Thomas Jefferson wrote:
Had not the Roman government permitted free inquiry, Christianity could never
have been introduced. Had not free inquiry been indulged at the era of the
Reformation, the corruptions of Christianity could not have been purged away. If it
be restrained now, the present corruptions will be protected, and new ones
encouraged.
Jefferson, supra note 251, at 221–22.
267. See generally Hamilton, supra note 12.
268. Laycock, supra note 50, at 1416–17; Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise
Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1128 (1990); McConnell,
supra note 13, at 1415 (“[C]onstitutionally compelled exemptions were within the
contemplation of the framers and ratifiers as a possible interpretation of the free exercise
clause.”); see also Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against
Discretionary Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 555 (1991); Michael W.
McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 3 (2000).
269. See generally Frederick M. Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation: The Regrettable
Indefensibility of Religious Exemptions, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 555, 574 (1998)
(“[T]he historical moment for exemptions has come and gone. There no longer exists a
plausible explanation of why religious believers—and only believers—are constitutionally
entitled to be excused from complying with otherwise legitimate laws that burden practices
. . . .”); Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical
Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915, 917 (1992); Hamilton, supra note 12; William P.
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power to act outside the law—was not part of the Framers’ intent,
the framing generation’s understanding, or the vast majority—and
the best—of the Supreme Court’s free exercise jurisprudence.270
As Justice Scalia explained in Boerne, the most plausible reading
of early free exercise enactments permitted the application of laws
protecting the public good to religious institutions:
Religious exercise shall be permitted so long as it does not violate
general laws governing conduct. The “provisos” in the enactments
negate a license to act in a manner “unfaithfull to the Lord
Proprietary” (Maryland Act Concerning Religion of 1649), or
“behav[e]” in other than a “peaceabl[e] and quie[t]” manner
(Rhode Island Charter of 1663), or “disturb the public peace”
(New Hampshire Constitution), or interfere with the “peace [and]
safety of th[e] State” (New York, Maryland, and Georgia
Constitutions), or “demea[n]” oneself in other than a “peaceable
and orderly manner” (Northwest Ordinance of 1787). At the time
these provisos were enacted, keeping “peace” and “order” seems to
have meant, precisely, obeying the laws.271

In fact, “[e]very breach of a law is against the peace.”272
However, the no-harm principle was not only advocated in the
framing era, but rather has continued to be persistent in American
political thought. The most influential philosopher of the nineteenth
century in the English-speaking world was John Stuart Mill, who
further developed the principle of no-harm. He set forth the

Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise Exemption, 40 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 357, 411–12 (1990); Ellis West, The Case Against a Right to Religious-Based
Exemptions, 4 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 591, 624 (1989) (rejecting
constitutionally compelled exemptions, but not legislative exemptions); see also Gedicks, supra
note 61, at 950–51 (“[I]n the long run, no effective defense is possible [for judicially
mandated exemptions]. To the extent that a residuum of religious exemptions persists under
state law . . . , I say enjoy them while they last.” (footnote omitted)).
270. The Warren Court’s distortion of the Free Exercise Clause from a principle of noharm to a virtually unfettered individual right was contrary to the intent of the First
Amendment and fundamental common sense. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 423
(1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Those situations in which the Constitution may require
special treatment on account of religion are, in my view, few and far between, and this view is
amply supported by the course of constitutional litigation in this area.”).
271. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 539 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(citations omitted).
272. Queen v. Lane, 87 Eng. Rep. 884, 885 (Q.B. 1704).
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following maxims, which came to be known collectively as the Harm
Principle:
[F]irst, that the individual is not accountable to society for his
actions, in so far as these concern the interests of no person but
himself. . . . Secondly, that for such actions as are prejudicial to the
interests of others, the individual is accountable, and may be
subjected either to social or to legal punishments, if society is of
opinion that the one or the other is requisite for its protection.273

Mill thereby refined the Lockean principle. It is a firm rejection of
individual (or institutional) autonomy from the laws that protect
others.
Mill also advocated absolute dominion over one’s mind,274 which
entailed tolerance of conflicting beliefs: “If all mankind minus one,
were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary
opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one
person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing
mankind.”275 The universe of actions was divided into two
categories: those that will not harm others and those that will. While
the former category should not be regulated, the latter category
should be.
Where the legislature outlawed actions that harmed no one,
Mill’s moral philosophy demanded liberty and would have voided
the law. But where the legislature outlawed actions that did harm
others, the law was valid.
In the 1960s, H.L.A. Hart elaborated upon Mill’s views. Hart
also believed that the line to be drawn between legitimate laws and
illegitimate laws rested on the Harm Principle.276 Joel Feinberg
further developed this theory.277 By the latter half of the twentieth
century, the no-harm rule was widely accepted as the best way to

273. MILL, supra note 46, at 114.
274. Id. at 11.
275. Id. at 18.
276. Hart believed that “[r]ecognition of individual liberty as a value involves, as a
minimum, acceptance of the principle that the individual may do what he wants, even if others
are distressed when the learn what it is that he does—unless, of course, there are other good
grounds for forbidding it.” HART, supra note 247.
277. See generally Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in DOING AND
DESERVING (1970); JOEL FEINBERG, 1 THE MORAL LIMITS OF CRIMINAL LAW 214 (1988).
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explain the legitimacy of criminal, tort, and regulatory laws. It
278
remains the dominant approach.
The no-harm reasoning as it developed over the centuries brings
the Supreme Court’s Religion Clause jurisprudence into better
focus. Reynolds v. United States was decided soon after Mill’s
passing.279 The Reynolds decision reflects two of the crucial elements
of Mill’s reasoning. First, Reynolds explicitly recognized the absolute
right to believe.280 Second, it granted the legislature the power to
make religious conduct illegal, at least where the religious conduct
harmed others.281 There was no question in the Court’s reasoning
that the federal antipolygamy statute prevented and punished a
severe societal harm.282
Mill’s third category—that it is immoral to regulate actions that
hurt no one else—is not a doctrinal factor in the Supreme Court’s
religion-clause doctrine, but is implicit in its political theory. The
Court in Employment Division v. Smith saw a natural limitation on
the enactment of laws burdening religious conduct in United States’
values:
Values that are protected against government interference through
enshrinement in the Bill of Rights are not thereby banished from
the political process. Just as a society that believes in the negative
protection accorded to the press by the First Amendment is likely
to enact laws that affirmatively foster the dissemination of the
printed word, so also a society that believes in the negative
protection accorded to religious belief can be expected to be
solicitous of that value in its legislation as well.283

278. See Epstein, supra note 60, at 370–71.
279. Mill died in 1873. THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA (6th ed. 2001), available at
http://www.bartleby.com/65/mi/Mill-JS.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2004). Reynolds was
decided in 1879. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
280. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164 (determining what the Free Exercise Clause guaranteed,
the Court said, “Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was left
free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order”).
281. Id.
282. Id. at 164–66.
283. 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
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III. PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL THEORIES IN SUPPORT OF
THE NO-HARM RULE AND AGAINST CHURCH AUTONOMY
Even though history supports the general application of the noharm principle to religious institutions, various theories might be
advanced to justify church autonomy. But an examination of each of
these theories leads to the conclusion that the no-harm rule is more
grounded and better supported in these theories than the less
nuanced notion of church autonomy. Scholars have argued the
existence of church autonomy based on various theories, including
utilitarianism, deterrence, Catholic thought, and Protestant thought,
among others. However, each of these philosophical/theological
theories supports the application of the no-harm rule to all
individuals in society, including religious institutions and clergy.
One of the missing voices in the discussions concerning the
regulation of religious institutions in this conference is a
philosophical or theological defense of church autonomy. The
defenders of church autonomy tend to assume without explanation
that “church autonomy” is a good thing, without delving into a
more nuanced defense. As opposed to a notion of church autonomy,
the no-harm rule has a lengthy and distinguished philosophical
pedigree, as discussed above, and can be justified on both a
utilitarian and deontological basis.
Utilitarianism is a branch of consequentialist philosophy284 by
which one judges the rightness of an action according to whether the
action leads to the greatest public good.285 Utilitarianism has been
broken down into act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism. Act
utilitarianism analyzes the consequences of each individual act in
light of the larger good, weighs those consequences, and then
determines the utility of individual actions.286 Rule utilitarianism, in

284. I am indebted to Mark Tushnet for suggesting this line of inquiry.
285. See Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation,
reprinted in A BENTHAM READER 78 (Mary Peter Mack ed., 1969); see also Leo Katz, Root of
Formalism: Form and Substance in Law and Morality, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 566, 567 (1999).
286. “The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest
Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote
happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.” John Stuart Mill, On
Utilitarianism, reprinted in ESSENTIAL WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL 189, 194 (Max Lerner
ed., 1961); see also Definition of Act-Utilitarianism, at http://www.utilitarianism.com/
actutil.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2004).
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contrast, focuses on particular rules and asks which rule, if always
followed, would produce the greatest good.287 In fact, for purposes
of legal analysis, these two approaches are virtually identical, and
therefore I will use the generic term “utilitarianism” to analyze
religious institutions. In either case, ethical choices are made in light
of their consequences. Ultimately, church autonomy cannot be
defended on utilitarian grounds.
Deontology, or libertarianism, asks a separate question: whether
a choice is intrinsically good.288 For the deontologists, the correct
action is not linked inextricably to the question of the public good.
Rather, the moral question turns on individual rights and whether
the moral choice is good in itself, without reference to a general
outcome. Robert Nozick prescribes a libertarian theory that attempts
to move beyond anarchy to utopia by identifying “side constraints”
on individual action, which are constraints defined by harm done to
another individual.289 Thus, the deontologist asks what would be the
best action taken by the church,290 not whether the church’s action is
good for society. Nozick includes in the calculation of what is the
best action some consideration of “side constraints,” a telling and
necessary caveat for those libertarians who must live in society (which
is all of them). Even under a deontological theory, church autonomy
cannot be justified in many circumstances because the intrinsic value
of the civil right, for example the protection of children from
physical abuse, weighs more heavily in the balance than the intrinsic
value of an autonomous religious institution. The rule that forbids
harm to others—even at the expense of some autonomy for religious
institutions—is favored over autonomy under both philosophical
approaches.

287. See MILL, supra note 46, at 194; JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF
JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 88–125 (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 1999) (1832); see also
Definition of Rule-Utilitarianism, at http://www.utilitarianism.com/ruleutil.htm (last visited
Nov. 5, 2004).
288. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 33–35 (1974).
289. Id. at 32.
290. See Brady, supra note 11; Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 35. Paul Ramsey defends a
deontological approach to Christian ethics in his book Basic Christian Ethics, 235–45 (1977).
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A. Utilitarianism Supports the No-Harm Rule and
Does Not Support Church Autonomy
The Supreme Court has operated primarily out of a utilitarian
framework in its religious institution cases. Following the guiding
principle of no-harm, the Court has permitted religious institutions
the broadest rights when the likelihood of involuntary harm to
others is at its least—in the belief cases.291 But the Court also has
permitted restrictions of religious institutions when the likelihood
that others will be harmed is at its greatest—in the conduct cases.292
When religious institutions are capable of harming others, the Court
has deferred to the legislature’s determination of the cost to society
and followed the legislature’s dictate to restrict the liberty of
religious institutions to act. 293
The use of a utilitarian framework is in fact the best explanation
of the Court’s decision in Jones v. Wolf to permit the application of
“neutral principles of law” in contested church property cases.294 In
that case, the Court provided legal guidance for churches in the
future to avoid the sort of dispute that prompted the Jones litigation:
Through appropriate reversionary clauses and trust provisions,
religious societies can specify what is to happen to church property

291. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877–79 (1990).
“Laws,” we said, “are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot
interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices. . . . Can a
man excuse his practices to the contrary because of his religious belief? To permit
this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law
of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.”
Id. (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–67 (1879)); see also McDaniel v.
Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626 (1978) (holding that the government may not impose special
disabilities based on religious belief); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961) (holding
that the government may not compel affirmation of religious belief); United States v. Ballard,
322 U.S. 78, 86–88 (1944) (ruling that the government may not punish those with religious
beliefs it believes false).
292. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 878–80; Gen. Council on Fin. and Admin. v. Superior Court
of California, 439 U.S. 1355, 1372–73 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1978); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (ruling that a mother could be prosecuted under
child labor laws); Reynolds, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1879) (upholding a bigamy conviction).
293. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 878–80; Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization,
493 U.S. 378 (1990); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 145; see
also Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 608 (1979); Gen. Council, 439 U.S. at 1372–73 (Rehnquist,
Circuit Justice 1978) (denying motion to stay).
294. See Wolf, 443 U.S. at 608.
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in the event of a particular contingency, or what religious body will
determine the ownership in the event of a schism or doctrinal
controversy. In this manner, a religious organization can ensure
that a dispute over the ownership of church property will be
resolved in accord with the desires of the members. 295

By sketching this legal map, the Court rejected church autonomy in
favor of a system in which all of society—including the church and
its members—would benefit. If churches followed the Court’s
principles from the beginning, there would be fewer conflicts, fewer
cases, and more stability in terms of church property ownership. The
impulse was utilitarian, not autonomy.
The utilitarian asks whether in the legal system the greater good
is achieved through more or less restriction of a given institution or
practice. Church autonomy, in contrast, would permit religious
institutions to operate with a bare minimum of government
regulation, on the theory that the public good is best served under
such a regime. Church autonomy would argue against imposing a
negligence standard on hiring decisions.296 This conclusion, however,
cannot be squared with the utilitarian’s question regarding the
greater good.
The no-harm rule would tend to support laws that reduce the
likelihood that religious institutions will harm others. Its utility lies
in its ability to decrease suffering and therefore increase the public
good. Examples include torts, regulatory laws, and criminal laws.
The no-harm rule has two prongs: belief and conduct, which I will
analyze under utilitarianism.
1. Utilitarian analysis of the absolute protection of belief
The absolute protection of belief grants an unlimited right to
individuals to believe whatever they choose. The question for
utilitarianism is whether such absolute protection also serves the
greater good. The absolute protection of belief serves a number of
social ends. First, it increases the likelihood that there will be a
variety of beliefs from which to choose. In a society of imperfect
295. Id. at 603–04.
296. This is in fact the argument made by Professors Lupu and Tuttle at this Conference.
See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 35.
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humans, each with different and limited views, the absolute
protection of belief fosters the search for truth.297 When that belief is
translated into speech or political action, religious belief “can be a
resource for alternative human visions that challenge and enrich
discussion of public policy.”298 Second, it prevents the situation in
which those with unusual beliefs are driven to rebel against society, a
phenomenon sometimes called the “venting function.”299 Third, it
increases the collective creativity of the culture, which furthers
industry, the arts, and scholarship.300
Failure to absolutely protect beliefs severely undermines society
by reducing the robustness of the marketplace of ideas, by creating
incentives for original thinkers to violently rebel, and by stifling
creativity, and therefore industry, the arts, and scholarship. One
might argue, however, that permitting the absolute protection of
belief contributes to the dissemination of beliefs that are dangerous if
they persuade others to act. It also permits individuals and groups to
harbor antisocial beliefs, including racist, violent, and sexist views.
However, in the absence of action (in the form of speech or
conduct), those beliefs do not harm their targets.
For the utilitarian, these concerns are to be weighed against each
other, and while the threat to the culture of dangerous beliefs is not

297. See THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6–7 (1970);
Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 880
(1963).
298. Sullivan, supra note 2, at 174.
299. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
Those who won our independence . . . knew . . . that it is hazardous to discourage
thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds
hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies in the
opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and that
the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones.
Id.; THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 12
(1966); Letter from Thomas Jefferson, to Elijah Boardman (July 3, 1801), quoted in Charles
A. Beard, The Great American Tradition: A Challenge for the Fourth of July, 123 NATION 7, 8
(1923) (“We have nothing to fear from the demoralizing reasonings of some, if others are left
free to demonstrate their errors and especially when the law stands ready to punish the first
criminal act produced by the false reasonings; these are safer corrections than the conscience of
the judge.”).
300. The Founders’ belief in the importance of this function is evident in the
Constitution’s limitation of time for copyrights “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 785–86 (1988).
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negligible, the benefits to society are enormous. On a utilitarian
analysis, it is difficult to fault the rule favoring the absolute
protection of belief.
2. Utilitarian analysis of the regulation of conduct that harms others
I will now apply a utilitarian analysis to a particular legal situation
governing religious institutions. It is obvious that under a utilitarian
analysis, the most serious crimes, even when done by religious
entities, must be capable of regulation. These include murder, rape,
theft, kidnapping, and assault. Many have believed that the closer
questions arise in the tort context—in particular, liability for
negligent hiring where a religious institution failed to do background
checks on particular clergy, and the clergy subsequently sexually
abused children. I have chosen this example not only because it has
contemporary application, but also because the result may not be as
crystal clear as issues involving criminal law or regulatory rules
affecting safety and health.
If religious institutions were liable for negligent hiring, their
liberty to choose clergy would be incrementally reduced by the
requirement that they engage in background checks for every eligible
clergy. Under utilitarian analysis, then, one must weigh the
diminution in liberty against the good arising out of churches having
the information provided by background checks.
In this era, the burden on the religious institution of doing a
background check on a potential clergy member is not substantial.
Businesses routinely do background checks on employees.301 Day
care centers, hospitals, and nursing homes and services are required
to do similar background checks.302 Even families typically do
301. John Bonné, Most Firms Now Use Background Checks, MSN News, at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4018280 (Jan. 21, 2004) (“A report from the Society for
Human Resource Management shows that 80 percent of companies said they run a criminal
check on applicants before hiring, up nearly 30 percent from 1996—making the practice as
common as checking references or prior work histories.”).
302. See ILL. ADMIN. CODE. tit. 77 § 250.420 (2003) (requiring hospitals to perform
background checks on employees); Julie A. Braun & Cheryl C. Mitchell, Recent Developments
in Seniors’ Law, 34 TORT & INS. L.J. 669, 690 (1999) (“The Elder Care Safety Act of
1997 . . . requires nursing facilities, home health agencies, and hospice programs to conduct
criminal and abusive work history background checks for nurse aids and home health aides
under the Medicare and Medicaid programs.”); Michael Gibbons & Dana Campbell, Liability
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background checks on those working in the home.303 Criminal
background checks are relatively inexpensive,304 and because there is
so much demand for them, the paths to such information are fairly
clear.305 It is true that criminal background checks will not capture
some pedophiles, so in order to avoid being found negligent, the
religious institution may have to do more. This could include oldfashioned methods of checking potential employees, such as
contacting references and asking about character, or more
specifically, asking why a seminarian or priest was reassigned from a
previous position. Even these old-fashioned methods are not
particularly onerous, and they present a negligible burden compared
to the harm that the duty is intended to prevent. Psychological
testing is also likely to be necessary to avoid charges of negligence.
Many religious institutions already impose such testing on their
candidates.306

of Recreation and Competitive Sport Organizations for Sexual Assaults on Children by
Administrators, Coaches and Volunteers, 13 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 185, 209 (2003)
(“[M]ost states require teachers and day care workers to undergo background checks as a
condition of their employment.”); Tony Fong, Necessary Knowledge, NAT’L COUNCIL OF
STATE BDS. OF NURSING, available at http://www.ncsbn.org/news/ncsbninthenews_
55E82069B54E4876928D9B9E331FD235.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2004) (“Currently,
hospitals must check with the National Practitioner Data Bank when they hire doctors. The
databank contains information about criminal convictions, license suspensions and medical
fraud convictions on doctors’ records.”).
303. There are many services that perform preemployment screening for in-home
employees like nannies and housekeepers. The fees associated with these services depend on
the number and depth of checks requested, but most basic screenings cost around fifty dollars.
See, e.g., http://www.nannycheck.com (last visited Nov. 5, 2004).
304. See Richard Burnett, Do a Thorough Background Check on Workers—or Let the Hirer
Beware, Bankrate.com (May 15, 2000), at http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/biz/
Biz_ops/20000515.asp (“It doesn’t take a Big 5 accountant or a rocket scientist to figure the
value of pre-employment background checks. It’s simple. Pay as little as $15 to run a basic
criminal record check.”).
305. See generally http://www.backgroundchecks.com (last visited Nov. 5, 2004)
(offering several options for background checks, including a “US OneSEARCH Sex Offender”
search, which allows subscribers to simultaneously search sex offender records of thirty-nine
states).
306. For example, the Evangelical Presbyterian Church requires candidates for the
ministerial positions to submit “cop[ies] of physical examination from physician and
psychological assessment results.” PROCEDURE MANUAL FOR MINISTERIAL AND CANDIDATES
COMMITTEES 27–28 (2003), available at http://www.epc.org/general-assembly/
documents/Procedure-Manual.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2004). One of the recommendations
of the Catholic Church’s Lay Review Board was to institute more intense screening of
seminary candidates. NATIONAL REVIEW BOARD FOR THE PROTECTION OF CHILDREN AND
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On the other side of the scale and weighing against requiring
background checks are the cost to the religious institution’s freedom
to choose whomever it wishes to be a clergy member and the
financial cost of the background checks. As discussed above, the
financial cost is de minimis. The restriction on freedom posed by
background checks is also minimal. Negligent hiring liability,
especially when the concern is to prevent criminal child abuse does
not dictate who can be chosen as clergy, but rather only requires that
the religious institution know the background of those it places in
positions of authority in proximity to children. The religious
institution remains free to place its clergy where its theology directs,
but it assumes the risk if harm results when it either fails to obtain
the information that was available regarding the danger of the
individual to children and certainly when it knowingly ignores such
information. The knowledge gleaned from the background check—if
used—is likely to save the religious institution money in the long
run. Because the potential liability would encourage religious
institutions to place fewer individuals who abuse children in
positions of power, the cost to the institution of litigation arising
from child abuse would decline. The cost of litigation following
clergy abuse is likely to be far higher than the cost of the background
check and more costly than the de minimis restriction on the
religious institution’s actions. Weighing the benefits that flow from
the restriction against its costs, it would appear that negligent hiring
liability is not contrary to the best interests of religious institutions
and is clearly in favor of children’s welfare.307
The religious institutions, however, are likely to respond that the
cost of background checks may be de minimis, but there are other
elements of the tort law governing employment that do not impose
such a small cost. For example, religious organizations are fighting
the imposition of punitive damages in clergy abuse cases.308 While
YOUNG PEOPLE, A REPORT ON THE CRISIS IN THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN THE UNITED
STATES 140–41 (2004), available at http://www.usccb.org/nrb/nrbstudy/nrbreport.pdf
(last visited Nov. 5, 2004) [hereinafter REPORT ON THE CRISIS IN THE CATHOLIC CHURCH].
307. See Tremper, supra note 157, at 439 (“Failure to hold charitable actors sufficiently
responsible for their injury-causing activities may also threaten the legitimacy of the charitable
sector. Thus, the tort rules for charitable actors should comport at least roughly with moral
intuitions about responsibility and justice.”).
308. In cases where punitives have been proven under standing law, they have been

1167

2HAM-FIN

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

12/1/2004 7:29 PM

[2004

the monetary cost of a background check is small, punitive damages
can be quite large. The benefit of the damages lies in their power to
deter future bad behavior and to punish the person for their
wrongful action.309 In the case of imposing punitive damages against
the Catholic Church for the tortious actions of abusive priests, the
justification is the same as that of any other master/servant
relationship: “the imposition of punitive damages upon the employer
serves as a deterrent to the employment of unfit persons for
important positions.”310
Opponents argue that such funds were never intended for abuse
victims, and that they should go toward the good works for which
they were originally intended. In effect, they are arguing that the
funds’ intended purposes are greater in value than the deterrence
value of a punitive damage award. They are asking the courts to
weigh more heavily in the balance their contributing members than
their victims. The cost being claimed is that the institution cannot
choose at will where its funds are directed. The institution, however,
created the choice by permitting the victimization of children, so to
now argue that punitives burden the choice is specious. Indeed, if
that is their world view, deterrence is even more necessary than it
might have been thought previously. This argument is attractive to
many on its surface, but it shows how important it is to hold the

permitted to go forward. See Isely v. Capuchin Province, 880 F. Supp. 1138, 1159 (E.D.
Mich. 1995) (deciding to submit punitive damages to jury for “non-abusing” defendant
church because, under the law of Wisconsin, punitive damages are only “available when the
defendant acts in wanton, willful, or reckless disregard,” and the plaintiff did not meet the clear
and convincing standard); Roman Catholic Diocese v. Secter, 966 S.W.2d 286, 291 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1998) (rejecting Archdiocese argument and upholding punitive damage award of
$700,000 on appeal); Mrozka v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, 482 N.W.2d 806,
812–13 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (upholding punitive damage award for clergy sexual abuse in
the face of archdiocese argument that punitive damages were inappropriate where the jury
originally awarded $2,700,000 in punitive damages, but reducing the award to $187,000);
Hutchison ex rel. Hutchison v. Luddy, 742 A.2d 1052, 1059 (Pa. 1999) (vacating order of
Superior Court that reversed a jury’s award of punitive damages in the amount of $1,050,000
against bishop and archdiocese because the Supreme Court found “[t]heir inaction in the face
of such a menace is not only negligent, [but] it is reckless and abhorrent”); see also Associated
Press, Legal Group Argues Church Shouldn't Pay Punitive Damages in Lawsuits, Sept. 1, 2004,
available at http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/0901churchlawsuits-ON.html (last
visited Sept. 4, 2004) (reporting The Becket Fund’s filing of an amicus brief against punitive
damages in a recent Arizona clergy abuse case).
309. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1979).
310. Id. § 909, cmt. b.

1168

2HAM-FIN

1099]

12/1/2004 7:29 PM

Religious Institutions and the No-Harm Doctrine

institution liable to punitive damages in these cases. If the institution
is culpable, and believers know that their donations are at risk, then
perhaps they will monitor their own institution better and discard
the blind trust that permits their institution to operate in such a
reprehensible way that its actions justify punitive damages.
Even if a religious institution could show that the cost of the
background check or of the punitive damages would bankrupt the
church and even put it out of existence, the religious institution
cannot win under a utilitarian analysis. It is difficult to imagine a
more important social interest than protecting children from physical
and sexual abuse. The interest is even higher when the children are
likely to trust the individuals who would abuse them, as in the case
of clergy. Clergy hold special places of privilege in their religious
circles, which means that negligently letting a pedophile into the
circle puts children at greater risk than if the individual were a clerk
at a store. Even when weighing the interest of the children in being
protected from pedophiles in positions of trust against the continued
existence of a particular religious institution, the religious institution
loses. Indeed, it would be unconstitutional for a legislature to take a
position on whether a religious institution flourishes or expires. In
the United States, religious institutions are part of a public market in
belief, and it is the people, as believers, that choose whether a church
will flourish or not, not the government. The government has no
legitimate interest in choosing public policy based on the religious
institution’s continued existence, especially where that policy has
been threatened by the institution’s own decisions. Thus, when a
religious institution is decimated by its illegal actions, society is not
harmed by the disappearance of that one institution. This is not a
threat to the marketplace in religions per se, because the vast
majority of religious institutions (and individuals) will be lawabiding.
A cost-benefit analysis, however, is insufficient to fully answer the
utilitarian question, which also requires the determination whether
society at large will be better off with the rule. The cost to society of
clergy abuse is enormous, and includes the victim’s (the family’s and
the community’s) physical and emotional suffering, the cost of
therapy and treatment, the reduced productivity of the victim in later
life, and the cost of prosecuting the perpetrators and litigating civil
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harms. The increased costs in time and effort to the religious
institution to obtain background checks simply cannot compare. In
light of the extreme cost to society, the cost of punitive damages also
fails to weigh in favor of autonomy. The greater good is served even
when the religious institution bears a substantial financial burden.
B. The Libertarian Approach to the No-Harm Rule
The libertarian’s or deontologist’s approach is different from the
utilitarian’s in method, but not in outcome. The libertarian examines
the intrinsic good in the rule and the actions governed.
1. The absolute protection of belief
The first prong of the no-harm rule, that belief is absolutely
protected, is in fact a restatement of strict libertarianism. It protects
liberty without any possibility of regulation.
2. The libertarian analysis of the rule permitting conduct to be
regulated
Deontology would ask first whether imposing background
checks on a church violates that church’s intrinsic right to autonomy
and whether the rule that religious institutions must investigate the
backgrounds of potential clergy is intrinsically good. The intrinsic
good of the rule favoring background checks lies in the civil rights of
children, which have been codified in the international United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.311 The rights of the

311. The international Convention on the Rights of the Child, which codifies the
customary international law of children’s civil rights, was adopted and opened for signature,
ratification, and accession by G.A. Res. 94/25, U.N. GAOR (Nov. 20, 1989). It entered into
force on September 20, 1990. Convention of the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, U.N. 28
I.L.M. 1448 [hereinafter Convention on the Rights of the Child]. The Convention, among
other things, makes the best interest of the child a primary consideration of courts and
administrative bodies, ensures the protection and care of the child necessary for his or her wellbeing, and requires “that the institutions, services and facilities responsible for the care or
protection of children shall conform with the standards established by competent authorities,
particularly in the areas of safety, health, in the number and suitability of their staff, as well as
competent supervision.” Id. at art. 3. Additionally, the Convention requires the protection of
children “from all forms of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent
treatment, maltreatment or exploitation, including sexual abuse, while in the care of parent(s),
legal guardian(s) or any other person who has the care of the child.” Id. at art. 19 (emphasis
added). The protective measures should include judicial involvement when appropriate. The
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religious institution reside in the libertarian notion of freedom from
government and judicial involvement in all matters pertaining to
clergy, or, more narrowly, the right to be free from any rule akin to a
licensing requirement.312 There is a problem for deontology in
general when rights must be weighed against each other, because the
theory in some of its versions rests on an assumption that rights are
intrinsic, and therefore unassailable.313
In this situation, however, weighing rights against each other is
unavoidable. Deontology thus weighs two civil rights against each
other: the church’s liberty interest or right to be free from any
government oversight (or any rule even remotely akin to licensure),
and the rights of the child to be free from sexual abuse. The rights of
the child include having public policy interests considered in the
“best interest of the child.”314 The best interest of the child demands
that religious institutions take reasonable steps to obtain information
to judge whether a particular employee in proximity of children is in
the best interest of children. On this reasoning, encouraging
background checks through tort liability would seem quite valuable.
The deontological right of the religious institution, on the other
hand, is more attenuated. While there may be a right based in
libertarian notions to be free from some government or judicial
involvement, there can be no absolute right. For example, there can
be no question that the right of a religious institution to be free from
judicial oversight cannot extend to murder.
Perhaps, however, the religious institution would nuance its
argument by asserting that it is not claiming absolute liberty, but
rather the solitary right to determine who its clergy are and to
determine the reasons for choosing clergy and for dismissing them.

United States is a signatory to the Convention; to date, however, the Senate has not yet
ratified the treaty. The United States and Somalia are the only countries to sign the treaty but
fail to ratify it. 1 Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, pt. I, at 283, U.N.
Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/21. The treaty’s provisions, however, reflect international consensus
on its principles, and therefore, even without ratification, the United States is bound by its
principles as a matter of customary international law. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS § 102 (1987).
312. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 35.
313. See generally Kenneth W. Simons, Deontology, Negligence, Tort and Crime, 76 B.U.
L. REV. 273 (1996).
314. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 311, at 1450.
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Background checks infringe on that right by adding another criterion
for decision. This is a typical argument in clergy abuse cases. This
argument, though, is a red herring, because it is no different from
the argument for absolute liberty. The only difference is that here
the religious institution is suggesting that it should be immunized
regardless of the consequences of its religious decisions in placing
clergy. In effect, the interests of the child, on this understanding, are
completely subjugated to a right to place clergy at will.
No civilized society could tolerate such liberty or licentiousness,
and therefore no respectable theory—not even Nozick’s libertarian
approach—advocates absolute liberty of conduct. Nozick follows the
libertarian path but then draws the line on liberty by introducing the
concept of “side constraints” on one’s actions. He articulates the
same no-harm principle present in Locke, Madison, Jefferson, and
Mill: “Side constraints express the inviolability of other persons.”315
In other words, one person’s liberty ends when another person is
violated, and rights determinations involve line drawing, not
absolutism. The introduction of side constraints into libertarian
theory transforms Nozick’s theory into one that is consistent with
the Supreme Court’s recognition of ordered, rather than absolute,
liberty.
Professors Lupu and Tuttle suggest that imposing negligent
hiring theories and an obligation to engage in background checks on
religious organizations is tantamount to a licensing scheme, which
has been disfavored in constitutional analysis.316 The problem with
their approach, however, is twofold. First, their analysis begs the
question by relabeling the tort in disfavored First Amendment terms.
Second, their argument glosses over dispositive differences. A true
licensing scheme would have the government choosing and releasing
clergy members at will, or would give the government the final word
on who will be a clergy member. In that circumstance, the religious
organization’s decisionmaking has been taken over by the
government, leading to obvious Establishment Clause concerns. The
serious problems with such a licensing scheme, however, do not

315. NOZICK, supra note 288, at 32.
316. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 35 (justifying a rule against negligent hiring liability
on the theory that it is tantamount to a licensing scheme).

1172

2HAM-FIN

1099]

12/1/2004 7:29 PM

Religious Institutions and the No-Harm Doctrine

necessarily translate into an argument against tort theories that
encourage background checks.
The two legal regimes are quite distinct: In the licensing scheme,
the religious institution’s decisions are displaced by the government.
Under the tort theory, the religious institution makes its own
decisions but is held responsible for the harm its conduct produces.
The former dishonors the absolute right to believe, by letting the
government make the choice. In contrast, the latter honors the right
to believe and, at the same time, the right of others to avoid harm.
Thus, even with a tort, like a negligent hiring theory, by
encouraging background checks, the religious institution retains the
right to choose its clergy. If it chooses those whom it knows are
potential pedophiles, it simply assumes the risk. That is liberty, even
if it is the sort of liberty freighted with social responsibility, such as
the liberty identified by libertarian Nozick.317
Both the utilitarian and the deontological philosophical theories
respect and support the rule of no-harm to others. In contrast, the
church autonomy theory is difficult to defend under either theory. A
pure libertarian theory, without Nozick’s side constraints, would
favor the church autonomy notion however. But even Nozick does
not favor a regime of unrestrained licentiousness. That sort of
libertarianism cannot be squared with a society of equals in a
republican form of government; at a minimum, individuals must be
charged with the responsibility of avoiding harm to others.
C. Deterrence Theory, Which Is Based on a No-Harm Principle,
Does Not Support Church Autonomy
Professor Brady argues that church autonomy is necessary
because churches provide important benefits to society.318 Professors
Lupu and Tuttle argue in favor of a default rule, akin to that
employed in New York Times v. Sullivan, in order to avoid even the
semblance of a clergy licensing scheme.319 What neither theory

317. See generally NOZICK, supra note 288, at 32; Carmella, supra note 9, at 1033.
318. See Brady, supra note 11.
319. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 35; see also N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S 254,
281–82 (1964) (“Any one claiming to be defamed by the communication must show actual
malice or go remediless. This privilege extends to a great variety of subjects, and includes
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adequately takes into account is the human character of religious
institutions. Religious institutions are not merely religious, as in
holy, or focused on higher values. Many are beneficent in various
ways, to be sure, but beneficence is not even necessarily the religious
institution’s primary or dominant character when the focus is the
public good. These are complex institutions that are run and staffed
by humans who are inherently imperfect. This reality is, after all, the
world view on which the constitutional scheme is based.320
According to the Framers, humans are inherently likely to abuse
whatever power they hold, and only a structured society based on
the rule of law, and a structured Constitution pitting various power
centers against each other, could forestall the inevitable temptations
to abuse power.321 Unlike government, which is checked by
constitutional structures and principles, religious institutions and
individuals are private entities and therefore, if they are to be
checked, the rule of law must be applied. So long as the law does not
target the religious institution, or religion in general, and so long as
it does not mandate particular beliefs, it is the obligation of the
courts to apply the law.322 Far from being constitutionally required,
exemptions are the task of the legislatures, which have the
institutional capacity to consider whether exempting religious
institutions burdened by particular laws is consistent with the public
good.323
Much of the law exists to deter harm before it happens and to
punish conduct when it renders harm; laws directed at harm include
criminal, tort, and regulatory laws. “The ‘prophylactic factor’ of
preventing future harm—that is, punishment and deterrence—has

matters of public concern, public men, and candidates for office.” (internal quotations and
citations omitted)).
320. See generally Hamilton, supra note 149 (discussing the paradox of hope and distrust
at the base of constitutional vision). Indeed, Professor Lupu has made this very point in past
writings. See Lupu, supra note 29 (describing the likelihood that religious institutions will use
church autonomy to hide secular and illegal activities).
321. Hamilton, supra note 149.
322. See Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307, 1315 (2004); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507, 529 (1997); Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
533 (1993); Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).
323. See infra Part IV, notes 412–15, 482 and accompanying text; see also supra note
269 (listing articles opposed to judicially compelled exemptions).
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always been an important reason for imposing tort liability.”324
Indeed, “[t]hese factors—punishment and deterrence—are obviously
more important in situations in which the defendant has the clear
ability to prevent the harm, so imposing liability will effectively and
efficiently result in deterrence and therefore less future harm.”325 As I
will discuss in more detail in Part IV, the recent clergy abuse
litigation has revealed that Catholic Church authorities were aware
that known child sexual abusers were working closely with children
in their parishes.326 These authorities had the ability to prevent the
harm, but they did not. The Church’s Lay Review Board found the
Church’s actions shocking,327 and those actions are difficult to
explain in the context of this society. One gets a sense that the social
irresponsibility of their actions arose out of a sense of exceptionalism
and perhaps even the vestiges of the clergy privilege and the
ecclesiastical courts. Imposing liability on such negligent hiring,
supervision, and retention decisions will effectively result in
deterrence and less future harm to children.
Church autonomy reduces both deterrence and punishment for
religious institutions and, as a result, increases the potential and
likely harm to others. When left autonomous, i.e., unaccountable to
the public good identified by the common law and the legislatures,
religious institutions are left to rely on their own devices to deter
criminal behavior. Yet, self-policing is never a successful gambit for
securing the public good.328 Over time, the United States has learned

324. Deana A. Pollard, Wrongful Analysis in Wrongful Life Jurisprudence, 55 ALA. L.
REV. 327, 369 (2004); see also notes 65–67 and accompanying text. See generally RICHARD
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 149 (6th ed. 2002); GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST
OF ACCIDENTS 135 (1970).
325. Pollard, supra note 324, at 339.
326. See generally Richard Sipe, Priests, Celibacy, and Sexuality: Preliminary Expert Report
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
327. REPORT ON THE CRISIS IN THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 306, at 91–93.
328. It has taken lawsuits against religious institutions for society to learn about pervasive
child abuse and subsequent cover-ups in various institutions. See, e.g., Jury Awards $37M in Sex
Abuse by Texas Minister, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 23, 2004, at A4 (detailing a verdict for nine
boys against the Lutheran minister who abused them); Mormon Church To Pay $3 Million in
Sex Abuse, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2001, at A10; Spotlight Investigation: Abuse in the Catholic
Church, BOSTON GLOBE, available at http://www.boston.com/globe/spotlight/
abuse (last visited Nov. 5, 2004) (chronicling the scandal and lawsuits against the Catholic
Church since January 2002); see also Marci A. Hamilton, Shockingly, Only 2% of Catholic Clergy
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that it is not sound policy to leave self-policing to attorneys, doctors,
accountants, daycare centers, charities, or corporations.329 Each
group has strong incentives to protect their own, and institutions in
particular operate to perpetuate themselves.330 There must be both
internal and external checks on the natural inclination to abuse
power.331
The burden rests on those who would grant churches autonomy
from the law, or even individual laws, to prove that churches are
sufficiently distinct from other institutions—in terms of the
likelihood of their bad acts—to justify a diminished need for
deterrence and punishment. While Professor Brady is undoubtedly
correct that religious institutions make important contributions to
society, so do all of the regulated groups listed above, from attorneys
to day care centers. What she fails to prove is that religious
institutions are less likely to harm the public good than other
organizations. For the Christian realist Reinhold Niebuhr, that is an
Sexual Abusers Were Ever Jailed: A Demonstration that the Self-Policing of Criminal Behavior
Will Never Work (Mar. 11, 2004), available at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/
20040311.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
329. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002)
(protecting investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosure made
pursuant to securities laws); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY (2003) (many states
follow the model code in their attorney ethics laws); Code of Medical Ethics (American
Medical Association 2001) (“a body of ethical statements developed primarily for the benefit
of the patient”); Code of Ethics and Statement of Policy Implementation & Enforcement of
Ethical Requirements (International Federation of Accountants 2001) (model code which
“endorses the concepts of objectivity, integrity, and professional competence and highlights
how all accountants can attain the highest levels of performance in meeting their
responsibilities to the public”), available at http://www.ifac.org/Ethics (last visited Nov. 11,
2004); National Association for the Education of Young Children (NAEYC) Code of Ethical
Conduct (1997) (describing “guidelines for responsible behavior and set[ting] forth a
common basis for resolving the principal ethical dilemmas encountered in early childhood care
and education”), available at http://www.naeyc.org/resources/position_statements/
pseth98.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2004); Standards for Charity Accountability (Better Business
Bureau Wise Giving Alliance 2003) (developed to “encourage fair and honest solicitation
practices, to promote ethical conduct by charitable organizations and to advance support of
philanthropy”), available at http://www.give.org/standards/newcbbbstds.asp (last visited
Nov. 11, 2004).
330. Of course, the best, most recent example of this phenomenon lies in the Catholic
Church’s clergy abuse era, described in Part IV. See also DAVID BLOOR, WITTGENSTEIN,
RULES AND INSTITUTIONS 32–35 (1997) (discussing the “collective pattern of self-referring
activity” of institutions).
331. This is the same calculus employed by the Framers in crafting the Constitution. See
Hamilton, supra note 149, at 293.
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impossible burden to bear. Though one might find a religious
individual capable of behaving selflessly in some circumstances,
documenting such perfect behavior is a fruitless exercise.332 Indeed,
Lord Acton’s phrase “Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power
corrupts absolutely”333 is as applicable to individuals in religious
institutions as it is to those in secular institutions.
Examples of corruption are readily apparent; religious belief and
institutions have been and continue to be an impetus to war and
terrorism around the globe.334 In the United States alone, religious
groups have been responsible for the September 11th attacks that
killed over 3,000 individuals,335 the sexual abuse of children in the
Catholic Church at a rate at least twice that of the average
population,336 and the death of children from easily treatable diseases
or from severely misguided attempts at healing.337 Adequate
deterrence in all three of these categories cannot be achieved
through autonomy and depends on the consistent application of
both criminal and tort liability.

332. REINHOLD NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SOCIETY 3–4 (1932)
(discussing human nature and the fact that “sentiments of benevolence and social goodwill will
never be so pure or powerful, and the rational capacity to consider the rights and needs of
others . . . will never be so fully developed as to create . . . . [a] social utopia”).
333. OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 1 (5th ed. 1999).
334. These wars include, to name just a few, the Crusades, the Inquisition, the Spanish
Inquisition, the Yugoslavian breakup, and the Irish War between Protestants and Catholics. See
John L. Esposito, Practice and Theory, in ISLAM AND THE CHALLENGE OF DEMOCRACY
(Joshua Cohen & Deborah Cashman eds., 2004); RELIGION AND POLITICS IN SOCIETY 8
(Michael Kelly & Lynn M. Messina eds., 2002) (discussing “religious fault zones” including
the Middle East, the southern Sahara, the Balkans, and central and southern Asia, among
others); MICHAEL A. SELLS, THE BRIDGE BETRAYED: RELIGION AND GENOCIDE IN BOSNIA
89–92 (1996) (discussing the role of religion in the genocide that occurred during the Bosnian
war). See generally RICHARD S. DUNN, THE AGE OF RELIGIOUS WARS 1559–1725 (1980).
335. See Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the
Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, S. REP. NO. 107-351 and H.R. REP. NO. 107-792
(2003).
336. See JOHN JAY COLLEGE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE
PROBLEM OF SEXUAL ABUSE OF MINORS BY CATHOLIC PRIESTS AND DEACONS IN THE
UNITED STATES 18 (2004), available at http://www.nccbuscc.org/nrb/johnjaystudy (last
visited Nov. 5, 2004).
337. See Seth Asser & Rita Swan, Child Fatalities from Religion-Motivated Medical
Neglect, 101 PEDIATRICS 625, 625–29 (1988); see also CNN, Autistic Boy Dies at Faith
Healing Service, Aug. 25, 2003, available at http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/Midwest/
08/24/autistic.boy.death.
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D. Catholic Social Thought, or the Doctrine of Subsidiarity,
Is Based on a No-Harm Principle
The Catholic Church’s precepts reject autonomy in the face of
violations of public order: “[T]he state may intervene in intermediate
communities in order to protect individuals. Communities have
power; they should use that power to benefit people, not to harm
people.”338 These precepts reflect the republican principles
articulated at the beginning of this Article: “[S]ociety has the right
to defend itself against possible abuses committed on the pretext of
freedom of religion. It is the special duty of government to provide
this protection.”339 When a religious institution’s actions violate
public order, the action “ceases to be religious exercise and becomes
a penal offense.”340
Pope Pius XI initiated what has become known as Catholic Social
Thought in 1931.341 Catholic Social Thought, and in particular the
theory of subsidiarity, leads to the identical theory of the good
republican government enunciated in the first sentence of this
Article: “The attainment of the common good is the sole reason for
the existence of civil authorities.”342 Catholic theory advocates the
protection of freedom but simultaneously the necessity of legal
intervention to prevent harm. “[C]hurches may ‘govern themselves

338. Robert F. Cochran, Tort Law and Intermediate Communities: Calvinist and
Catholic Insights, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 4, at 498 (“In some situations,
where communities have caused harm to people, the state should provide a remedy to the
injured party.”).
339. John Courtney Murray, S.J., Annotations to Declaration on Religious Freedom, in
THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II 675, 686 n.20 (Walter M. Abbott, S.J. ed., 1966)
[hereinafter DOCUMENTS].
340. Id.
341. Quadragesimo Anno, Encyclical of Pope Pius XI on Reconstruction of the Social
Order, reprinted in THE PAPAL ENCYCLICALS 1909–1939, at 415–42 (Claudia Carlen Ihm
ed., 1981).
342. Angela C. Carmella, A Catholic View of Law and Justice, in CHRISTIAN
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 4, at 265.
Given our essential dignity, intelligence, free will, and social character, Catholic
social doctrine offers a catalogue of rights and duties that ‘flow[] directly and
simultaneously from [our] very nature’. . . . The church recognizes . . . the right to
participate in public affairs and contribute to the common good; and the right to
juridical protection of these rights.
Id. (quoting Pope John XXIII, Pacem in Terris [Peace on Earth] 9 (1963), reprinted in THE
GOSPEL OF PEACE AND JUSTICE 201, 203 (J. Gremillion ed., 1975)).
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according to their own norms . . . [and] have the right not to be
hindered, either by legal measures or by administrative action on the
part of government, in the selection, training, appointment, and
transferal of their own ministers.’”343 But this principle of liberty is
limited in turn by a principle of social responsibility: “[A]ll freedoms
enjoyed by churches are subject to restriction whenever religious
conduct violates the public order.”344
The theory of subsidiarity rests in the first instance on the
theology of original sin, which has been paraphrased as follows:
“man is a self-centred creature. He can be trusted to abuse his
freedom.”345
If the Christian conception of human dignity demands that people
have the right to exercise as much control as possible over their
own lives, then the Christian doctrine of original sin acknowledges
that they will misuse that control and opt for morally dubious or
unacceptable outcomes. Government is therefore necessary in order
to restrain such sinful tendencies. However, because government
itself is subject to the same sinful tendencies, it is right that it
should be limited, by principles such as the Rule of Law and the
Separation of Powers, in order that its potential for great harm may
be constrained.346

Catholic Social Thought makes no exception for religious individuals
or institutions on this theory. “Catholic teachings embrace both the
affirmative duty (owed not to the state but to God) of church leaders
to behave morally and promote the common good in conditions of
freedom, and the recognition of the legitimate role of the state to
limit that freedom in some circumstances.”347 This means that they,
too, are rightly subject to the rule of law.348 Thus, law must be
applied to all citizens as enacted through accountable governmental
343. Carmella, supra note 9, at 1048 (quoting Declaration of Religious Freedom, in
DOCUMENTS, supra note 339, at 682).
344. Id.
345. WILLIAM TEMPLE, CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIAL ORDER 45 (1942).
346. David H. McIlroy, Subsidiarity and Sphere Sovereignty: Christian Reflections on the
Size, Shape and Scope of Government, 45 J. CHURCH & STATE 739, 746 (2003); see also
Carmella, supra note 342, at 255.
347. Carmella, supra note 9, at 1045.
348. See id. at 1047 (“[F]reedom is to be restricted only in specific circumstances to
correct injury, and only when it is prudent to do so.”).
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institutions. Accordingly, the rule of law must be applied to those
that are religious in order “to prevent the selfishness of A from
destroying the freedom of B.”349 While the state should give liberty
to intermediate institutions like religious institutions, these
institutions should not be permitted to harm others.350 Rather, the
Church must “accept[] limits to religious freedom when public order
is violated.”351 Thus, the “biblical model for government is that of
the shepherd, whose prime concern is for the welfare of his people
(the sheep).”352
Professor Angela Carmella has encapsulated the concepts of
Catholic Social Thought, the rule of law, and freedom in the apt
phrase “responsible freedom.”353
Responsible freedom means first and foremost the proper, moral
use of [a religious institution’s] freedom in the promotion of the
common good. Second, it means the recognition of, and
appropriate response to, legitimate state authority. Finally, it also
means the maintenance of independence and integrity when the
Church must work with the state on matters of common
concern.354

These principles, taken together, call for complete protection of a
religious institution’s power to determine its own ecclesiology but, at
the same time, establish a rule of no-harm to third parties or the
general public’s interest in the rights of third parties.
E. Protestant Theology Supports a No-Harm Rule,
Not Church Autonomy
The Protestant mindset, and its interpretation of the violent
history of religion in Europe, holds relevance for understanding the
legal system that emerged in early America. It can be no accident
that the rise of Protestantism, its elemental rejection of the Roman
Catholic Church and its practices, and its affirmation of the
sinfulness of all humans—including and especially those who were
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
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Id. at 70–71.
Carmella, supra note 9, at 1035.
McIlroy, supra note 346, at 747.
See generally Carmella, supra note 9.
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clerics—coincided with the demise of the ecclesiastical courts,
sanctuary, and the benefit of clergy.355
Protestant theology, the reformed branch in particular, has long
rested on a deep mistrust of human nature rooted in original sin,
which has led to the necessity of government and a no-harm rule.356
In fact, the Calvinist-Presbyterian branch of reformed theology
contributed heavily to the construction of the United States
Constitution’s emphasis on checks and balances, separation of
power, and the necessary division of power between state and federal
governments.357 This starting point is shared by the Framers,
Catholic Social Thought, and reformed theology. All three equally
value the rule of no-harm; that is, the necessity of deterring all
citizens and institutions from harming others. For Protestant
theology, government rightly exists to serve the common good, and
that good is served best when the potential to do harm is restrained
through duly enacted laws.
One particularly relevant idea in Protestant theology is the theory
of “sphere sovereignty” introduced by reformed theologian Abraham
Kuyper in the late nineteenth century.358 Under sphere sovereignty
(or authority as some have suggested), church and state (as well as
the arts and business, among other social organizations) each have
their own sovereign base, but each also has a distinctive role. “[T]he
telos of the state is the common good.”359 Thus, the distinctive role
of the state is to “prevent the spheres from infringing upon one
another, and it may use compulsion when necessary to maintain
order.”360 He further explained:
The cogwheels of all these spheres engage each other, and precisely
through that interaction emerges the rich, multifaceted
multiformity of human life. Hence also rises the danger that one
sphere in life may encroach on its neighbour like a sticky wheel that

355. See supra notes 133–53.
356. See supra notes 216–23.
357. Carmella, supra note 342, at 296–300, 302–04.
358. Frederick Nymeyer, A Great Netherlander Who Had One Answer to the Problem of
‘Liberty’ Destroying Liberty, Namely Sphere Sovereignty, in PROGRESSIVE CALVINISM (1956),
available at http://www.visi.com/~contra_m/pc/1956/2-2great.html.
359. McIlroy, supra note 346, at 759.
360. Id. at 754–55.

1181

2HAM-FIN

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

12/1/2004 7:29 PM

[2004

shears off one cog after another until the whole operation is
disrupted. Hence also the raison d’etre for the special sphere of
authority that emerged in the State. It must provide for sound
mutual interaction among the various spheres, insofar as they are
externally manifest, and keep them within just limits.361

This oversight role includes the power to protect the powerless in
every sphere.362 Thus, no sphere is considered immune from the
sovereignty or power of another, but rather each sphere is to exercise
its authority according to its own telos.363 Moreover, the state holds
the authority to “intervene when the authorities in other spheres are
manifestly abusing their power.”364
The just criticism of the sphere sovereignty theory is that it is
fuzzy at the boundaries, and it does not fully articulate the specific
role of either the state or the religious institution.365 Its value for this
Article, however, lies in its articulation of the role of government visa-vis the Church. It is not at all a stretch to claim that the powers
identified are those undergirding the no-harm doctrine: the state is a
neutral arbiter that ensures peace and protects the powerless. The
state that chooses church autonomy is at odds with this notion.
Ultimately, history and theology illustrate that in the AngloAmerican tradition all paths lead to the contemporary Religion
Clause doctrine of no-harm.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT’S RELIGION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
AND THE DOCTRINE OF NO-HARM
Based on the history and theory described above, church
autonomy lies far outside accepted republican principles. The no361. Abraham Kuyper, Sphere Sovereignty, NEW CHURCH SPEECH, Oct. 20, 1880, cited
in McIlroy, supra note 346, at 755.
362. Id.; ABRAHAM KUYPER, LECTURES ON CALVINISM 124–25 (William B. Eerdmans
ed., 1987) (1898–99), available at http://www.kuyper.org/stone/lecture4.html.
363. McIlroy, supra note 346, at 757–59.
364. Id. at 759; see also Johan van der Vyver, Sphere Sovereignty of Religious
Institutions: A Contemporary Calvinistic Theory of Church-State Relations 24 (1999), at
http://www.uni-trier.de/~ievr/konferenz/papers/vanvyver.pdf (“Persons engaged in
government [have] the right and an obligation to scrutinize the conduct of their subjects . . . .
Unbecoming conduct should not escape the power of the sword simply because it was
committed in the name of religion.”).
365. See Johan D. van der Vyver, Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of
Multiculturalism, 17 CONN. J. INT’L L. 323, 329–31 (2002) (book review).
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harm rule, by contrast, creates coherence between the religion
clauses and our republican form of government. The Supreme Court
has been correct to articulate its Religion Clause jurisprudence in
belief, conduct, and harm categories, as it has never acknowledged
legal independence for religious entities’ actions.366
Not only does the no-harm rule bring the religion clauses into
harmony with a republican form of government, but it also
reinforces neutrality in the church-state relation. It does not depend
on judicial assessments of the “centrality”367 of beliefs or the identity
of the religious entity.368 Beliefs are absolutely protected, which
leaves courts the task for which they are best equipped: applying
“neutral principles of law” to findings of fact regarding actions.369
The cases usually included under the heading of “church
autonomy” follow the no-harm principle, not a principle of church
independence or immunity from the law. As discussed in Part I, the
Court has recognized in both its Free Exercise cases and its religious
institution cases (which have invoked both religion clauses) that
there is an absolute right of conscience.370 One can believe whatever
one chooses, because freedom of belief confers numerous benefits on

366. See supra notes 48–52 and accompanying text (explaining that the Supreme Court
has never adopted the term “church autonomy” to explain its religious institution cases).
367. Compare Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990)
Judging the centrality of different religious practices is akin to the unacceptable
“business of evaluating the relative merits of differing religious claims. . . . [I]t is not
within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a
faith, or the validity of particular litigants’ interpretations of those creeds.”
Repeatedly and in many different contexts, we have warned that courts must not
presume to determine the place of a particular belief in a religion or the plausibility
of a religious claim.
(internal citations omitted), with Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963)
Even if consideration of such evidence [of malingering or deceit] is not foreclosed
by the prohibition against judicial inquiry into the truth or falsity of religious
beliefs—a question as to which we intimate no view since it is not before us—it is
highly doubtful whether such evidence would be sufficient to warrant a substantial
infringement of religious liberties.
(internal citation omitted).
368. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 653–54 (2002); Agostini v.
Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 230–31 (1997); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 10
(1993); Witters v. Wash. Dep’t of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 488–89 (1986).
369. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602–03 (1979).
370. See supra notes 1–61 and accompanying text.
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society. The greater good grants religious institutions, as well as
individuals and nonreligious institutions, that which it grants all
other citizens—complete freedom to develop and to share ideas and
beliefs—because a thriving marketplace in belief and speech is good
for the country.371 The Court has included religious entities within
the larger category of all citizens, all of which have an absolute right
of conscience. These cases stand for the proposition that no court
and no legislature may dictate what one believes, either individually
or as a group. Far from placing religious institutions in a separate
universe, this framework positions them as vital participants in a
culture protective of belief and debate. In other words, even in the
belief cases, religious institutions never stand above or beyond the
laws that govern others, but rather they stand shoulder-to-shoulder
with other citizen-believers. To be sure, religious institutions have
merited special attention on this issue, because so much of who they
are rests on belief itself and because the control of a people’s beliefs
has been a potent temptation for governments throughout the ages.
However, these reasons do not make institutions any less full citizens
deserving the utmost protection of belief.
Thus, religious institutions participate in the absolute right to
believe, not because they are autonomous from the law, but rather
because (1) the law requires such liberty in the interest of the greater
good and (2) the belief itself will not harm others.372
By the same token, religious institutions are subject to “neutral,
generally applicable laws” (to use the phrasing in the Free Exercise
cases)373 or, in other words, “the neutral principles of law” (the

371. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 124 S. Ct. 619, 729 (2003) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (“The very ‘purpose of the First Amendment [is] to preserve an uninhibited
marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail.’” (quoting Red Lion Broad. Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969))); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)
(“[D]ebate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may
well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and
public officials.”).
372. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.
373. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993)
(“In addressing the constitutional protection for free exercise of religion, our cases establish
the general proposition that a law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be
justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of
burdening a particular religious practice.”); Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879
(1990).
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phrase employed in the religious institution cases),374 because action
can harm others. To hold otherwise would be to permit religious
institutions to inflict the harm that the law was intended to
prevent.375 Thomas Jefferson described the fault line in this doctrine:
“[I]t does me no injury for my neighbour to say there are twenty
gods, or no God. It neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg.”376
It is not that the religious institution was autonomous at one
moment and then became encumbered by the social obligation to
obey the law the next. Rather, religious institutions in the United
States are and have always been part and parcel of the larger society.
When a dispute extends beyond their shared beliefs into action that
potentially harms others, religious institutions are treated as any
other integral element of society. They are accountable to the larger
good, as it is expressed through duly enacted laws.
Instead of using the concept or even the terminology of church
autonomy, the Supreme Court has made harm the measure of laws
governing religious conduct. In a recent free exercise case, the Court
mandated strict scrutiny in circumstances when a law burdened only
religious entities but failed to regulate similar harm caused by other
entities.377 The Court explained the rule, saying that strict scrutiny is
required “[w]here government restricts only conduct protected by
the First Amendment and fails to enact feasible measures to restrict
other conduct producing substantial harm or alleged harm of the
same sort.”378 In other words, the government can legitimately make
conduct that harms others illegal for everyone, including the
religious, but when the government targets religious actors and
religious actors alone, it has demonstrated that the purpose of the

374. Jones, 443 U.S. at 604 (“[A] State is constitutionally entitled to adopt neutral
principles of law as a means of adjudicating a church property dispute.”).
375. That is the message the Court is delivering with its statement: “Our cases do not at
their farthest reach support the proposition that a stance of conscientious opposition relieves an
objector from any colliding duty fixed by a democratic government.” Smith, 494 U.S. at 882
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461
(1971)).
376. Jefferson, supra note 251, at 221; see also Letter from Thomas Jefferson, supra note
253, at 442–43 (“The declaration that religious faith shall be unpunished, does not give
impunity to criminal acts dictated by religious error.”).
377. Church of Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546–47.
378. Id. (applying strict scrutiny when laws target a religious institution for regulation).
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law is not really the eradication of harm, but rather the targeting of
religion.379
This rule was further explained in Locke v. Davey, which held that
a presumption of unconstitutionality does not apply to laws
governing religious entities in the absence of “hostility” or
“animosity” toward a religious institution or institutions.380 Hence,
where a religious institution finds itself face-to-face with a legal
obligation that exists to prevent harm to others, it has no First
Amendment defense simply because the law imposes an incidental
burden on that institution.381
These same principles undergird both the free exercise and
religious institution cases. The meaningful difference between the
two sets of doctrine lies not in a rule of legal obligation in one and
autonomy in the other. Rather, when the Court has faced a free
exercise case involving the regulation of belief, the Court has taken
jurisdiction and rendered the law unconstitutional.382 When it has
faced a religious institution case involving solely a dispute over belief
within a religious institution, the Court has declined jurisdiction,
because deciding the case would place it in the position of
determining belief.383 Thus, the cases are procedurally
distinguishable, but there is no difference in the underlying theory
that belief cannot be regulated or determined by the government.
Whereas under both the free exercise and religious institution cases,
if the institution has engaged in conduct, that conduct can be
considered by the courts when they apply neutral principles of law.384

379. Id. at 533; Fraternal Order of Police v. Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 364–67 (3d Cir.
1999); see also Locke, 124 S. Ct. 1307, 1312–13 (2004).
380. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1314–15 (holding that a presumption of constitutionality—
strict scrutiny—applies when there is “animus” or “hostility” toward a religious institution).
381. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990).
382. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488,
496 (1961); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87–88 (1944); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
383. Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1 (1929) (affirming the
dismissal by the Philippines Supreme Court of a claim improperly decided by the district court
because it was solely ecclesiastical in nature).
384. See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 604–05 (1979); Md. & Va. Churches v.
Sharpsburg Church, 396 U.S. 367, 368 (1970) (dismissing an appeal for want of a federal
question because “the Maryland court’s resolution of the dispute involved no inquiry into
religious doctrine”); see also Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.
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Religious institutions have pushed for autonomy from judicial
oversight, and therefore the rule of law, in three particular arenas:
cases in which the parties are asking the courts to mediate a dispute
solely based on ecclesiology or belief,385 disputes between the
religious institution and adult clergy or lay employees,386 and claims

385. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 712–20 (1976)
(holding that courts have no authority to decide solely ecclesiastical issues); Presbyterian
Church in United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S.
440, 445–47 (1969) (“[It is] wholly inconsistent with the American concept of the
relationship between church and state to permit civil courts to determine ecclesiastical
questions[; hence, the First Amendment’s] language leaves the civil courts no role in
determining ecclesiastical questions in the process of resolving property disputes.” (emphasis
added)), distinguished by Gen. Council on Fin. & Admin. United States Methodist Church v.
California Superior Court, 439 U.S. 1369, 1372 (1978) (“There are constitutional limitations
on the extent to which a civil court may inquire into and determine matters of ecclesiastical
cognizance and polity in adjudicating intrachurch disputes.”); Gen. Council, 439 U.S. at 1372
(“But this Court never has suggested that those constraints similarly apply outside the context
of such intraorganization disputes. Thus, Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese and the other cases
cited by applicant are not on point.”); see also Gonzalez, 280 U.S. at 16 (“[D]ecisions of the
proper church tribunals on matters purely ecclesiastical, although affecting civil rights, are
accepted in litigation before the secular courts as conclusive, because the parties in interest
made them so by contract or otherwise.”); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 727 (1871)
(“[W]henever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have
been decided by the highest of these church judicatories to which the matter has been carried,
the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on them, in their
application to the case before them.”); German Reformed Church v. Commonwealth ex rel.
Seibert, 3 Pa. 282, 291 (1846) (“The decisions of ecclesiastical courts, like those of every other
judicial tribunal, are final; as they are the best judges of what constitutes an offence against the
word of God and the discipline of the church.”).
386. See, e.g., Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648 (10th
Cir. 2002) (invoking the principle of church autonomy and refusing to decide an ecclesiastical
question); Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc., 203 F.3d 1299 (11th
Cir. 2000) (observing a ministerial exception for clergy); Bollard v. Cal. Province of the
Society of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 1999) (declining to apply a ministerial exception for
clergy); Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conf. of United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343 (5th
Cir. 1999) (same); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (observing
a ministerial exception for clergy); Young v. N. Ill. Conf. of United Methodist Church, 21
F.3d 184 (7th Cir. 1994) (same); Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Presbyterian Hosp., 929
F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1991) (same); Rayburn v. Gen. Conf. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d
1164 (4th Cir. 1985); Van Osdol v. Vogt, 908 P.2d 1122 (Colo. 1996) (observing a
ministerial exception for clergy); Williams v. Episcopal Diocese of Mass., 766 N.E.2d 820
(Mass. 2002) (acknowledging, without formally adopting, the ministerial exception in
affirming the dismissal of a claim brought by clergy); McKelvey v. Pierce, 800 A.2d 840 (N.J.
2002) (declining to observe a ministerial exception); Newport Church of Nazarene v. Hensley,
56 P.3d 386 (Or. 2002) (finding a statutory ministerial exception not unconstitutional);
Church of Christ at Centerville v. Carder, 713 P.2d 101 (Wash. 1986) (upholding a church
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brought by third parties against clergy and/or the religious
institution.387
The Supreme Court’s cases lay down a complementary set of
rules for the three categories of cases involving religious institutions.
First, the courts may not determine “solely” ecclesiastical matters.388
Second, some courts have created a judicial doctrine, called the
board’s termination of a minister); Gillespie v. Elkins S. Baptist Church, 350 S.E.2d 715 (W.
Va. 1986) (same); see also EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795 (4th
Cir. 2000) (observing a ministerial exception for lay employee); Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944
(3d Cir. 1991) (same); Brazauskas v. Fort Wayne-South Bend Diocese, Inc., 796 N.E.2d 286
(Ind. 2003) (same); Montrose Christian Sch. Corp. v. Walsh, 770 A.2d 111 (Md. 2001)
(finding constitutional a statute that applied a ministerial exception to lay employees); Madsen
v. Erwin, 481 N.E.2d 1160 (Mass. 1985) (observing a ministerial exception for a lay
employee’s wrongful termination claims, but not for other claims), distinguished by Hiles v.
Episcopal Diocese of Mass., 773 N.E.2d 929, 937 (Mass. 2002) (disallowing defamation
claims if they “arise[] out of the church-minister relationship”); Hill-Murray Fed’n of Teachers
v. Hill-Murray High Sch., 487 N.W.2d 857 (Minn. 1992) (declining to apply the ministerial
exception to lay employees in collective bargaining); South Jersey Catholic Sch. Teachers Org.
v. St. Teresa of the Infant Jesus Church Elementary Sch., 696 A.2d 709 (N.J. 1997) (same);
cf. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (upholding a Title VII
exemption for church employees).
387. See, e.g., Davis v. Studdert, No. 02-4110, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 3622 (10th Cir.
Feb. 25, 2003) (dismissing an action against a church for its leaders’ alleged fraud); Kelly v.
Marcantonio, 187 F.3d 192 (1st Cir. 1999) (sexual abuse action against a church and its
leaders); Doe v. Hartz, 134 F.3d 1339 (8th Cir. 1998) (same); Ayron v. Gourley, 47 F. Supp.
2d 1246 (D. Colo. 1998), aff’d, 185 F.3d 873 (10th Cir. 1999) (same); Bear Valley Church
of Christ v. DuBose, 928 P.2d 1315 (Colo. 1996) (allowing some claims in a sexual abuse
action against a church and local leader); Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 2002) (action
against church and local leadership for negligent hiring); Kliebenstein v. Iowa Conf. of United
Methodist Church, 663 N.W.2d 404 (Iowa 2003) (holding that the Establishment Clause did
not bar a defamation action against a church and its leaders); Odenthal v. Minn. Conf. of
Seventh-Day Adventists, 649 N.W.2d 426 (Minn. 2002) (allowing an action against a church
and local leader for negligence in counseling); Davis v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day
Saints, 852 P.2d 640 (Mont. 1993) (multiple causes of action against a church and local
leadership for the local leadership’s handling of an injury that occurred on church property);
Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239 (Mo. 1997) (allowing some claims in a sexual abuse action
against a church and local leader); Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 21
P.3d 198 (Utah 2001) (multiple causes of action against a church and local leadership
resulting from harm suffered by the plaintiff after reporting sexual abuse); Pritzlaff v.
Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780 (Wis. 1995) (allowing some claims in a sexual
abuse action against a church and local leader).
388. See, e.g., Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 712–20; Presbyterian Church
in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440,
449–50 (1968); Kreshik v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190, 191 (1960); Kedroff v. St.
Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 113–15 (1952);
Gonzalez, 280 U.S. at 7–8; Shepard v. Barkley, 247 U.S. 1, 2 (1918); Watson, 80 U.S. at 727;
see also Carmella, supra note 9, at 1039–40.
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“ministerial exception,” to avoid deciding cases involving the
relationship between the religious institution and its adult clergy or
employees in some circumstances.389
The cases in each of these first two categories cannot be justified
by a theory that religious institutions stand autonomously outside
society. Rather, the first is fully explained by the absolute right to
believe, and therefore there is no cognizable harm. In the second,
objections to the harm were waived by the adult’s decision to accept
employment with a religious employer. Neither category presents the
specter of harm to innocent parties.
The third category of cases involves harm to third parties.390 The
courts may, and indeed must, apply neutral principles of law, even if
the case involves a religious institution and religiously motivated
conduct, because harm resulting from actions must be redressed or
prevented to serve the public good.391
Where the law can be applied by reference to actions and not just
belief, and where third parties are legally harmed, there is no
constitutional justification for precluding the courts from exercising
their usual function of applying neutral, generally applicable laws to
defendants, whoever they may be. Although the Supreme Court has
389. See supra note 386 (listing cases); see also Carmella, supra note 9, at 1039
(explaining the ministerial exception cases as involving a “church-clergy relationship”; thus,
“[b]ecause he or she is deemed to have consented to the internal governance of the employer
institution, the clergy person, as employee, must rely on those protections” provided under
church law).
390. See Carmella, supra note 9, at 1040 (“The general rule of broad institutional
autonomy for the church-clergy relationship no longer applies . . . when a third party sues a
church regarding clergy conduct. In fact, a growing majority of jurisdictions allow judicial
scrutiny of church decision making in many tort actions.”).
391. See, e.g., Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546–
47 (1993) (applying strict scrutiny when laws are not neutral and generally applicable and
“[w]here government restricts only conduct protected by the First Amendment and fails to
enact feasible measures to restrict other conduct producing substantial harm or alleged harm of
the same sort”); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 539 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(“[T]he most plausible reading of the ‘free exercise’ enactments . . . is a virtual restatement of
Smith: Religious exercise shall be permitted so long as it does not violate general laws governing
conduct.”); Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 n.2 (1990) (“[I]t is hard to see any
reason in principle or practicality why the government should have to tailor its health and
safety laws to conform to the diversity of religious belief . . . .”); Serbian Eastern Orthodox
Diocese, 426 U.S. at 713 (reserving the question of whether there may be an exception where
civil courts may review ecclesiastical decisions in instances of fraud or collusion, while holding
there is no exception for arbitrary decisions).
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yet to directly address the liability of a religious institution for harm
to third parties in certain circumstances,392 the logic of its Religion
Clause jurisprudence requires deference to legislative judgments
when the dispute involves conduct resulting in legally cognizable
harm, especially when the harms impact those who are incapable of
consenting to such harm, e.g., children or emotionally disabled
adults.393 To be sure, some state court decisions have misread the
principles justifying judicial intervention in the belief and adult
employee cases and concluded that they lack jurisdiction even when
there is third-party harm, but those cases are inconsistent with the
parameters of the Supreme Court’s Religion Clause jurisprudence,
the no-harm rule, and the First Amendment’s grounding in the
United States’ republican form of government.
A. The Solely Ecclesiastical Dispute Cases
The Court traditionally has refused to further investigate
ecclesiastical disputes that invite the Court to settle
intraorganizational disputes over belief or reopen ecclesiastical
decisions made by an institution’s highest authority. This is because
religious institutions—just like individuals—have complete dominion
over belief.394 The key to understanding these cases lies in the

392. See ATLA-TORT § 54:42 (“The United States Supreme Court has not yet resolved
the question of whether the First Amendment protects a religious organization from direct
liability for the sexual abuse of third parties by clergy, either in the context of the sexual abuse
of children or in the context of adult counseling.”).
393. See, e.g., Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310, 320–21 (Colo. 1993) (ruling
that the plaintiff’s claim was not barred by the First Amendment where she entered into a
sexual relationship with her priest, who had counseled her regarding mental and emotional
problems); Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 2002) (holding that the First Amendment
cannot be used to “shut the courthouse door” on claims of negligence against a church in a
sexual abuse case).
394. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 877 (“The free exercise of religion means, first and foremost,
the right to believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires.”); Thomas v. Review
Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981) (“[R]eligious beliefs need
not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First
Amendment protection.”); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 372 (1970) (White, J.,
dissenting) (“Thus the Amendment embraces two concepts,—freedom to believe and freedom
to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be.” (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303–04 (1940)));
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184 (1965) (“The validity of what [the conscientious
objector] believes cannot be questioned.”); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 443 (1961)
(“No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or
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Court’s use of the term “solely” to modify “ecclesiastical.” The mere
presence of religious belief or ecclesiology, however, does not
necessarily bar the Court’s jurisdiction.395 It is not possible to decide
a free exercise or even many Establishment Clause cases without
taking judicial notice of the religious entity’s beliefs. For example,
the Court took judicial notice of the Native American Church’s
beliefs in Smith, the Santerians beliefs in Lukumi, and the
conscientious objector’s beliefs in Seeger. The Court has only
withdrawn from cases where it has been asked to be the arbiter of
belief for the organization.
The Court has consistently declined jurisdiction in order to
protect the religious institution’s absolute right to determine its own
beliefs. For example, in Watson v. Jones,396 the Court was asked to
settle a property dispute turning on the question of whether the
church had changed its doctrine, an alteration which would
invalidate its property interest in the local church building. The
Supreme Court held: 1) civil judges are incompetent to resolve
questions concerning religious doctrine; 2) members of a hierarchical
church have voluntarily joined the general church body, thus giving
implied consent to its internal governance; and 3) the structure of
our political system requires a severe limit on involvement by civil
courts in the affairs of religious bodies.397 The Court noted that “it is
a very different thing where a subject-matter of dispute, strictly and
purely ecclesiastical in its character,—a matter over which the civil
courts exercise no jurisdiction—. . . becomes the subject of its
action.”398
In Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,399 the
Supreme Court of Illinois had held that the proceedings of the
disbeliefs . . . .”); see also Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (invalidating the
compelled display of a license plate slogan that offended individual religious beliefs); W. Va.
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 634 (1943) (invalidating a compulsory flag salute
statute challenged by religious objectors and noting, “[t]o sustain the compulsory flag salute
we are required to say that a Bill of Rights which guards the individual’s right to speak his own
mind, left it open to public authorities to compel him to utter what is not in his mind”).
395. See infra Part IV.B.
396. 80 U.S. 679 (1871).
397. Id. at 725–33.
398. Id. at 733.
399. 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
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Mother Church respecting a bishop were procedurally and
substantively defective under the internal regulations of the Mother
Church and were therefore arbitrary and invalid. The United States
Supreme Court ruled that the inquiries made by the state supreme
court into matters of ecclesiastical cognizance and polity contravened
the First and Fourteenth Amendments.400 In doing so, the Court
announced, “it is the essence of religious faith that ecclesiastical
decisions are reached and are to be accepted as matters of faith
whether or not rational or measurable by objective criteria.”401
In addition, in Presbyterian Church in United States v. Mary
Elizabeth Blue Hull,402 the question presented to the Court was
whether the restraints of the First Amendment (as applied to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment) permitted a civil court
to determine title to church property on the basis of the court’s
interpretation of church doctrine. The Supreme Court determined
that civil courts had no role in determining purely ecclesiastical
questions in the process of resolving property disputes.403
The Court did not intend the “solely ecclesiastical” category,
however, to create a means by which religious institutions could use
their beliefs as a smoke screen for illegal behavior. The presence of
“fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness” would have altered the Court’s
decision to decline jurisdiction over the dispute, despite the
ecclesiastical elements in the case.404

400. Id. at 698.
401. Id. at 714–15.
402. 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
403. Id. at 446; see also Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929)
(“[D]ecisions of the proper church tribunals on matters purely ecclesiastical, although affecting
civil rights, are accepted in litigation before the secular courts as conclusive, because the parties
in interest made them so by contract or otherwise.”). The Court reiterated this point in
Watson:
[W]henever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or
law have been decided by the highest of these church judicatories to which the
matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and
as binding on them, in their application to the case before them.
80 U.S. at 727.
404. Hull, 393 U.S. at 447 (quoting Gonzalez, 280 U.S. at 16); cf. Milivojevich, 426
U.S. at 713–15 n.7 (holding that any inquiry into arbitrariness of church actions was
foreclosed but noting that “[n]o issue of ‘fraud’ or ‘collusion’ is involved in this case”).
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B. The Ministerial Exception Cases
Many suits in the second category of cases—those involving
claims brought by an adult employee against a religious institution—
involve the question of the application of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.405 These cases involve judicial application of the
law in the context of a relationship between a religious institution
and its clergy. Before the Court’s decision in Smith, which
legitimated legislative exemptions but not judicially crafted
exemptions, some courts crafted a “ministerial exception.” It stood
for the proposition that the religion clauses “require a narrowing
construction of Title VII in order to insulate the relationship
between a religious organization and its ministers . . . .”406 The
ministerial exception was first articulated in McClure v. Salvation
Army.407 Nearly every Circuit Court has adopted it, although it is
enforced with varying degrees of vigor depending on the Circuit.408
The Supreme Court has yet to rule on its constitutionality.
Courts adopting the exception justify it as “a long-standing
tradition that churches are to be free from government interference
in matters of church governance and administration.”409 What they
405. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
406. Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 945 (9th Cir. 1999).
The ministerial exception is a doctrinal creation that protects churches from Title VII beyond
the protection provided by the legislative exemption for employment of those of the same
faith. See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
407. 460 F.2d 553, 560–61 (5th Cir. 1972).
408. Compare EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 213 F.3d 795 (4th Cir. 2000)
(affirming the application of a ministerial exception to a sex discrimination claim brought on
behalf of a Cathedral’s female Director of Music Ministry and part-time music teacher at the
Cathedral elementary school), Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, 203 F.3d
1299 (11th Cir. 2000) (affirming a ministerial exception to a minister’s retaliation and
constructive discharge claim), and Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conf. of the United
Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 1999) (affirming a ministerial exception to a
plaintiff minister’s sex and pregnancy discrimination claims when she was terminated after
returning from maternity leave), with Bollard, 196 F.3d at 947–48 (declining to apply the
ministerial exception to sexual abuse). See also supra note 386 (listing church-employee cases).
409. Gellington, 203 F.3d at 1304 (citing, among others, Kedroff v. St. Nicholas
Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94, 107 (1952)). The circuits have held
that the ministerial exception was not overruled by Smith because
it was not developed to provide protection to individuals who wish to observe a
religious practice that contravenes a generally applicable law . . . [and] because the
ministerial exception is [not] based . . . on strict scrutiny, [so] the Court’s rejection
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properly mean is that there is a long-standing prohibition on courts
mediating solely ecclesiastical disputes, which is true; they err,
however, when they decline jurisdiction in a case involving not only
ecclesiology, but also the application of neutral principles of law,
especially in a context where the law does not substantially burden
any religious belief.410
While some courts have read the ministerial exception broadly,
the Ninth Circuit did not apply it in a situation where the church did
not claim that its right to oversee its ministers was infringed and
where the behavior was not religiously mandated.411 Additionally, the
New Jersey Supreme Court declined to apply it in McKelvey v.
Pierce,412 remanding the case to the lower court to determine the
issues, instead of assuming the courts lacked jurisdiction simply
because the case was brought by a seminarian against a religious
institution.
To be clear, the ministerial exception cases involve only the
employee and the employer and hinge on the notion that no one is
being harmed because the adults have consented to the religious
institution’s requirements.413 In those jurisdictions that recognize the
in Smith of the compelling interest test does not affect the continuing vitality of the
ministerial exception.
Id. This formalistic reading of the Court’s free exercise cases, which does not address the issue
of institutional competence to decide whether an exemption is warranted, is not terribly
persuasive.
410. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878–79 (1990). In the absence of a
substantial burden on religious belief, there is in fact no justification for invoking or applying
the machinery of the religion clauses. The term has been imported into federal religious liberty
legislation, again as a threshold issue. See, e.g., Midrash Sephardi v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d
1214 (11th Cir. 2004); San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1035
(9th Cir. 2004); Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752,
761 (7th Cir. 2003), cert denied, 124 S. Ct. 2816 (2004); see also 106 CONG. REC. S7,776
(2000) (“[RLUIPA] does not include a definition of the term ‘substantial burden’ because it is
not the intent of this Act to create a new standard for the definition of ‘substantial burden’ on
religious exercise. Instead, that term as used in the Act should be interpreted by reference to
Supreme Court jurisprudence.”).
411. See Bollard, 196 F.3d at 948.
412. 800 A.2d 840, 852–53 (N.J. 2002) (holding that despite the ministerial exception,
the trial court should not have assumed that it lacked jurisdiction to hear a seminarian’s claims
without examining each one to determine whether it could be heard without excessive
entanglement in religious affairs); see also Williams v. Episcopal Diocese, 766 N.E.2d 820,
824–26 (Mass. 2002) (acknowledging the ministerial exception without adopting it in
affirming the dismissal of an employment discrimination claim brought by clergy).
413. See infra Part III.B.
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ministerial exception, it is unlikely to be reversed in the near future,
but it is in tension with the Court’s most recent cases clarifying the
Free Exercise Clause.
Title VII already provides an exemption for religious entities by
permitting them to discriminate in their employment decisions on
the basis of faith. The exemption was upheld in Corporation of the
Presiding Bishop v. Amos.414 On any measure of the public good, it
makes tremendous sense. Without a doubt, there would be
something unseemly about a federal law that would require an
Orthodox Jewish shul to hire a Baptist as a rabbi, or a Pentecostal
Church to hire a Muslim as a pastor.
The ministerial exception, however, is a judicial invention that
has been used at times to extend Congress’s exemption for
discrimination on the basis of religious belief to other types of
discrimination.415 Strictly speaking, the judicially crafted ministerial
exception is inconsistent with Locke v. Davey, Boerne, and Smith and
may be vulnerable to reversal by the Supreme Court.416 The principle
at issue is whether the courts are institutionally competent to craft
free exercise exemptions. Under the reasoning of these cases, courts
are not competent to carve out individual exemptions from generally
applicable laws; that is the province of the legislature. That is the
explicit holding in Smith.417
This is not to say that the state or federal legislatures could not
craft a statute that would do the work of the ministerial exception.
They could. When the legislature does so, it brings better tools to
assess the exemption options than a court has available. It can study
the issue from many angles, from listening to constituents to using
hearings, experts, and appointed commissions to assess the issue. The
legislature is in a strong position to make a judgment regarding what
degree of harm will result from permitting a religious institution to

414. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
415. See, e.g., Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 953 (9th Cir. 2004)
(holding that a minister’s claims of discrimination on the basis of sex, in the form of sexual
harassment, could go forward); Smith v. Raleigh Dist. of the N.C. Conf. of the United
Methodist Church, 63 F. Supp. 2d 694 (E.D.N.C. 1999) (finding that a ministerial exemption
did not bar suit by secular church employees alleging discrimination on the basis of sex).
416. Locke, 124 S. Ct. 1307; Boerne, 521 U.S. 507; Smith, 494 U.S. 872.
417. 494 U.S. at 890.
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discriminate “because of such individual’s race, color, . . . sex, or
national origin.”418 In sharp contrast, a court has only the evidence
in one case and the views of two parties before it, and there is no
guarantee that the facts before it or the parties’ positions are
representative of such disputes. Nor does a court have the capacity to
independently investigate the issue. Indeed, its lack of investigative
power makes it all too likely that its determinations will be based on
opinion and personal views, rather than factors relevant to the public
good. To be sure, legislatures are not perfect institutions; the point
here is simply that they are comparatively better than courts in
choosing which exemptions to carve out of a law and which to reject.
To be consistent with the Supreme Court’s Religion Clause
jurisprudence, the courts should apply Title VII as its neutral
language dictates and leave ministerial exemptions to the legislative
process.419 For purposes of this Article, however, the ministerial
exception cases are relevant because they are consistent with the noharm principle. Their rationale is that the religious employee has
acquiesced in the religious entity’s governance and therefore is not
harmed by the religious institution’s application of its religious
principles to him or her.
C. The Third-Party Harm Cases
This third category of cases involves church accountability for the
harm caused by its clergy and its leadership. This is the arena where
the notion of church autonomy stands in starkest contrast to the noharm principle. Many of these cases involve instances in which
members of the clergy abuse children or adults who are disabled or
in a disabled state. While it can be argued that clergy members
voluntarily have given up their rights against a hierarchical church
and therefore may not sue for discrimination (though, again, that is a
418. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
419. Of course, to the extent a clergy employee case involves solely questions of belief,
the courts properly should refuse jurisdiction. See supra notes 366–76` and accompanying text.
Where the relevant law does not require the courts to decide belief, however, under existing
Supreme Court Religion Clause jurisprudence, the courts should take jurisdiction and apply
the law. See supra notes 377–93 and accompanying text. There is also an emerging line of cases
that only applies the ministerial exception where the religious institution claims that its
conduct was driven by its religious beliefs. See, e.g., Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375
F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2004); Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940 (9th
Cir. 1999).
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question best left to legislatures, not courts), many victims of
religious institutions, especially children, are not in a position to
assent to the harm perpetrated by the clergy and the religious
institution. The reasons for avoiding jurisdiction over solely
ecclesiastical disputes “are not applicable to purely secular disputes
between third parties and a particular defendant, albeit a religiously
affiliated organization.”420
If the claims in a case involve nothing more than a demand for
the court to interpret and apply the religious institution’s canon, the
courts will not resolve the dispute, and barring other claims, the case
is dismissed.421 That is completely consistent with the position of
Jefferson, Madison, and the Supreme Court that belief must be
protected absolutely from government interference.422 Where the
claims involve the “legal effects and consequences” arising out of
such beliefs,423 however, the courts may take judicial notice of the
beliefs, but they must rule solely on whether the actions taken were
consistent with the legal standards governing those actions.424 This is
sometimes referred to as the “neutral principles” rule.425
Since 1990, the Supreme Court has articulated with increasing
detail the constitutional metes and bounds regarding (1) the
legislature’s power to regulate a religious institution’s conduct and
(2) the judiciary’s lack of power to create exemptions.426 According
420. Gen. Council on Fin. and Admin. of the United Methodist Church v. Superior
Court of California, 439 U.S. 1355, 1372–73 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1978) (internal
citation omitted) (emphasis added); see also Malicki, 814 So. 2d 347, 356–57 (Fla. 2002)
(distinguishing internal church disputes from third-party harm cases).
421. See supra notes 394–98.
422. See supra Part III.C. It is also consonant with the Court’s emerging freedom of
association jurisprudence. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000)
(“[P]rotection of the right to expressive association is ‘especially important in preserving
political and cultural diversity and in shielding dissident expression from suppression by the
majority.’” (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984))).
423. Den, 12 N.J.L. at 226.
424. Nelson, 18 Vt. at 567 (“In the decision of this case we have endeavored to conform
our decision to the principles of law, as they are applicable to our State. If we have recognized
no ecclesiastical jurisdiction, it is because none such exists here; and it certainly will contribute
to our peace, that there is no such jurisdiction in this State.”).
425. Solid Rock Baptist Church v. Carlton, 789 A.2d 149, 155 (N.J. Super. App. Div.
2002).
426. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 514 (1997); Employment Div. v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
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to the Court, legislatures are in the most appropriate position to
determine whether harm needs be prevented, and so long as the
legislature regulates to rid society of a particular harm, and does not
single out a religious institution or individual in the process, the law
is presumptively constitutional.427 In other words, the proper focus
of the legislature is the public good, the needs of society. The same
public good horizon can then be applied by a legislature to create
exemptions from neutral, generally applicable laws, but the
exemption is driven by a full consideration of the public good, not
constitutional necessity.428
In the religious conduct cases, the Court has held that
accommodation is a more appropriate task for the legislature than
the courts. The republican theory of government is needed to
explain this. First, under a republican theory of government, the
429
judiciary and the legislature play distinctive roles. Second, the
legislature is supposed to rule above the passions of the people and
430
to govern in the interest of the larger public good. That is its only
legitimate role, and its inevitable role if the form of government is
431
sufficiently well constructed.
427. Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307, 1309 (2004) (holding that nothing in
Washington’s Promise Scholarship Program “suggests [the requisite] animus towards religion”
needed to justify the application of strict scrutiny); Boerne, 521 U.S. at 535 (“When the
exercise of religion has been burdened in an incidental way by a law of general application, it
does not follow that the persons affected have been burdened any more than other citizens, let
alone burdened because of their religious beliefs.”). The Court also emphasized this point in
Smith:
It is a permissible reading of the text, in the one case as in the other, to say that if
prohibiting the exercise of religion (or burdening the activity of printing) is not the
object of the tax but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and
otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been offended.
494 U.S. at 878.
428. The Court discussed the applicability of legislative exemptions in Smith:
[A] number of States have made an exception to their drug laws for sacramental
peyote use. . . . But to say that a nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption is
permitted, or even that it is desirable, is not to say that it is constitutionally required,
and that the appropriate occasions for its creation can be discerned by the courts.
Id. at 890 (citations omitted).
429. SELLERS, SACRED FIRE, supra note 1, at 24–27; see also WOOD, THE CREATION,
supra note 19, at 460–63.
430. See SELLERS, SACRED FIRE, supra note 1, at 75–77; WOOD, THE CREATION, supra
note 19, at 371, 381.
431. See SELLERS, SACRED FIRE, supra note 1, at 75–77; WOOD, THE CREATION, supra
note 19, at 608.
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The question is left where to draw the line between legitimate
exemptions and those that are illegitimate. There are two scenarios
that raise questions: exemptions that involve laws making harmless
conduct illegal and those exemptions that are not lifting a burden on
religiously motivated conduct, but rather granting religious entities
special privileges simply because they are religious. The first should
raise red flags of potential discrimination, while the second is in
violation of the Establishment Clause.
1. Exemptions that make harmless conduct illegal
Where the legislature addresses only actions by individuals that
do not impact and harm others, there is a good question whether the
public good has been or can be served. Laws outlawing harmless
behavior are hard to justify in light of the public good. John Stuart
Mill explained as follows:
[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their
number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power
can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.432

This is not to say that a law that regulates harmless conduct
would be unconstitutional, but rather that the proper role of the
legislature is to identify actions that actually harm others for the
purpose of regulation.433 If they do not, then the public good does
not seem to be implicated, and the law is not a proper exercise of
power by a republican form of government.
The slipperiness in this approach lies in the definition of harm.
Some philosophers have abandoned the Mill/Hart/Feinberg
concept because it does not lead to concrete conclusions about
certain moral issues facing the society.434 Others have found that the

432. MILL, supra note 46, at 10–11.
433. It may be that such laws could be invalidated under constitutional analysis—either as
irrational or as pretexts for discrimination—but none comes to mind.
434. See generally Am. Booksellers Ass’n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985)
(wherein Judge Frank Easterbrook rejects the harm principle); JUDITH BUTLER, EXCITABLE
SPEECH: A POLITICS OF THE PERFORMATIVE (1997); Ethan A. Nadelmann, Learning To Live
with Drugs, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 1999, at A21.
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principle is as valuable for conservative policies as it was at one time
for liberal policies, which is to say that both sides in a debate over
regulation are capable of arguing “harm.”435 Joel Feinberg rightly
stated, “harm is a very complex concept with hidden normative
dimensions. . . .”436 This is a legitimate philosophical concern, but it
need not deter its application in the legal-political arena.
The representative form of government assigns to the legislature
the task of assessing the public good in light of all the circumstances
and facts. In fact, the legislative task at its very core is to weigh
competing social goods and harms. In this context, the task is no
different. When considering whether to relieve a religious entity of a
legal duty, the legislature should weigh on the one hand the
importance of respect and tolerance for a wide panoply of religious
faiths, and on the other whether the harm that the law was intended
to prevent can be tolerated in a just society. For the philosophers,
the problem with this approach is that it could result in endless
cycling of the harm concept because there is no logical or
hermeneutical principle that will finally determine actual harm. The
finality problem is solved in the republican form of government,
however, because a determination of harm can be made final. When
the legislature determines that there should be no exemption or that
there should be one, and enacts a law reflecting its judgment, it
renders the final word on the balance of harms. The law reflects no
more than contemporary understandings and need make no claims
to transcendent value, but it is final for contemporary purposes.
The utility of employing legislative judgment here (as opposed
to judicial judgment) is that the legislature has tremendous power to
repeal the laws that it finds are noxious in practice. Precedent has not
nearly the pull that it has in the judicial arena. Thus, judgments
about relative harm can be revisited and reweighed. The repealability
of the harm analysis takes into account the human nature of
regulation—it is always based on imperfect understanding and always
capable of being viewed through different lenses at a later time.437
435. See generally Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 109 (1999).
436. FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 247, at 214.
437. That is in fact happening in the context of children’s interests. Religious
organizations have been successful in obtaining state and federal laws that exempt faith-healing
parents from the force of the laws that protect children. See Rita Swan, Moral, Economic, and

1200

2HAM-FIN

1099]

12/1/2004 7:29 PM

Religious Institutions and the No-Harm Doctrine

What may be most interesting here is that the public good can be
served best by exempting the religiously motivated conduct while
retaining the rule against all other actors. A good example of this
phenomenon can be found in the exemptions for the religious use of
peyote,438 which appear to be harmless to society. The drug, unlike
heroin, is not quickly addictive or part of a worldwide illegal market.
It is also unattractive to recreational users because it often leads to
nausea and headaches and in a significant number of instances yields
no result. Moreover, those who use it tend to stay in the place of
worship well beyond its effectiveness and therefore do not drive
impaired or engage in any other harmful behavior that could affect
others following its use. Thus, the Church’s use of peyote is harmless
to society and therefore worthy of an exemption.
That does not mean, however, that its use should be legalized for
all users. A recreational user (if one is inclined to take it despite its
recreational defects) is likely to be more inclined to drive or
otherwise harm others under the influence, because the use would
not be limited to a religious ceremony that lasts longer than the
effects of the hallucinogen. The harm calculus thus weighs in favor of
a religious exemption but not in favor of outright legalization.

Social Issues in Children's Health Care: On Statutes Depriving a Class of Children of Rights to
Medical Care: Can this Discrimination Be Litigated?, 2 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 73, 79–80
(1998). Children’s rights, however, have become internationally recognized, and the argument
for giving such latitude to parents to harm their children, even if religiously motivated, has lost
a significant degree of force. See, e.g., Weld Approves Child Abuse Law, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec.
29, 1993, at Metro-24 (reporting the passage of legislation that “repeals a statutory provision
that states a child shall not be deemed neglected if treated with spiritual healing alone”); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 11166(a)(2)(c)(1)–(2) (2004) (noting that the duty-to-report statute excludes
reporting information received during “penitential communication,” but clarifies that
“[n]othing in this subdivision shall be construed to modify or limit a clergy member’s duty to
report known or suspected child abuse or neglect when the clergy member is acting in some
other capacity that would otherwise make the clergy member a mandated reporter”).
438. The federal government and a majority of states exempt the religious use of peyote.
See James D. Gordon III, The New Free Exercise Clause, 26 CAP. U. L. REV. 65, 77–78 (1997);
see also Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
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2. Exemptions that do more than lift a burden on religiously motivated
conduct
The Smith Court implied that there are some legislative
exemptions that may violate the Establishment Clause.439 Legislative
exemptions that only lift the burden placed on the religiously
motivated because the conduct when done by the religious entity
will not harm individuals or society, and do no more, have followed
the Court’s doctrine. The open question is what happens when a
legislature grants an exemption for religious institutions that
provides more than is needed to lift the burden. For example, the
peyote exemptions for religious use are constitutional, but an
exemption for any use by religious entities would not be. The latter
gives religious entities the right to use peyote in all circumstances,
not only in religious ceremonies, and therefore provides a benefit to
religious entities solely because of their religious status, not because
their religious conduct has been burdened. That is a violation of the
Establishment Clause.440
The RFRAs violate the Establishment Clause in a different way,
by flaunting the republican government principle. They make all or
most of the federal or relevant state laws presumptively illegal. Justice
Stevens referred to this as “a legal weapon that no atheist or agnostic
can obtain.”441 The process of enactment is the precise opposite of
what should occur in a legitimate legislative determination of
exemptions. It is blind accommodation, where the legislature has
given religious entities across the board power to trump thousands of
laws. These across-the-board approaches make it impossible for any
legislature to make the public good determination that legitimates an
exemption. The legislature is handing religious entities a power to
battle generally applicable, neutral laws, without taking upon itself
the necessity of determining whether voiding the law for some is in
the public’s interest. It is a benefit without consideration of the
public good and therefore is a subsidy as opposed to a legitimate
exemption.

439. Smith, 494 U.S. at 886–87.
440. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (noting that to avoid
violating the Establishment Clause, a statute’s “principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion”).
441. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 537 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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In sum, a discussion of so-called church autonomy starts at the
wrong end when it begins—and certainly when it ends—with only a
discussion of what the church needs or demands.442 The
constitutionally relevant question is not what is best for any church—
indeed that question is forbidden by the neutrality principle
underlying the Establishment Clause443—but rather whether the
liberty accorded is consonant with the rule against harming others. If
so, the public good has been properly served. If not, the public
good, and therefore the constitutional order, has been subverted.
Both values—liberty and no harm to others—are necessary elements
of any First Amendment calculus.
Misunderstandings by some state courts have led them to
conclude that because the religious institution chose a particular
placement for a cleric on the basis of religious belief, that the courts
are thereby barred from applying general, neutral laws regulating
harm inflicted by such clerics.444 These courts have made a category

442. See, e.g., Brady, supra note 11; see also Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 35.
443. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 648–49 (2002); Good News Club v.
Milford, 533 U.S. 98, 112–14 (2001).
444. See, e.g., Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 692 A.2d 441, 445 (Me.
1997). The court in this case held that the First Amendment barred a negligent supervision
claim against a church regarding the sexual relationship between an adult parishioner and priest
during the course of marital counseling because
on the facts of this case, imposing a secular duty of supervision on the church and
enforcing that duty through civil liability would restrict its freedom to interact with
its clergy in the manner deemed proper by ecclesiastical authorities and would not
serve a societal interest sufficient to overcome the religious freedoms inhibited.
Id.; L.L.N. v. Clauder, 563 N.W.2d 434, 444–45 (Wis. 1997) (holding that the First
Amendment barred consideration of a negligent supervision claim against a diocese for a sexual
relationship between an adult parishioner and priest while the priest was counseling the
parishioner in his position as a hospital chaplain); Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533
N.W.2d 780, 790 (Wis. 1995) (concluding “that the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution prevents the courts of this state from determining what makes one competent to
serve as a Catholic priest since such a determination would require interpretation of church
canons and internal church policies and practices” in the context of negligent retaining,
training, and supervision). But see Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 358–60 (Fla. 2002)
(finding that the First Amendment does not preclude a religious institution’s liability for
tortious acts arising out of sexual misconduct of clergy); Gibson v. Brower, 952 S.W.2d 239,
248 (Mo. 1997) (affirming the dismissal of breach of fiduciary duty, negligent hiring and
supervision claim, and conspiracy claims, but reversing dismissal on intentional failure to
supervise clergy claim) (“This rule clearly applies to ‘generally applicable criminal law.’ It also
logically applies to intentional torts. Religious conduct intended or certain to cause harm need
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mistake. The law may not forbid religious institutions from believing
clergy belong in certain positions, but it certainly can govern their
actions that cause harm to third parties. Thus, courts are not being
asked to resolve a dispute over religious doctrine, or even to apply
religious doctrine, but rather to apply settled legal principles to
actions. “Although normally the practice of transferring a priest is a
religious decision left up to his superiors, in [the context of
childhood sexual abuse by clergy] it comes squarely within the state’s
jurisdiction.”445 While the logic of the ministerial exception—if one
accepts it as good law and sets aside the question whether courts are
institutionally competent to make what is in fact a public
determination—may provide some justification for protecting the
relationship between a religious institution and its adult clergy from
judicial scrutiny, it cannot justify failure of the courts to apply
generally applicable laws when the church and its clergy have harmed
a third party.446 To return to the rule of Smith and its antecedents,
once the church takes action, it opens itself to legal liability, and the
fact that it acted out of religious motivation is irrelevant to a court’s
inquiry into whether the legally proscribed action was taken and the
legally proscribed harm accrued.
V. A CASE STUDY OF THE NO-HARM DOCTRINE:
THE CATHOLIC CHURCH’S CLERGY ABUSE ERA
The elephant in the room at a conference addressing “church
autonomy” in the early twenty-first century is the worldwide
phenomenon of childhood sexual abuse by members of the clergy—
with the knowledge of their individual churches—around the
world.447 Although it has been a problem for children for decades,
not be tolerated under the First Amendment.” (quoting Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872, 884 (1990), and citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940))).
445. Carmella, supra note 9, at 1049.
446. The Florida Supreme Court reasoned:
Substantial authority in both the state and federal courts concludes that the right to
religious freedom and autonomy protected by the First Amendment is not violated
by permitting the courts to adjudicate tort liability against a religious institution
based on a claim that a clergy member engaged in tortious conduct such as sexual
assault and battery in the course of his or her relationship with a parishioner.
Malicki, 814 So. 2d at 358–59.
447. See JASON BERRY & GERARD RENNER, VOWS OF SILENCE (2004); DAVID FRANCE,
OUR FATHERS: THE SECRET LIFE OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN AN AGE OF SCANDAL
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and in truth centuries, it became impossible to ignore or deny in the
United States when the Boston Globe broke the story of the Boston
Archdiocese’s extensive clergy abuse.448 The magnitude of clergy
sexual abuse is shocking in the Catholic Church, but it is also present
in many other denominations.449
In the Catholic Church, the phenomenon of child abuse by
clergy members is an issue with which the Church has struggled for
centuries, reaching as far back as the fourth century.450 But the

(2004); see also REPORT ON THE CRISIS IN THE CATHOLIC CHURCH supra note 306, at 92;
Ireland Orders Priest Abuse Inquiry, BBC NEWS, Apr. 5, 2002, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1912153.stm; Jury Awards $37M in Sex Abuse
by Texas Minister, supra note 328; Brian Lavery, Archbishop of Dublin, Under Fire, Is Replaced,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2004, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/27/
international/europe/27irel.html; Sex Abuse Scandal Flares in Australia, CBS NEWS, June 3,
2002, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/06/03/world/main510854.
shtml; Thousands of Jehovah’s Witnesses Abused, Groups Say, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 2004,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A29713-2004Mar27.html
(relating that more than six thousand victims made allegations since 1991).
448. The Boston Globe received a Pulitzer Prize for uncovering extensive childhood sexual
abuse by priests with full knowledge of the Boston Archdiocese. See Mark Feeney, Globe Wins
Pulitzer Gold Medal for Coverage of Clergy Sex Abuse, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 8, 2003, at A1,
available at http://www.boston.com/globe/spotlight/abuse/extras/pulitzers.htm. Every
article written about the scandal by the Globe’s investigative reporters since they broke the story
in January 2002 can be accessed by visiting http://www.boston.com/globe/spotlight/abuse.
449. “While recent cases have focused on Catholic clergy, virtually every religious
denomination has had its scandals. Over the past decade, reports of sexual misdeeds by clergy
have cut across the religious landscape, from Protestant and Mormon churches to Jewish,
Muslim, and Buddhist congregations.” Jeffery Sheler, Unholy Crisis, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT, Feb. 11, 2002, at 25; see, e.g., Kevin Eckstrom, Presbyterian Church Mulls New Rules
in Sex Abuse Cases, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 2002, at B9 (reporting that an internal Presbyterian
church report indicates that a “serial molester might have been stopped had officials
intervened”); Jury Awards $37M in Sex Abuse by Texas Minister, supra note 328 (reporting
that, in addition to the jury award of $37 million to nine plaintiffs abused by a Lutheran
minister, plaintiffs’ attorneys disclosed that the church paid out more than $32 million in
settlements prior to the verdict); LDS Church, Hospital Settle Child-abuse Case Out of Court,
DESERET NEWS, March 28, 2000, at B6 (settling a $750 million child abuse case out of court);
Carrie A. Moore, Church Settles Abuse Case, DESERET NEWS, Sept. 4, 2001, at A1 (reporting
that the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints settled a child abuse case in Portland for
$3 million).
450. FRANCE, supra note 447, at 64; KAROL JACKOWSKI, THE SILENCE WE KEEP: A
NUN’S VIEW OF THE CATHOLIC PRIEST SCANDAL 44–45 (2004); Frances Grandy Taylor,
Report Falls Short, Whistleblower Says, HARTFORD COURANT, Feb. 28, 2004 (discussing Father
Thomas Doyle’s response to the John Jay and National Review Board Reports); Press Release,
Fr. Thomas P. Doyle, The John Jay Report and The National Review Board Report (Feb. 26,
2004) (on file with author).
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Church has continued to operate as though it were a separate
sovereign legal system, which is the heritage of the now-defunct
ecclesiastical court jurisdiction over crimes in Britain and elsewhere
in Europe.451 It has operated as though it was autonomous of the law
and unaccountable to the public good. In 1962, the Vatican issued a
directive addressing the abuse phenomenon, which ordered secrecy
and excommunication for those who did not abide by that secrecy.452
The fundamental question posed and answered by this era of
clergy abuse revelations is whether religious institutions should be
left alone to discipline criminally errant, tortious clergy. In 1987,
Professor Lupu described precisely the problem that occurs when
religious institutions, like the Catholic Church, operate as though
they are autonomous of the law:
Recognizing such claims of autonomy will, by definition, insulate
from regulation behavior that the political branches have decided
needs regulating. As the autonomy cloak spreads, the quantity of
such otherwise illegal behavior, and the harm it causes, will
presumably increase. And as the scope of autonomy moves farther
away from the special activities that legitimate the autonomy claim,
tolerance of those harms becomes increasingly difficult to justify.
Moreover, assertions of autonomy may be likely to cloak
economically self-interested behavior as they are to protect
ideological purity. Because institutional autonomy claims will
provide this cloak for behavior that is self-interested and otherwise
unlawful behavior, their availability will create incentives for
organizations to hide a variety of non-religious or non-speech
activity behind the cloak. This, in turn, will tend to debase activities
which we have come to respect as constitutionally special, turning
them into easily accessible havens for economic and social
outlaws.453

It is painfully apparent that self-policing has not worked to
protect thousands of children from severe childhood sexual abuse.454
451. See supra Part II.A.2.
452. Vatican Press, Instruction on the Manner of Proceeding in Cases of Solicitation from
the Supreme and Holy Congregation of the Holy Office to All Patriarchs, Archbishops, Bishops and
Other Diocesan Ordinaries Even “Of the Oriental Rite” (1962), available at
http://www.survivorsfirst.org/downloads/Crimine.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2004).
453. Lupu, supra note 29, at 403.
454. REPORT ON THE CRISIS IN THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 306, at 92.
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The church autonomy theory being proposed in briefs authored by
Catholic Church lawyers across the United States argues in favor of
letting the Church handle its problems internally, without legal or
judicial involvement, regardless of the harm that has or will result
from the Church’s actions.455 Other churches have not voluntarily
come forward regarding abuse until they were haled into court.456
Indeed, but for the law, the abuse may have stayed out of the
public’s awareness forever. Quite similar reasoning is present in
papers presented at this conference.457 The no-harm principle,
however, drives to an opposite conclusion.
If all churches were internally and naturally inclined always to
take into account and to act for the public good in the oversight of
clergy actions taken with respect to children or disabled adults, a
church autonomy doctrine might be consistent with the public
good. The facts of this era prove without question that the public
good cannot be entrusted to private ordering, even when the private
entity is a religious institution. The public good was not a driving
factor in the handling of clergy abuse within the Catholic Church
over decades, to say the least. Rather than employing the “moral use
of its freedom in the promotion of the common good,” the Church
Too many [B]ishops[’] . . . responses were characterized by moral laxity, excessive
leniency, insensitivity, secrecy, and neglect. Aspects of the failure to respond
properly to sexual abuse of minors by priests included: (i) inadequately dealing with
victims of clergy sexual abuse, both pastorally and legally; (ii) allowing offending
priests to remain in positions of risk; (iii) transferring offending priests to new
parishes or other dioceses without informing others of their histories; (iv) failing to
report instances of criminal conduct by priests to secular law enforcement
authorities, whether such a report was required by law or not; and (v) declining to
take steps to laicize priests who clearly had violated canon law.
Id.
455. The Catholic Church has resisted releasing its files under subpoena in many
jurisdictions, including Boston, Los Angeles, and Philadelphia. In Boston, Judge Constance
Sweeney rejected the privilege claims, including arguments made not to release documents to
the public, lamenting “the increasingly dreary attempts of the [Roman Catholic Archbishop]
to slow or limit disclosure of discovery.” Walter V. Robinson, Judge Finds Records, Law at
Odds, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 26, 2002, at A1; see also William Lobdell and Larry B. Stammer,
Mahony Criticized by National Review Panel, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2004, at A1 (quoting the
National Review Panel, which said “the [Los Angeles] archdiocese engaged in a very public
spat with law enforcement agencies who questioned his level of cooperation in the criminal
investigation”).
456. See, e.g., Jury Awards $37M in Sex Abuse by Texas Minister, supra note 328.
457. Brady, supra note 11; Dane, supra note 70; Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 35.

1207

2HAM-FIN

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

12/1/2004 7:29 PM

[2004

has concentrated solely, almost narcissistically, on its power and
public reputation.458
Despite clear knowledge of widespread pedophilia and
ephebophilia459 within the Church over the course of decades,460
cardinals and bishops worldwide hid the sexual abuse of minors from
prosecutors, parents, and professionals.461 As a result, the hierarchy
of the Church knowingly and negligently put children at risk of
sexual abuse by repeat offenders. Given that most pedophiles abuse a
series of children, not just one,462 the repeated opportunities made
available with each new parish virtually guaranteed the large number
of victims that resulted. The Church’s own numbers, which cannot
reflect the many victims who have yet to report their childhood
sexual abuse, indicate that at least 10,667 children suffered
childhood sexual abuse at the hands of 4,392 members of the clergy
within the Church between 1950 and 2002.463 Rather than reporting
this criminal activity to the authorities, the Church systematically
covered up the criminal behavior and thereby created further
opportunities for pedophile priests to access children.
For church autonomy to work in a society, the churches would
have to take it upon themselves to ensure that their actions served

458. Carmella, supra note 9, at 1033; REPORT ON THE CRISIS IN THE CATHOLIC
CHURCH, supra note 306, at 100–12.
459. Ephebophilia is the psychological term for the attraction of adults to adolescents. It
is derived from the root “ephebe,” which means “a young man.” WEBSTER’S NEW
ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY 610 (2002).
460. Sipe, supra note 326.
461. REPORT ON THE CRISIS IN THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 306; see also Sipe,
supra note 326.
462. “Pedophiles molest four times the number of children than do non-pedophile
molesters. On average, a pedophile molests 11.7 children compared to a non-pedophile
molester, who molests, on average, 2.9 children.” GENE G. ABEL & NORA HARLOW, THE
ABEL AND HARLOW CHILD MOLESTATION PREVENTION STUDY 3 (2002), available at
http://www.stopchildmolestation.org/pages/study3.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2004). One
Catholic psychologist, Thomas Plante, expected an average of eight victims per clergy
perpetrator and was surprised that the report’s average was only three. Clergy Abuse Report
Cites ‘Homo-Erotic Culture,’ S.F. CHRON., Feb. 28, 2004, at A2.
463. JOHN JAY COLLEGE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 336, at viii–ix. Victims of
childhood sexual abuse report their abuse between five and thirty-five percent of the time,
which means that the Report’s numbers probably should be multiplied by three to twenty
times. Sociologist and Catholic priest, Andrew Greeley, predicted that there are probably
100,000 clergy abuse victims in the United States. Michael Paulson, Abuse Study Says 4% of
Priests in US Accused, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 17, 2004, at A1.
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the public good, or at least did not harm it. In the clergy abuse
context, the Church would have needed a foolproof plan to get
pedophile priests away from children and to find the most effective
ways of treating the problems of the children who were molested.
Neither the public good nor the best interest of children was an
overriding concern of the Church; rather, perpetuation of the
institution, avoidance of public scandal, and preservation of power
were far more potent motivators. One commentator characterizes
the problem as follows:
Where was the deficiency? In each diocese, the bishop enjoyed
virtually unlimited discretionary power without serious checks and
balances. The life and employment of every priest depended on
him, every complaint converged on him, and all decisions
originated from him. He was immune from any control from
within his jurisdiction . . . . In the diocese, the divine power of the
bishop has been exaggerated to the point that protection from
human frailties has been omitted or neglected.464

In the review of clergy sexual abuse written by the Church’s own
lay review board, the response to victims from too many bishops was
“characterized by moral laxity, excessive leniency, insensitivity,
secrecy, and neglect.”465 The result has been shocking; in effect, the
Church was abetting, if not condoning, thousands of child rapes. It
is the largest child abuse scandal in United States history.466 And the
464. Ladislas Orsy, Bishops’ Norms: Commentary and Evaluation, 44 B.C. L. REV. 999,
1025 (2003).
465. REPORT ON THE CRISIS IN THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 306, at 92. The
report also notes that “Church leaders . . . were altogether too easy on their fellow clergy and
too willing to take the easy way out . . . . All of the presumptions weighed in favor of the
accused priest . . . . This tilt is attributable in part to ‘clericalism’ . . . .” Id. at 93; see also Scott
Appleby, The Church at Risk: Remarks to the USCCB (June 13, 2002), available at
http://www.usccb.org/bishops/appleby.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2004) (noting that all
Catholics agree that the cause of the scandal is “a betrayal of fidelity enabled by the arrogance
that comes with unchecked power”); JASON BERRY, LEAD US NOT INTO TEMPTATION:
CATHOLIC PRIESTS AND THE SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN (2000); BERRY & RENNER, supra
note 447; A.W. RICHARD SIPE, CELIBACY IN CRISIS: A SECRET WORLD REVISITED (2003);
A.W. RICHARD SIPE, A SECRET WORLD: SEXUALITY AND THE SEARCH FOR CELIBACY (1990);
A.W. RICHARD SIPE, SEX, PRIESTS, AND POWER: ANATOMY OF A CRISIS (1995).
466. It is an extreme understatement to state that other institutional child abuse scandals
pale in comparison. See, e.g., Nancy Hass, Margaret Kelly Michaels Wants Her Innocence Back,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1995, at 37 (describing a day care sexual abuse scandal in Maplewood,
New Jersey, where a worker was charged with molesting twenty children); Lynn Sweet, On a
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resulting harm to the public good is enormous. “The practice of
reassigning abusive priests implicated public order in all three of its
dimensions: it violated the rights of others, the public peace, and the
public morality.”467
It is difficult enough to concentrate elected representatives’ focus
on the common good, even though the system is geared to move
their attention in that direction and even though that is their
assigned obligation in the constitutional order. Relying on private
institutions to act only in the interest of the public good is an
exercise in futility. There are no checks in the system that can
transform private entities into public-regarding entities. They are
neither positioned to have all that is necessary to calculate the public
good nor do they operate from a horizon that necessarily includes all
classes of citizens.468 In addition, they typically operate within a
world view that measures harm from a self-interested perspective
and, therefore, are likely to underestimate the actual quantum of
harm to others.469

Quest for Vindication, CHI. SUN-TIMES, June 6, 1999, at 30 (describing a day care sexual
abuse case in Chicago in which a worker was acquitted of molesting four girls); see also Taylor
v. Litteer, No. 94-78-SD, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15803 (D.N.H. Oct. 24, 1994) (describing
one of several Boy Scout sex abuse cases involving a single child’s allegations of abuse);
MARTIN J. COSTELLO, HATING THE SIN, LOVING THE SINNER: THE MINNEAPOLIS
CHILDREN’S THEATRE COMPANY ADOLESCENT SEXUAL ABUSE PROSECUTIONS 110–12
(1991) (analyzing child abuse prosecutions of staff at a youth theatre company in 1984);
Barbara Baird, Youth Groups Fear Specter of Sexual Abuse, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1988, § 2, at 4
(describing abuse in the Little League and Big Brothers); Tom Coakley, Brockton Preschool
Withdraws State Appeal; License Revocation Stands in Sexual Abuse Case, BOSTON GLOBE,
Sept. 29, 1989, Metro-17 (describing abuse in a Massachusetts preschool); Steve Crane,
Woman Maintains Innocence in Preschoolers’ Abuse Case, WASH. TIMES, July 26, 1989, at B1
(describing abuse in a Maryland preschool); Seth Mydans, Child Abuse: Some Prosecutions Win,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1990, at A12 (describing the notorious McMartin Preschool sexual abuse
scandal in Manhattan Beach, California, where owners were charged with seventy-five counts
relating to child molestation; Dade County day care owners convicted in Florida); Eileen
Ogintz, Jordan Sex Case Is Over; Trauma Isn’t, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 15, 1985, at C6 (describing
child abuse sex ring in Jordan, Minnesota).
467. Carmella, supra note 9, at 1049.
468. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
469. See John McElhenny, Monsignor Says Harm of Abuse Wasn’t Recognized, BOSTON
GLOBE, Feb. 23, 2004, at A1 (reporting the comments of Monsignor Richard S. Sniezyk,
interim leader of the Springfield Diocese, during an interview in which he said that the scandal
that has rocked the Catholic Church stems from a belief among some priests during the 1960s,
1970s, and 1980s that sex with young men was acceptable).
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While the Church has a constitutional right to complete control
over its belief system, including those beliefs that dictate clergy
placement, it is not immunized thereby for the actions it takes that
result in harm to third parties. For example, and taking an example
distinct from childhood sexual abuse, a church may believe in
purifying the bodies of babies by not feeding them.470 A court may
not mandate that the church alter its beliefs, or require admission
into the church of those who disagree with those beliefs, no matter
how heinous.471 The church’s beliefs are autonomous and may
revolve in a completely autopoietic universe for eternity, untouchable
by state control. When the group translates its beliefs into action,
however, and children are near death or dying, the state has an
obligation to interfere with the group by applying the laws against
child neglect, endangerment, and murder, regardless of religious
motivation.472 When injurious conduct is present, the entity’s
religious beliefs, if invoked to forestall the law, are a smoke screen to
accountability. Beliefs do not immunize actions,473 and thus the
state—through legislation and judicial enforcement—has the power
to redress the harm caused by the religious entity even though the
conduct was religiously motivated.
In the clergy abuse cases, the Church does not profess a belief in
making children available to pedophiles, but it has expressed a belief
in priest “formation,” which entails guidance of priests by their
religious superiors. That belief is sacrosanct, and no legitimate
government can force the Church to alter the belief. But where the
Church renders third-party harm through its conduct, that conduct
is fair game for criminal, tort, and regulatory law.
The sole question before the courts in the third-party harm cases
is whether the religious group or individual took illegal action that
caused harm and whether the law is generally applicable and neutral
toward all who took similar actions. If the law was neutral, the action
was taken, and the proscribed harm ensued, the group or individual
is culpable and liable under the law. For example, where a church
470. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cottam, 616 A.2d 988, 993 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
471. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
472. See, e.g., Hermanson v. State, 604 So. 2d 775, 775–76 (Fla. 1992); Nicholson v.
State, 600 So. 2d 1101, 1102–03 (Fla. 1992).
473. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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moves a pedophile from one parish to another, and new victims are
created with each move, the church is accountable under the
governing law, which may include prohibitions against reckless
endangerment, negligent supervision, conspiracy to child abuse,
aiding and abetting child abuse, accessory to child abuse, a panoply
of tort laws, and regulations involving the operation of a school.474 It
is the price for living in a democratic society.
Some would argue that the no-harm rule is detrimental to
“minority” religions, because they will be unlikely to obtain
exemptions from generally applicable, neutral laws. Thus, they would
raise the specter of mainstream religions obtaining numerous
exemptions from the law, while minority religions cannot. The
concern deserves some response, because it is based on multiple
misunderstandings regarding the United States and its republican
form of government.
Minority religions are not necessarily or even usually consigned
to a life of belief divorced from action under a republican form of
government. First, the reference to “minority” religions is somewhat
misleading. In the United States, there is no majority religion.
Protestantism, taken as a whole, which would encompass a vast
number of faiths, is a dwindling majority and will not be the majority
religion in the very near future.475
Second, it is a fact that minority religions have done quite well in
obtaining exemptions in the legislatures, which would seem to
weaken the argument significantly.476 The often-stated concern that
the courts are the better institution to secure religious liberty
because they are better than legislatures at protecting minorities has
not been proven as an empirical matter. During Prohibition, which
474. See, e.g., Smith v. O’Connell, 986 F. Supp. 73 (D.R.I. 1997) (negligent
supervision); Mark K. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 73 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1998) (negligent supervision, retention, and fraud and conspiracy to suppress facts); Gagne v.
O’Donoghue, No. CA 941158 1996 WL 1185145 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 26, 1996)
(negligent hiring and supervision, breach of fiduciary duty, and clergy malpractice); Kenneth
R. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 229 A.D.2d 159 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (negligent
hiring, supervision, and retention); Jones by Jones v. Trane, 591 N.Y.S.2d 927 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1992) (breach of trust, outrageous conduct, and negligent hiring); Hutchison ex rel.
Hutchison v. Luddy, 742 A.2d 1052 (Pa. 1999) (negligent hiring, supervision, and retention);
C.J.C. v. Corp. of Catholic Bishop of Yakima, 985 P.2d 262 (Wash. 1999) (negligence).
475. See Peter Smith, Protestants Are Close to Losing Majority Status, LOUISVILLE
COURIER-JOURNAL, July 21, 2004, at 1A.
476. See generally HAMILTON, supra note 3.
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was a time when anticlericalism was strong in the United States,
Congress provided an exemption to the Catholic Church for the use
of sacramental wine.477 In more recent years, orthodox Jews obtained
a right to wear yarmulkes in the military after the courts declined to
create an exemption from the military’s uniform rules.478 Before and
after the Supreme Court declined to craft an exemption for Native
American Church members to use the prohibited drug peyote, many
states and the federal government created such exemptions.479 In all
three of these instances, small or disfavored religious entities were
able to obtain the legislative exemption they sought.
Third, the republican form of government is not a system
whereby majorities of the people govern. Rather, a majority of the
people choose their rulers, but those rulers are then set free from the
majority to rule in the public good.480 Political scientists moreover
now accept as fact that minorities with a coherent message fare better
in the legislative process than unorganized majorities.481
Fourth, the argument seems to be that small religions will be
subject to covert discrimination. The religion clauses discourage
legislatures from acting on such motives. Any law specifically singling
out a particular religious organization for detrimental treatment is
unconstitutional.482 Where the legislature has decided that particular
477. See National Prohibition Act of 1919, ch. 85, tit. II, § 3, 41 Stat. 305, 308–09
(1919).
478. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 509–10 (1986) (holding that a government
prohibition on wearing a yarmulke did not violate the Free Exercise clause because the military
evenhandedly regulated its interest in uniform and discipline). Congress responded by
amending the regulations. See 10 U.S.C. § 774 (2000).
479. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990). After the decision in Smith,
Oregon and the federal government joined other states and created legislative exemptions for
the use of peyote. See Louis Fisher, Indian Religious Freedom: To Litigate or Legislate?, 26 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 1, 32–36 (2001).
480. See generally Hamilton, Direct Democracy, supra note 1; Marci A. Hamilton,
Discussion and Decisions: A Proposal to Replace the Myth of Self-Rule With an Attorneyship Model
of Representation, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 477 (1994); Hamilton, Why the People Do Not Rule,
supra note 1.
481. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 144 (2d ed. 1971); see
also JEFFREY M. BERRY, THE NEW LIBERALISM: THE RISING POWER OF CITIZEN GROUPS 154
(1999) (“The dominant scholarly explanation of interest group mobilization—then and now—
is Mancur Olson’s selective incentive theory of collective action.”).
482. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533
(1993).
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actions are unacceptable, because they generate certain harm, and
issued a blanket prohibition on the action, there is some insurance
that the legislature has not acted out of discriminatory motives. The
willingness to burden all actors with the law means that the
legislature is concerned about the harm, not the identity of the actor.
Even then, perhaps there is a risk that some small, politically
powerless religions that are incapable of putting together a coherent
message for the legislature and incapable of enlisting the support of
mainstream religions may well have problems obtaining exemptions.
The system does not generate perfect results, no matter how
exemptions are handled. In the end, the Smith Court weighed the
alternatives in this scenario as follows:
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political
process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices
that are not widely engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence
of democratic government must be preferred to a system in which
each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the
social importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious
beliefs.483

The legislature is the entity that is institutionally competent to
hear the concerns of burdened religious entities and to make the
determination whether relieving them of obligations to a particular
law is consistent with the public good. Thus, the route for those
individuals and institutions that find their religious conduct at odds
with the prevailing law lies beyond the courts. The Supreme Court
in Smith made it clear that religious entities may ask for legislative
exemptions narrowly tailored to their religious practices.484 If a
religious entity can persuade a legislature that exempting it from the
483. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
484. Id.; see also Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 330 (1987)
(upholding an exemption from Title VII for the secular, nonprofit activities of a religious
organization). It is, however, interesting to note that for Justice Brennan, the religious nature
of the organization was not important in this case:
I write separately to emphasize that my concurrence in the judgment rests on the
fact that these cases involve a challenge to the application of § 702’s categorical
exemption to the activities of a nonprofit organization. I believe that the particular
character of nonprofit activity makes inappropriate a case-by-case determination
whether its nature is religious or secular.
Id. at 340 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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law will not harm the public good, then an exemption is consistent
with ordered democracy.485 If not, then the church is rightly
prevented from doing the harm proscribed by the legislature.
An expansive church autonomy doctrine, in contrast, would turn
the democratic process on its head. If churches were autonomous,
courts would be jurisdictionally barred from examining any action
that is religiously motivated, because they would have to address
some ecclesiastical beliefs. In effect, the courts would have to abstain
from applying the law to the religious entity or individual. Even a
weaker version, wherein the courts weighed the church’s interest in
autonomy against the needs of the society, undermines the search for
the larger public good because the courts’ weighing is inevitably
limited by the case and controversy requirement, which forbids the
court from investigating the issues beyond the bounds of the parties’
filings.
Courts are institutionally incompetent to determine what is in
fact in the public’s interest. The church autonomy that would
remove courts from hearing legal disputes brought by third parties
against religious institutions in effect nullifies those laws. Thus, the
theory displaces the legislature’s judgment regarding the public
good. Moreover, where the courts would take jurisdiction, but
would weigh the public interest against the religious entity, as in the
486
Sherbert line of cases, they are especially incompetent. The courts
do not have the tools or the resources to investigate the larger public
good and therefore are in no position to determine whether an
exemption should be carved out of a particular law. The exemption
decision properly belongs to the body entrusted with ensuring the
public good—the legislature—which is situated through its many
contacts with the people and its access to wide-ranging, independent
investigation to determine how particular religious practices will
impact and therefore potentially harm citizens.

485. For further elaboration of this concept, see Hamilton, Direct Democracy, supra note 1.
486. Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989); Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind.
Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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When religious institutions demand autonomy from duly enacted
laws, they are asking to be set outside society, which is an
impossibility. Even more problematic, they are asking to be placed
beyond the rule that demands accountability for actions that harm
others.
VI. CONCLUSION
“Church autonomy” is no doctrine at all but rather a theory
fundamentally at odds with the Constitution, its history, and the rule
of law it institutes. An expansive church autonomy regime would
turn all religious entities into potential threats to fellow citizens and
inevitably cause the sort of interdenominational strife that this
country largely has avoided to date. The era of immunity for
religious institutions and individuals from laws that punish harm
inflicted upon others has long passed, with the demise of the benefit
of clergy, the ecclesiastical courts’ jurisdiction over crimes, sanctuary,
the decline in charitable immunity, and the inexorable rise of the noharm rule.
The no-harm rule, with its distinguished pedigree in John Locke,
Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, John Stuart Mill, H.L.A. Hart,
Joel Feinberg, utilitarian and deontological philosophy, and Catholic
and Protestant theology, ensures expansive liberty of conscience but
protects citizens from the harmful actions of all others, whether
religious or secular.
The no-harm doctrine is already deeply embedded in the
Supreme Court’s cases, in which the Court has repeatedly affirmed
both the absolute liberty of conscience and the principle of no harm.
The draw of the church autonomy theory among religious
institutions in this era is a throwback to long-rejected principles that
cannot coexist with the continual working out of the principle of the
rule of law in a republican democracy. The Catholic Church’s clergy
abuse era is strong testimony to the cost to society of religious
institutions that seek to operate in a secret sphere, where unchecked,
they may harm untold numbers and forestall the administration of
justice. It is no longer an open question whether religious
institutions should be governed by the laws that govern everyone
else, if it ever was; it is a proven necessity.
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